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Introduction
Empirical asset pricing faces a number of challenges when predictions of theoretical models
fail to pass empirical tests, thus creating puzzles. Attempts to explain stylized facts drive
research efforts in asset pricing, portfolio choice theory, and behavioral finance. Classical
asset pricing theory relates prices of financial assets to the stochastic discount factor.
Therefore, understanding the forces that determine the structure of stochastic discount
factors and the investor’s rewards for risk taking is instrumental in asset pricing and thus
can help resolve empirical controversies.
The aim of my dissertation is to discover new systematic risk factors in various areas of
research: specifically, optimal contract theory, hedge fund research, and convertible bond
pricing. The first two chapters are devoted to ambiguity aversion, a concept that postu-
lates aversion not only to the uncertain realization of events (known unknowns) but also
to the unknown probability measures associated with uncertain external events (unknown
unknowns). Following the literature on robust optimization, we construct the ambiguity-
averse preferences and the Max-Min utility optimization problem that yields the optimal
asset allocation solution for an ambiguity-averse agent. In the first chapter, we demon-
strate the implications of the manager’s ambiguity aversion for optimal compensation con-
tracts. In the second chapter, we apply an empirically constructed ambiguity factor to
hedge fund portfolio allocation. The third chapter examines the systematic effect of hedge
fund demand on convertible bond pricing and proposes a price pressure risk factor for the
convertible bond market.
The first chapter of the dissertation examines the optimal executive compensation pol-
icy when a manager is ambiguity-averse. Standard principal-agent models of optimal con-
tract design poorly explain existing practices of executive compensation, in particular the
prevalence of stock-based compensation. This paper addresses this inadequacy by mod-
eling the optimal contract for an ambiguity-averse manager in a continuous-time moral
hazard model. The model predicts that the ambiguity-averse manager undertakes less
risky projects and exerts lower effort than the risk-averse manager. The optimal contract
for the ambiguity-averse manager therefore contains a larger fraction of the firm’s equity to
mitigate ambiguity aversion and to provide stronger incentives. The paper compares com-
pensation plans consisting of stocks or stock options. We evaluate equity-based compensa-
tion from the manager’s point of view (subjective evaluation) and from the shareholder’s
point of view (objective evaluation). The findings in the paper reveal that the manager’s
ambiguity aversion decreases the subjective value of equity-based compensation and widens
the gap between the subjective value and the objective (or market) value. Numerical sim-
ulations support the conclusion that stock option holdings in the optimal contract have
advantages over stocks in terms of incentive costs to shareholders and additional risk-taking
incentives.
The second chapter presents a hedge fund portfolio choice model for an investor facing
ambiguity. The investor faces both idiosyncratic hedge fund ambiguity and aggregate mar-
ket (stock market or macroeconomic) ambiguity. The optimal hedge fund asset allocation
model reveals that firstly an investor tends to reduce her allocation to risky assets under
ambiguity, hedge funds or stocks alike, and secondly only systematic ambiguity is priced
in equilibrium. Moreover, the more directional (strongly correlated with the market) the
hedge fund strategy is, the lower the optimal allocation to hedge funds by an investor who
is sensitive to ambiguity. The theoretical model derives the equilibrium two-factor capi-
tal asset pricing model under ambiguity (ACAPM) that demonstrates how the ambiguity
factor is priced in financial markets. It contributes to the alpha versus alternative beta
debate by postulating the hypothesis that expected hedge fund returns embed a risk pre-
mium for systematic ambiguity exposure. In the empirical section, we measure ambiguity
as the cross-sectional dispersion in survey-based macroeconomic forecasts for growth in the
Industrial Production Index and in stock market forecasts for S&P 500 Index returns, and
we construct the systematic ambiguity factors from the universe of S&P 500 stocks. We
estimate ambiguity betas for long/short equity hedge fund strategies and document sig-
nificant ambiguity exposures, especially for directional long/short equity hedge funds. We
compare the out-of-sample performance of portfolios constructed according to the hedge
fund alphas’ ranking with and without systematic ambiguity exposures and find that the
former outperform the latter.
The third chapter addresses an anomaly in convertible bond underpricing by investi-
gating the role of convertible arbitrage hedge funds as liquidity providers to the convertible
bond market. Prices of convertible bonds are sensitive to unexpected demand shocks gen-
erated by convertible arbitrage hedge funds. This paper investigates whether price pressure
created by innovations in hedge fund demand can account for the systematic mispricing of
convertible bonds. We test the hypothesis that the mispricing of convertible bonds disap-
pears after taking into account price-pressure risk. We empirically construct the risk factor
associated with hedge fund price pressure and document the non-negligible risk premium
embedded in convertible bond returns. Moreover, we demonstrate that the contempo-
raneous returns of convertible bond mutual funds have significant negative exposure to
the price-pressure factor. The price-pressure factor provides an incremental improvement
over conventional equity and bond factors in explaining returns of convertible bond mu-
tual funds. Price-pressure risk is amplified during financial crises, creating the risk of a
convertible bond sell-off.
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Chapter 1
Equity-Based Compensation in the
Presence of Ambiguity Aversion
Abstract
Standard principal-agent models of optimal contract design poorly explain existing prac-
tices of executive compensation, in particular the prevalence of stock-based compensation.
This paper addresses this inadequacy by analyzing the optimal contract for an ambiguity-
averse manager in a continuous-time moral hazard model. We study the impact of am-
biguity aversion on the optimal structure of managerial compensation plans. The model
predicts that an ambiguity-averse manager undertakes less risky projects and exerts lower
effort than a risk-averse manager. The optimal contract for the ambiguity-averse man-
ager therefore contains a larger fraction of the firm’s equity to mitigate ambiguity aversion
and to provide stronger incentives. The paper compares compensation plans consisting of
stocks or stock options. The findings of the paper reveal that stock option holdings in the
optimal contract have advantages over stocks in terms of incentive costs to shareholders
and additional risk-taking incentives.
JEL codes: D81, G35
Keywords: Ambiguity Aversion, Contract Theory, Executive Stock Options
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1.1 Introduction
Over the last few years, a major debate regarding the optimality of stock options in exec-
utive compensation plans has taken place. The options were granted not only to align the
interests of managers and shareholders but also, in contrast to linear stock pay, to provide
risk-taking incentives. Executive stock option holdings started growing in the 1980s in the
United States and became widespread worldwide in the 1990s. As Murphy (1999) reports,
39% of CEO compensation in S&P 500 firms was granted in the form of stock options in
1996, growing to 47% in 1999. These recent trends in compensation patterns have not
been successfully predicted by standard principal-agent models of optimal contract design.
Two explanations exist for this discrepancy: either the observed contracts are not
optimal or the models are wrong. To support the former hypothesis, Bebchuk and Fried
(2004) suggest that the existing compensation structure mainly reflects rent-seeking and
thus stays far from being an optimal contract. To support the latter explanation, Dittmann
and Maug (2007) argue that the standard principal-agent model used in the compensation
literature predicts almost no stock option holding, which contradicts the empirical evidence.
An excessive CEO payout, especially in the form of stock options, can be caused by a lower
value of executive stock options relative to the market option value due to an undiversified
home-biased managerial portfolio and a suboptimal exercise policy. Moreover, large grants
of deeply out-of-the-money options make the compensation less valuable at the date of
grant.
This paper proposes an alternative explanation for the prevalence of equity-based ex-
ecutive compensation. We introduce an ambiguity-averse manager who takes into account
possible model misspecification in her decision-making process. The paper addresses the
importance of the manager’s ambiguity aversion in her evaluation of her stock option com-
pensation. The ambiguity-averse manager has lower risk-taking incentives as she is averse
to both risk and ambiguity. Hence the optimal compensation contract for ambiguity-averse
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executives should contain stronger risk-taking incentives, mitigating ambiguity aversion.
As a result, the optimal contract structure should favor equity-based compensation, and
in particular, larger stock option holdings.
A manager is generally exposed to several sources of ambiguity. First, a CEO might
be averse to the idiosyncratic source of ambiguity because she has imperfect control of the
firm’s performance as measured by cash flow dynamics. Second, there exists ambiguity
about the market risk and systematic factors that explain the stock price in a multifactor
asset-pricing model. Moreover, ambiguity is also caused by the model risk reflected in the
uncertainty in the set of systematic factors of the asset-pricing model. We show in this
paper that the manager’s ambiguity aversion contributes to the abnormal returns on the
firm’s stock.
This paper offers a theoretical model of the optimal contract for an ambiguity-averse
manager in the principal-agent framework. The manager has control over the underlying
stock price process via her choice of idiosyncratic volatility and effort. From this perspec-
tive, the specification of control variables of managers is similar to the case in Cadenillas
et al. (2004). Effort is costly as in a standard moral hazard model, but there is no disu-
tility in choosing volatility. The choice of volatility reflects the managerial choice of risky
projects. The manager’s problem is a version of Merton’s consumption and investment
choice problem solved by robust optimization techniques. However, the investment choice
is constrained by the compensation contract. The constraint determining the firm’s stock
loading in the managerial portfolio is endogenous and chosen by a principal. A shareholder
acts as a principal and maximizes the firm’s expected value by setting the firm’s equity
value in the compensation package. The compensation plan for the manager consists of
either the firm’s stock or stock options.
The paper solves the model for the optimal effort, risk choice, consumption, and eq-
uity compensation and studies the effect of ambiguity aversion on the optimal solution.
Furthermore, the paper calibrates the model parameters to provide a comparative statics
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analysis of the implicit optimal solutions. The ambiguity-averse agent has a higher overall
risk aversion, implying the choice of less risky projects. The key observation of the optimal
solution is that ambiguity aversion reduces the optimal risk choice and the optimal effort
of the manager. The ambiguity-averse manager therefore has lower risk-taking incentives
and lower incentives generally than a risk-averse manager. As a result, shareholders should
increase these incentives via higher volumes of stock-based compensation in order to miti-
gate the effect of ambiguity aversion. This effect is consistent with the results of Uppal and
Wang (2003) who explain the home bias in an investor’s portfolio by ambiguity aversion.
Ambiguity aversion also reduces the subjective value of equity-based compensation
contracts. The subjective evaluation — the evaluation from the manager’s point of view
— is based upon work by Ingersoll (2006), who suggests that a manager evaluates the
firm’s stocks or stock options at lower values than the market does. Our paper finds
that ambiguity further decreases the subjective value of equity-based compensation for a
manager and widens the gap between the subjective value and the market value. This gap
is a deadweight loss for a company. Our paper compares evaluations of stocks and stock
options and concludes that both forms of compensation can deliver required incentives for
the ambiguity-averse manager. However, executive stock options are superior to stocks in
terms of incentive costs to shareholders and ability to provide risk-taking incentives.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly describes the rel-
evant literature on executive compensation and ambiguity aversion in finance, and outlines
how this paper stands in the literature. Section 1.3 describes the setup of the principal-
agent model of executive compensation contract and introduces the ambiguity-averse pref-
erences of the manager. Section 1.4 presents the optimal solution of the optimization
problem, the subjective evaluation of equity-based compensation, and numerical simula-
tions. Concluding remarks and future research avenues are provided in Section 1.5. The
appendices in Section 1.6 contain all proofs, derivations, and tables.
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1.2 Literature Review
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), in their seminal paper on continuous-time principal-agent
models, demonstrated the linearity of the optimal contract when both the agent and the
principal have exponential utilities. Sung (2005) has extended this pure moral hazard
model as well as his own earlier papers (Schattler and Sung (1993) and Sung (1995)) by
incorporating adverse selection into the model. This leads to constant values of optimal
controls and linearity of optimal contracts. His setting is characterized by a risk-neutral
principal and a risk-averse agent with exponential utility who can control the volatility as
well as the drift of the stochastic process for the company’s stock. As a solution method
he used dynamic programming and the martingale approach of stochastic control theory.
Carpenter (2000) also considered a dynamic model with the possibility for the agent to
choose volatility. However, the agent cannot affect the drift of the stock price process in
her framework. Ou-Yang (2003) solves the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation in
the model where an agent can affect both the drift and the diffusion rate simultaneously.
This feature allows application of this principal-agent setting to delegated portfolio man-
agement problems. Cadenillas et al. (2004) use a stochastic optimization technique and
the martingale approach in order to derive the optimal leverage and compensation level
chosen by the company and the optimal value for effort and volatility, which are controlled
by a manager. This setting can be used to assess the incentive effect of executive stock op-
tions. Our paper considers a similar linear specification for effort and volatility of the drift
dynamics of the stochastic process describing the company’s stock price process; however,
we employ the HJB method to obtain the optimal solution.
Both stocks and options have an incentive purpose in the compensation contracts but
their effect is quite different. Murphy (1999) and Core et al. (2003) argue that convex pay-
outs such as stock options mitigate the effect of executive risk aversion by giving managers
incentives to take riskier projects. Moreover, firms with greater growth opportunities pro-
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vide higher risk-taking incentives and should therefore offer compensation packages with
options. There are also additional features of executive stock options that have been noted
in the literature: the value of stock options decreases with the level of dividends, thus pro-
ducing incentives to reduce dividend payments after granting options to executives; also,
as Murphy (1999) reported, executive stock options are likely to favor share repurchases.
Carpenter (2000) investigates the relationship between risk preferences and option com-
pensation by modeling the optimal dynamic investment policy for a manager paid with
options on the firm’s stock. She found that the optimal compensation policy should con-
tain either deep in- or out-of-the-money options, but the impact of options on risk-taking
behavior is not linear. The risk aversion of the manager prevents him from preferring high
volatility of the stock price and forces him to choose volatility depending on the asset
value. When the asset value is small or options are deep out of the money, it is optimal to
increase asset volatility. However, if the asset value becomes large or options are near the
money, the manager lowers the risk. Moreover, Carpenter (2000) demonstrates situations
when vesting restrictions on executive options motivate the manager to set the volatil-
ity of stock prices lower than in the case of tradable options without vesting restrictions.
Ross (2004) also argues that giving options to managers will not necessarily stimulate
risk-taking behavior, and the incentive effect will depend on risk aversion. Lambert and
Larcker (2004) show that the optimal contract should contain out-of-the-money options,
and thus the choice of the optimal strike price is important for the incentive effect. Ju
et al. (2014) predict that call options may induce suboptimal risk choice for a risk-averse
manager. Therefore, the authors propose including lookback call options to ensure ex-post
risk-taking incentives and put option-type features to ensure ex-ante risk-taking incentives
in managerial contracts. Lookback call options mitigate the practice of option repricing.
Put options implicitly represent existing severance packages in the compensation contracts.
Another important issue is the manager’s evaluation of stock-based compensation,
which tends to be lower than the market value or the objective value for shareholders
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because of the absence of diversification due to vesting restrictions, a suboptimal exercise
policy of executive stock options, and the manager’s risk aversion. Ingersoll (2006) inves-
tigates the subjective evaluation of an executive stock option in details. Ingersoll (2006)
prices the executive options using a risk-neutral probability that corresponds to the con-
strained optimization problem of a manager. The more risk averse the agent or the stronger
the restrictions in place, the smaller the subjective value. The present paper also shows
benefits from using restricted stock that are consistent with recent empirical findings. The
cost of executive stock options to the shareholder refers to the objective value, which is
higher than the subjective value but lower than the market Black-Scholes price. Carpenter
(1998) calculates the value of executive stock options as an American option with a vesting
restriction and a random exogenous exercise. Lambert et al. (1991) compute the certainty
equivalent for the pricing of executive options from a manager’s perspective.
Ellsberg’s paradox (1961) illustrates the difference in behavior of economic agents un-
der risk and ambiguity and thus emphasizes the importance for economic decision making
of accounting for ambiguity. Ambiguity-averse preferences are based on the robust opti-
mization problem with a penalty entropy term. An ambiguity-averse agent minimizes the
difference measured by relative entropy between her expected utilities under a reference
model and an alternative model subject to a penalty for deviation. In a second step, the
agent maximizes her utility function with respect to the control variables. There are two
settings of such a Max-Min optimization problem. The first one uses local relative entropy
and constrained optimization. This setting corresponds to the axiomatic recursive multi-
ple prior utility setting based on Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) preferences over a set of
multiple prior distributions, further developed by Epstein and Schneider (2003) in discrete
time and by Anderson et al. (2003) in continuous time. The second setting is characterized
by adding the global relative entropy as a penalty term for deviations into the Max-Min
optimization. Maccheroni et al. (2006) build an axiomatic foundation for ambiguity-averse
preferences consistent with economic theory for deviations expressed by global relative en-
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tropy. A thorough discussion of two different ambiguity-averse settings appears in Trojani
and Vanini (2004).
Robust decision making has been widely used in the asset-pricing literature to tackle
a variety of puzzles. An important result of observational equivalence in asset pricing was
obtained by Maenhout (2004), Uppal and Wang (2003), Anderson et al. (2003), and origi-
nally by Duffie and Epstein (1992) for solving a Merton’s-type robust portfolio optimization
problem. This finding states that taking into account ambiguity aversion increases initial
risk aversion on the part of the decision maker. This increase would be one possible ex-
planation of the equity premium puzzle. Dow and Werlang (1992) used ambiguity-averse
preferences to generate the limited equity market participation effect in optimal portfo-
lio choice. Another interesting implication of robustness in asset pricing is its ability to
tackle the home-bias puzzle in a manager’s portfolio as demonstrated by Uppal and Wang
(2003). Trojani and Vanini (2004) analyze ambiguity-averse preferences in intertemporal
heterogeneous agent economies.
1.3 The Model
This section describes the model of the optimal compensation contract, where the ambiguity-
averse manager solves her consumption and investment allocation problem and the share-
holder decides upon the manager’s compensation plan.
1.3.1 Assets in the Economy
The manager allocates her wealth between risky assets and risk-free bonds. Risky assets
are represented by the market index (market portfolio) Mt and the firm’s stock St. The
company’s stock is also a part of the market index. Without any constraints, the man-
ager would invest a fraction of her wealth θM only in the market portfolio to eliminate
idiosyncratic risk. However, the compensation contract requires the manager to hold a
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proportion of her wealth θ in the firm’s stock until the termination of her employment.
This fraction θ is measured in excess of the stock’s share in the market allocation θM . After
the termination of the contract, she is free to hold the market portfolio, and she solves
the standard portfolio and consumption choice problem as in Merton (1969). We do not
consider optimal portfolio choice after the termination of the manager’s employment.
The assets in the economy are described as follows:
• risk-free bond
dBt = rBtdt; (1.1)
• market index, which also includes the company’s stock:
dMt
Mt
= µMdt+ σMdZ
M
t ; (1.2)
• the firm’s stock
dSt
St
= µdt+ σ
√
1− ρ2dZSt + σρdZMt , (1.3)
where ρ is the correlation coefficient between firm and market index, E(dZSt dZMt ) = ρdt.
It is possible to choose any asset pricing model to explain the expected return of a
company’s stock. We consider the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) with a possibility
of abnormal returns α in order to emphasize the effect of managerial choice of firm-specific
risk on expected returns:
µ = r +
σρ
σM
(µM − r) + α. (1.4)
The coefficient α is a possible mispricing that is affected by managerial actions, and has
important implications for this paper. First, it contains the efforts of the manager because
the manager can affect the stock price via exerting higher effort u. Second, α contains
the manager’s choice of idiosyncratic volatility σ. The volatility σ indicates the choice of
a manager within a menu of risky projects with different levels of risk. The choice of σ
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affects both the expected returns and the firm-specific risk. We assume that α is a linear
function of effort u and firm-specific volatility σ:
α = ξu+ ησ, where ξ > 0, η > 0. (1.5)
The coefficient ξ represents the manager’s type. This interpretation was inspired by
Cadenillas et al. (2004). The higher ξ, the lower the effort required to achieve the equivalent
impact on stock returns. We call the coefficient ξ the effort multiplier.
The coefficient η can be considered as a proxy for an industry classification. We call the
coefficient η the growth prospects. High values of η imply a high-growth sector such as the
information technology sector, while low values of η imply characteristics of a low-growth
sector such as the utilities sector. In this interpretation, the coefficient η is a discrete
variable, which ex-ante corresponds to the particular volatility level.
The manager’s choice of effort and volatility is an indicator for shareholders to determine
whether the manager requires additional incentives to boost her effort level or risk-taking
incentives to motivate her to take on a riskier project. In order to achieve a certain
target for α, the manager can either work hard without being involved in more profitable
but riskier projects, choose a lower effort level and try to make higher returns in riskier
investments, or do both.
1.3.2 Introducing Ambiguity
Assume that the model or more precisely the probability law that characterizes the stochas-
tic dynamics of assets returns is not correctly specified. Let P be a probability measure for
the reference model. All deviations from the reference model are described by alternative
probability measures Qh. The aim of the agent optimization is to find the true model
specification from among appropriately specified alternatives Qh.
Let Qh be a set of probability measures absolutely continuous with respect to P and
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parameterized by an appropriately adapted process ht
1. Assume that the Radon-Nikodym
derivative of Qh with respect to P is the following:
dQh
dP = exp{−
∫ t
0
||hs||2
2
ds−
∫ t
0
hsdZs}, (1.6)
where Zt = (Z
S
t , Z
M
t ) is a vector of Brownian motions and ht = (h
S
t , h
M
t ) is a vector of
parameters related to the corresponding source of ambiguity. The agent faces ambiguity
with respect to both the idiosyncratic risk of the firm and the market risk. Under Girsanov’s
Theorem, there exists an adapted process ht such that Z
h
t = Zt+
∫ t
0
hsds is a Qh-Brownian
motion. The distorted dynamics of the market index are the following:
dMt
Mt
= (µM + σMh
M
t )dt+ σMdZ
M
t , (1.7)
and those of the firm’s stock are
dSt
St
= (µ+ σ(ρhMt +
√
1− ρ2hSt ))dt+ σ(ρdZMt +
√
1− ρ2dZSt ). (1.8)
The distortion affects the expected returns of the assets, but the volatilities remain un-
changed under the alternative probability measures.
The distortion can be formally considered as a part of the mispricing term α. The
distorted mispricing term αh is given by the following equation:
αh = ξu+ ησ + σ(ρhMt +
√
1− ρ2hSt ). (1.9)
The ambiguity distortion in the mispricing term is caused by the presence of model risk,
namely use of the wrong asset-pricing model and mistakes in factor identifications as well
as the imperfect influence of the manager on performance.
1In general, h = h(St, t) but we consider only time-dependence for the sake of computational simplicity.
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Later we will demonstrate that the ambiguity parameters hM and hS are negative, and
thus concern about ambiguity reduces α and expected stock returns. Moreover, ambiguity
diminishes the growth prospects from η to η + (ρhMt +
√
1− ρ2hSt ). Ambiguity forces the
manager to avoid risky projects. Hence the ambiguity-averse manager is likely to require
stronger risk-taking incentives.
1.3.3 The Manager’s Problem
The manager solves her consumption-investment constrained optimization problem and
also chooses the optimal levels of effort and volatility. Effort u is costly, and its disutility
can be expressed by any convex function. For the sake of computational simplicity, we
assume a quadratic cost of effort. The marginal benefit of effort is higher for the agent
of a higher type ξ. The optimization problem for the standard risk-averse agent is the
following:
max
u,σ
max
θM ,Ct
E
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
C1−γt
1− γ −
u2
2
)
dt, (1.10)
where θM is the fraction of wealth invested in the market index, Ct is the manager’s
instantaneous consumption, r is the risk-free discount rate, u is the choice of effort, and σ
is the choice of firm-specific volatility. For computational simplicity, we assume an infinite
investment horizon2 and a zero bequest condition. The instantaneous utility is assumed to
be of the constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) type, where γ is the coefficient of relative
risk aversion.3
There are two ways to represent the size of the model’s misspecification: by means of
2The infinite time horizon simplifies the HJB optimality equation: the partial differential equation is
reduced to an ordinary differential equation. However, this assumption can be relaxed. The finite-horizon
model for the CRRA utility function can also be solved explicitly as shown in Merton (1969).
3In the case γ = 1, the utility has a logarithmic functional form. In this paper, we present results only
for the general case γ > 1.
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local relative entropy
Entloct (Qh|P) = Eh
1
2
∫ t
0
h2sds (1.11)
or global relative entropy
Entglob(Qh|P) = r
∫ ∞
0
e−rtEntloct (Qh|P)dt = r
∫ ∞
0
e−rtEh
1
2
∫ t
0
h2sds. (1.12)
Different settings arise because of differences in multiple prior distributions. Recursive
multiple-prior utility theory provides axiomatic foundations for an agent’s preferences with
local relative entropy. However, Maccheroni et al. (2006) have recently developed the
axioms for preferences with global entropy penalties as well as for a more general class of
functions that can be used as a penalty term.
The ambiguity-averse preferences are represented by the expected utility with an ad-
ditional penalty term for deviations from the reference model. We use the global relative
entropy to define the size of the distortion. The penalty term in the utility function is
the global relative entropy scaled by a nonnegative parameter that reflects the manager’s
ambiguity aversion. The Max-Min optimization of the objective function is a maximization
of the expected utility function under the search for the worst-case probabilistic scenario.
The manager is uncertain about the true probability measure and averse to this situation.
Therefore, she prefers to face the worst-case scenario. The optimization depicts a search for
the worst-case scenario by minimizing over a feasible set of alternative probability measures
Qh with a finite relative entropy or, equivalently, over the ambiguity parameter ht.
The Max-Min optimization problem for the manager becomes
max
u,σ
max
θM ,Ct
min
ht
Eh
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
C1−γt
1− γ −
u2
2
+ ψ
h2t
2
)
dt, (1.13)
subject to the distorted dynamics of the stock price (1.8) and market index (1.7).4 The
4The expectation in the optimization problem and the stochastic dynamics are under probability mea-
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manager selects the optimal allocation of her wealth to consumption and investment in
the market index. The optimization does not contain the managerial allocation of the
company’s stock because it is determined by shareholders. The manager’s portfolio is not
a diversified market portfolio because she is constrained to hold a certain fraction of wealth
in the firm’s stock.
The term ψ
h2t
2
is a penalty function expressed by a relative global entropy measure.
The minimization with respect to ht reflects the fact that the manager aims to limit the
magnitude of the distortion of the assets’ stochastic dynamics caused by ambiguity. The
higher the weighting function ψ, the higher the penalty for deviation from the reference
model and the lower the ambiguity aversion of the agent. Therefore, 1
ψ
is proportional to
the ambiguity-aversion coefficient. As in Skiadas (2003), this coefficient also serves as a
measure of comparative risk-aversion. In addition, ψ corresponds to a monotone increase of
utility in information filtration; for example, more and earlier information increases utility.
The range of ψ is [0,∞]. The case ψ = 0 corresponds to a myopic solution as the manager
does not penalize the choice of alternative probability measures. The case ψ →∞ indicates
infinite penalty, and thus she always chooses the reference model. Maenhout (2004) allows
ψ to be a function of the continuation utility, and this choice is determined by a relatively
easy possibility of obtaining a closed-form solution. We use the same specification of
ambiguity:
WJW
ψ
= Ω, (1.14)
where W is managerial wealth, J is the indirect utility function that satisfies the HJB
optimality equation5, and the constant Ω denotes the ambiguity-aversion coefficient.
sure Qh.
5See Appendix 1.6 for details of the HJB equation.
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1.3.4 The Firm’s Problem
The firm’s optimization problem is represented by the board members’ decision on a com-
pensation package for executives, which is determined by the fraction θ of managers’ wealth
that should be invested in the company’s stock. In fact, shareholders determine only the
lower bound for the firm’s holding constraint, θ ≥ θ˜. However, this lower bound will be
binding for the manager because absent constraints a manager should hold only the market
portfolio.
The firm maximizes its value, which is identical to the stock price at any time T :
max
θ
EST , (1.15)
subject to optimal values of effort and firm-specific volatility chosen by the manager. We
assume that there is no leverage in the capital structure of the firm. Moreover, the princi-
pal cannot observe the manager’s effort. Following Dittmann and Maug (2007) and Sung
(2005), the shareholder, who is the principal in the model, is assumed to be risk-neutral.
Unlike the manager, who is risk-averse and ambiguity-averse, shareholders are only con-
cerned with the firm’s expected value. Under this assumption, the principal’s evaluation
of compensation contracts is the risk-neutral evaluation. Following the terminology of In-
gersoll (2006), the shareholders’ valuation is the objective valuation, which is higher than
the manager’s subjective valuation but may be lower than the market valuation. However,
we assume that the shareholders’ evaluation of the compensation contract coincides with
the market evaluation. The compensation horizon T determines the vesting restrictions
imposed on the manager’s compensation, whether in the form of the firm’s stock or stock
options. The control variable θ is the fraction of the manager’s wealth linked to the firm’s
equity. The principal selects θ to maximize the firm’s expected value.
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1.4 Results
The above-stated optimization problem is a Merton’s-type problem with additional control
variables. The standard stochastic dynamic programming technique that leads to a solution
of the HJB optimality equation is applicable to our model. This section presents the
optimal solution of the model. Furthermore, we calibrate the parameters of the optimal
solution in the case when the compensation contract is defined in terms of stocks and stock
options. We compare the effect of the manager’s ambiguity aversion on the subjective
(for the manager) and objective (for the shareholders) evaluations of the compensation
payout in the form of either the firm’s stock or stock options. Based on these valuations,
shareholders can select the securities to be distributed to the manager.
1.4.1 Optimal Parameter Choice for the Principal and Agent
Theorem 1.1 derives the optimal values of effort and volatility selected by the manager as
well as the managerial holding in a firm’s equity determined by shareholders. These values
are the solutions to the manager’s problem (1.13) and the shareholders’ problem (1.15).
In addition, Theorem 1.1 provides the optimal value of consumption and the optimal
investment in the market portfolio.
Theorem 1.1. Depending on the equity compensation θ, the optimal choice of risk σ∗ for
the manager is the following:
σ∗ =
η + ρΩ(µM−r)
σM (Ω+γ)
θ
(
γ + Ω(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)2
)(
1− γ2ρ2
(γ+Ω)(γ+Ω(ρ+
√
1−ρ2)2)
) , (1.16)
and the optimal choice of effort u∗ for the manager is the following:
u∗ = θξa−γW 1−γ0 , (1.17)
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where a is a solution of the equation
a = r +
γ − 1
2γ
θ2ξ2a−γW 1−γ0 + y, (1.18)
and y depends only on risk and ambiguity preferences, the market risk premium, the risk-
free interest rate, and the correlation coefficient ρ.
The optimal fraction θ∗ of managerial wealth held in the firm’s stock in excess of the
market portfolio satisfies the following equation:
θ∗ = a
γ
2 ξW
γ−1
2
0
(
η +
ρ(µM − r)
σM
) 1
2
. (1.19)
The optimal consumption of the manager is given by
C∗t = aWt. (1.20)
The optimal fraction of wealth invested in the market portfolio is the following:
θ∗M =
µM − r − γθ∗βσ2M
σ2M(γ + Ω)
, (1.21)
where β = σρ
σM
is the market beta.
The comparative statics analysis of the optimal parameters is complicated due to the
presence of implicit equations. Here, we comment on explicit links between the manager’s
optimal choice and the model parameters. (The impact of ambiguity aversion on the
optimal solution is the subject of numerical simulations presented in Section 1.4.3.)
First, the consumption and investment choice of the manager follows a Merton’s so-
lution of the portfolio optimization problem. Optimal consumption is a linear function
of wealth. The optimal fraction of wealth invested in the market portfolio is a Merton’s
portfolio weight adjusted for ambiguity aversion Ω and excess holding θ of the firm’s stock.
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Ambiguity aversion decreases the investment in risky assets and amplifies the overall effect
of risk aversion. The adjustment for θ reflects the fact that the manager holds an undiver-
sified portfolio constrained by mandatory holdings in the firm’s equity as defined by her
equity-based compensation contract.
Second, one observes from the formula for the optimal effort (1.17) that a manager of
a higher type (i.e., a higher effort multiplier ξ) exerts higher effort in equilibrium.
Third, the positive linear relationship between the growth prospects η and the firm-
specific volatility σ in equation (1.16) is consistent with the empirical fact that high-growth
firms are prone to take on more risk. Moreover, a larger managerial holding θ in the firm’s
stock results in lower risk.
Finally, ambiguity aversion as well as risk aversion should decrease the manager’s like-
lihood of accepting riskier projects. From the shareholder’s point of view, the drop in firm-
specific volatility caused by ambiguity aversion diminishes his utility because the firm’s
value is positively related to σ and shareholders are risk-neutral. Therefore, shareholders
should use a higher share θ of equity compensation to induce the ambiguity-averse manager
to maintain the same level of incentive as a risk-averse manager. Whether this effect is
present in equilibrium is illustrated by the numerical simulations in Section 1.4.3.
1.4.2 Effect of Ambiguity on Option and Stock Compensation
This section investigates the impact of ambiguity on the optimal compensation paid either
in shares of the firm’s stock or in stock options. We evaluate the equity compensation
from the shareholders’ point of view (objective evaluation) and from the manager’s point
of view (subjective evaluation).
The objective evaluations of assets at time T are identical to their expected market
values, where expectations are taken under the reference probability measure.6 Although
6In the general case, the value of option compensation to shareholders may be less than its market
value because of possible suboptimal exercise policy. However, we ignore this argument and assume that
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the shareholders’ objective evaluations are computed using expected returns µ as defined in
equation (1.4), the manager’s ambiguity aversion still affects the compensation evaluation
due to optimal choice of effort u∗ and volatility σ∗. Theorem 1.2 states that the objective
value of stock compensation is the present value of holding the stock until time T , and the
objective value of stock option compensation is given by the Black-Scholes model value
with a strike price K and a time to maturity T . The incentive effect of option-based
compensation is measured by the option delta, the sensitivity of the option value with
respect to the underlying stock’s price. The convexity of the compensation payoff is given
by the option gamma, the sensitivity of the option delta with respect to the underlying
stock’s price. The risk-taking incentive is given by the option vega, the sensitivity of the
option value to volatility.
Theorem 1.2. The objective value of the firm’s stock held until time T is the following:
V MS = EST = S0eµT , (1.22)
where µ is given by equation (1.4) and evaluated at the optimal values of u∗ and σ∗. The
incentive effect of stock compensation is expressed by ∆MS = e
µT .
The objective value of the stock option compensation is the following:
V MO = S0e
αTN (d1)−Ke−rTN (d2), (1.23)
where T is the time to maturity, α is given by equation (1.5) (α = ξu + ησ), K is
the strike price, N is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and d1,2 =
ln(S0/K)+(r+α±σ22 )T
σ
√
T
.
The incentive effect is measured by the option delta:
∆MO = e
αTN (d1). (1.24)
the objective value of option compensation to shareholders equals the Black-Scholes market value.
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Option convexity is measured by the option gamma:
ΓM =
eαT
S0σ
√
T
∂N (d1)
∂d1
. (1.25)
The risk-taking incentive is measured by the option vega:
νM = S0
√
TeαT
∂N (d1)
∂d1
− ηeαTN (d1). (1.26)
The subjective evaluation of compensation is defined from the manager’s point of view.
First, the ambiguity-averse manager computes expected asset values under an alternative
probability measure. The manager’s ambiguity aversion affects the expected stock return
µ (1.4) via ambiguity distortion in the mispricing term (1.9):
µh = ξu+ ησ − σΩ(ρσMθM + θ
√
1− ρ2(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)) + r + σρ
σM
(µM − r). (1.27)
The manager evaluates compensation contracts using the distorted stock dynamics µh
(1.27) under the alternative probability measure and taking optimal values of effort u∗ and
volatility σ∗. Note that ambiguity aversion affects µ not only via the explicit additional
term αh but also implicitly via the equilibrium values of σ∗, u∗, and θ∗.
The second argument in the subjective evaluation of equity-based compensation is based
on Ingersoll (2006). The subjective evaluation is lower than the objective evaluation due to
an undiversified managerial portfolio that is constrained by the compensation contract to
hold the firm’s stocks or stock options. According to Ingersoll (2006), subjective evaluations
affect both interest rate and risky cash flows; in other words, the dividend yield. The
subjective interest rate r˜ is lower than the market interest rate r while the subjective
dividend yield is higher than the actual dividend yield. We apply this framework to the
setting with an ambiguity-averse manager.
Theorem 1.3 presents formulas for subjective evaluations of stocks and stock options
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held until time T by the ambiguity-averse manager. Furthermore, we compute option
greeks such as delta, vega, and gamma to measure the incentive and the risk-taking incen-
tive effects.
Theorem 1.3. The subjective value of the firm’s stock held until time T by the ambiguity-
averse manager is the following:
V SS = e
−(γ(1−θ)θσ2(1−ρ2))TS0. (1.28)
The incentive effect of stock compensation (the stock’s subjective delta) equals
∆S = e
−(γ(1−θ)θσ2(1−ρ2))T . (1.29)
The subjective value of the stock option is the following:
V SO = S0e
−T q˜N (d˜1)−Ke−T r˜N (d˜2), (1.30)
where T is the time to maturity, K is the strike price, and d˜1,2 =
ln(S0/K)+(r˜−q˜±σ22 T )
σ
√
T
, where
r˜ = r − γθ2σ2(1− ρ2), (1.31)
q˜ = −αh + γ(1− θ)θσ2(1− ρ2), (1.32)
αh = ξu+ ησ − σΩ(ρσMθM + θ
√
1− ρ2(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)). (1.33)
The incentive effect is measured by the subjective option delta:
∆SO = e
−T q˜N (d˜1). (1.34)
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The subjective option gamma is the following:
ΓS =
e−T q˜
S0σ
√
T
∂N (d˜1)
(d˜1)
. (1.35)
The risk-taking incentives are measured by the subjective option vega as follows:
νS = −eαhTN (dh1)
(
η − Ω
(
ρσMθM +
√
1− ρ2(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)θ
)
− 2γθσ(1− ρ2)
)
+S0
√
Teα
hT ∂N (dh1)
∂dh1
. (1.36)
The subjective evaluation coupled with ambiguity aversion lowers the equity compen-
sation values and affects the incentives provided by stocks or stock options. Section 1.4.3
numerically analyzes this impact. Moreover, we measure shareholders’ cost of providing
incentives as a market compensation value per unit of subjective delta. The stock incentive
costs are computed as follows:
SIC =
V MS
∆S
, (1.37)
and the option incentive costs equal the following:
OIC =
V MO
∆SO
. (1.38)
1.4.3 Numerical Simulations
This section calibrates the model parameters to illustrate numerically the optimal solution,
in particular, its sensitivity to different values of ambiguity aversion and risk aversion, and
provides a comparative statics analysis. The results of this study provide guidance on ways
to alter the compensation package to mitigate the ambiguity effect.
The following numerical parameters are fixed. The market is characterized by volatility
σM = 0.3 and an expected rate of return µM = 10%. The risk-free rate is assumed to be
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r = 4%. The initial value of the firm’s stock price is S0 = 1. The firm’s stock does not pay
dividends. The initial wealth of the manager is normalized to one, W0 = 1. Finally, the
growth prospects coefficient is η = 0.5 and the effort multiplier ξ = 0.5. The time horizon
is taken to be one year, T = 1.
The comparative statics are based on variation of the risk-aversion coefficient γ ∈
{2, 3, 4} and the ambiguity-aversion coefficient Ω ∈ {0.01, 0.5, 1}.7 The case Ω = 0.01
represents the reference model without manager ambiguity concerns. In addition, the
correlation coefficient between the stock return and the market return takes either of two
values ρ ∈ {0.1, 0.4}.
First of all, we are interested in the optimal value of volatility selected by an ambiguity-
averse manager given some pre-specified equity compensation θ. We compare two com-
pensation grants with 30% or 60% of the wealth held in the firm’s stock in excess of the
market portfolio. Table 1.1 (see Appendix 1.6.3 for all tables) reports the optimal choice
of risk by the manager depending on her ambiguity aversion and for different values of risk
aversion γ, correlation of the firm’s stock with the market ρ, and fraction of wealth θ held
in the firm’s stock.
Optimal volatility decreases for more risk-averse agents as well as for more ambiguity-
averse agents. In the presence of ambiguity, the manager has even stronger incentives not
to take on riskier projects and instead to pursue a conservative strategy. If the company-
issued stock has a higher market beta (or, equivalently, higher correlation with the market),
the manager can take on slightly higher firm-specific volatility. Finally, if the compensation
package contains twice as much in stock holdings then the manager chooses half the risk
level. This finding is consistent with the notion that the compensation contract should
contain additional risk-taking incentives, in particular, stock options. The presence of the
7We do not aim for a comprehensive analysis of feasible values that the ambiguity-aversion coefficient
could take. A primary goal of this study is a comparative analysis between the reference model with a
risk-averse agent and the alternative model with an ambiguity-averse agent. A calibration of ambiguity
aversion values to empirical data is a subject for future research.
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firm’s stock in the managerial portfolio provides a disincentive to implementing riskier
projects. The comparative statics are consistent with our intuition about how a manager
should behave, and the presence of ambiguity amplifies the incentive to pursue a low-risk
strategy regardless of the value of other model parameters.
Second, we illustrate the equilibrium solution of the model. Table 1.2 reports the
solution of the optimal contract: the optimal effort u∗ and the optimal volatility level σ∗
chosen by the manager for given model parameters, the optimal fraction of the manager’s
wealth in the firm’s equity θ∗ distributed by shareholders to the manager, and the initial
optimal consumption level c∗0. The results vary across ambiguity-aversion coefficient, risk-
aversion coefficient, and correlation of the firm’s stock with the market index.
The equilibrium levels of effort and volatility decrease with the manager’s ambiguity
aversion. Higher risk-aversion also decreases optimal effort, but the volatility profile is
either a hump-shaped or decreasing in risk aversion. We observe that ambiguity aversion
has a material impact on optimal volatility choice, in particular when compared to a
risk-averse manager’s choice. If the stock has a higher correlation with the market, it is
optimal for the manager to take on higher risk and exert more effort. To compensate for a
decrease in the manager’s effort and the choice of a lower risk, shareholders should create
better incentives and risk-taking incentives for the ambiguity-averse manager. Therefore,
shareholders distribute more equity-type compensation to the ambiguity-averse manager
in equilibrium. The lower the manager’s optimal choice of effort and volatility, the higher
the optimal equity compensation given by shareholders. Finally, the manager’s initial
consumption choice in equilibrium increases with ambiguity aversion and risk aversion.
The next tables show how the ambiguity-averse manager evaluates her compensation
plan paid in the firm’s stocks or stock options and compare the incentives created by stocks
and stock options.
Table 1.3 reports the objective (market) value V MS , the ambiguity value V
A
S , and the
subjective value V SS of the stock held until time T . The ambiguity value V
A
S is the hypo-
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thetical expected value of the stock computed under the alternative probability measure.
The ambiguity value is considered separately to emphasize the impact of ambiguity aver-
sion. Note that the subjective evaluation includes the manager’s ambiguity aversion. The
incentive effect of the stock compensation coincides with the stock’s subjective value. Ta-
ble 1.3 also reports stock incentive costs SIC as the ratio of the stock objective value to
the subjective value. SIC represents the costs to shareholders of providing incentives to
the manager. The results in Table 1.3 vary across different levels of the ambiguity-aversion
coefficient and the risk-aversion coefficient.
The ambiguity stock values are lower than the objective values but higher than the
initial price. Subjective evaluation driven by the requirement to hold the stock in the
managerial portfolio pushes the compensation value to a lower level, below the initial price.
However, higher ambiguity aversion slightly increases the subjective evaluation. Therefore,
the incentive effect of stocks is higher for the ambiguity-averse manager than for the risk-
averse manager. Moreover, the shareholders’ costs to provide incentives are lower for the
ambiguity-averse manager, as values of SIC decrease with ambiguity aversion.
Table 1.4 reports the objective (market) value V MO , the ambiguity value V
A
O , and the
subjective value V SO of an in-the-money call option, an at-the-money call option and an
out-of-the-money call option with strike prices K ∈ {0.8, 1, 1.2} and time to maturity
T = 1. Similarly to the previous table, the ambiguity value is the option price under
the alternative probability measure. Table 1.4 also reports the option deltas computed
with respect to the objective value ∆MO , the ambiguity value ∆
A
O, and the subjective value
∆SO. Option delta measures the incentive effect of the option payout. Table 1.5 reports
additional option greeks: the market vega νM , the subjective vega νS, the market gamma
ΓM , and the subjective gamma ΓS. Furthermore, Table 1.5 tabulates the option incentive
costs OIC computed as the ratio of the option objective value to the option subjective
delta.
The market values are higher than both the ambiguity values and the subjective values
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of the option compensation payout. Ambiguity aversion amplifies the spread between the
market value and the subjective value. In-the-money call options are more valuable to
the manager than the corresponding out-of-the-money call options. The actual incentives
for the manager measured by the subjective delta are lower than shareholders’ evaluation
of the incentives in terms of market delta. Furthermore, the incentive effect of executive
stock options measured by the option delta is lower than the incentive effect of the stock
and even a tradable option. However, the option incentive costs OIC are lower than
the stock incentive costs SIC regardless of the model parameters. This fact speaks in
favor of using stock options rather than stock in the compensation package. Another
advantage of options is the risk-taking incentives measured by the option vega. The risk-
taking incentives disappear if risk aversion increases. However, the effect is opposite for
the ambiguity aversion coefficient. The vega increases with ambiguity aversion in most
cases. The option gamma measures the convexity of the compensation payoff, and hence
gamma also helps offsetting the risk-reducing behavior of managers. As is the case with
vega, option gamma increases with ambiguity aversion. Note that the market values of
both vega and gamma are higher than their subjective values.
Relying on the comparison of subjective values and incentive effects, we conclude that
an ambiguity-averse manager requires higher effort incentives and risk-taking incentives in
her compensation plan. Both stocks and stock options provide incentives. While stocks
provide stronger incentives, the costs to shareholders of providing incentives are lower for
option compensation. Moreover, risk-taking incentives created by executive stock options
are of paramount importance for the ambiguity-averse manager.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper explains the prevalence of stock options in executive compensation plans by
incorporating the manager ambiguity aversion in the optimal contract design. We develop
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a principal-agent model of the optimal compensation plan in which the manager chooses
a level of effort and idiosyncratic volatility. The manager is constrained to hold a certain
share of her wealth in the company’s stock.
We find a significant negative effect of ambiguity aversion on both the optimal effort
level and the optimal risk selected by the manager. The model predicts a higher level of
equity-based compensation to offset the loss of effort incentives and risk-taking incentives
caused by ambiguity aversion. The paper compares the values of the stock and stock option
compensation payouts from the manager’s and shareholders’ points of view. The manager’s
ambiguity aversion amplifies the gap between the subjective value and the market value
of stock-based compensation. Both stocks and stock options create incentives that are
particularly important for ambiguity-averse managers. However, option compensation has
two main advantages: lower costs to shareholders and stronger risk-taking incentives.
There are two main directions for future research. An empirical study of this model
would provide us with reliable quantitative estimates of executive stock option holdings
in actual compensation contracts and thus allow us to calibrate the ambiguity-aversion
coefficient. Moreover, we could compare the structure of compensation contracts in periods
of high and low levels of ambiguity in the economy and assess the efficiency of executive
stock options relative to alternative types of compensation.
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1.6 Appendices
1.6.1 Optimal Solution to the Shareholders’ and Manager’s
Optimization Problem
This section contains a detailed solution of the model presented in Section 1.3.
Assume Bt follows a deterministic process
dBt = rBtdt, (1.39)
Mt follows the P-dynamics
dMt
Mt
= µMdt+ σMdZ
M
t , (1.40)
and St follows the P-dynamics
dSt
St
= µdt+ σ
√
1− ρ2dZSt + σρdZMt , (1.41)
where
µ = ξu+ ησ + r +
σρ
σM
(µM − r), ξ > 0, η > 0,
and
E(dZSt dZMt ) = ρdt, ρ ∈ [−1, 1].
Denote the set of alternative probability measures by Qh. Let Qh be absolutely contin-
uous with respect to the reference probability measure P . The Radon-Nikodym derivative
(or density) dQ
h
dP coincides with its conditional expectation, and hence is a martingale.
Under Novikov’s Condition, the density is an exponential martingale that is equal to the
following:
dQh
dP = exp{−
∫ T
0
||ht||2
2
dt−
∫ T
0
htdZt}, (1.42)
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where Zt = (Z
S
t , Z
M
t ) is a vector of P-Brownian motions and ht = (hSt , hMt ) is an adapted
process such that Zht = Zt +
∫ t
0
hsds is a Qh-Brownian motion. Existence of the process ht
is determined by Girsanov’s Theorem. In our framework, ht denotes a vector of ambiguity
parameters related to the corresponding source of risk. The distortedQh-dynamics of assets
in the economy are obtained by substituting the Zht -Brownian motion for the Zt-Brownian
motion. Computations show that the model’s misspecification is determined only by the
drift change of the corresponding process:
dMt
Mt
= (µM + σMh
M
t )dt+ σMdZ
M
t (1.43)
and
dSt
St
= (µ+ σ(ρhMt +
√
1− ρ2hSt ))dt+ σ(ρdZMt +
√
1− ρ2dZSt ). (1.44)
Let θ denote the fraction of the manager’s wealth invested in the firm’s stock in excess
of the market portfolio, θM denote the fraction of wealth invested in the market index (the
market portfolio), and 1 − θ − θM denote the fraction of wealth invested in the risk-free
bond. Assume the manager is endowed with positive initial wealth W0 > 0. Current wealth
Wt has the following P-dynamics:
dWt =
((
θM(µ
M − r) + θ(µ− r) + r)Wt − Ct) dt
+
(
(θMσM + θσρ)dZ
M
t + θσ
√
1− ρ2dZt
)
Wt. (1.45)
The Qh-dynamics of wealth are the following:
dWt =
((
θM(µM − r + σMhMt ) + θ(µ− r + σ(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)hSt ) + r
)
Wt − Ct
)
dt
+
(
(θMσM + θσρ)dZ
M
t + θσ
√
1− ρ2dZt
)
Wt. (1.46)
The manager’s optimization problem subject to the Qh-dynamics of wealth is the fol-
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lowing:
max
u,σ
max
θM ,Ct
min
ht
Eh
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
C1−γt
1− γ −
u2t
2
+ ψ
h2t
2
)
dt, (1.47)
where γ > 1 is the manager’s relative risk-aversion coefficient8, the coefficient ψ ≥ 0 is
inversely proportional to the manager’s ambiguity aversion, consumption is nonnegative,
Ct ≥ 0, and initial wealth is positive, W0 > 0.
The shareholder sets the optimal equity compensation θ in order to maximize the
expected stock price at given compensation horizon T :
max
θ
EST . (1.48)
In order to determine the optimal choice of investment, consumption, volatility, and
managerial effort, we rely on the stochastic dynamic programming technique that leads to
the HJB optimality equation.
Solving the optimization problem for the manager requires three steps. First, we solve
the minimization part for the optimal ambiguity parameter ht. Second, we solve the HJB
equation for the optimal consumption and investment as in Merton (1969) and, simulta-
neously, for the optimal effort and idiosyncratic volatility. Note that the minimization
cannot be interchanged with the maximizations because doing so would lead to a different
solution.
We define the indirect utility function (or value function) as follows:
J(W (s), s) = max
u,σ
max
θM ,Ct
min
ht
Eh
∫ ∞
s
e−r(t−s)
(
C1−γt
1− γ −
u2
2
+ ψ
h2t
2
)
dt. (1.49)
The indirect utility function is independent of explicit time due to the infinite time horizon:
J(W (s), s) = J(W (0), 0) = J. (1.50)
8We do not consider the case γ = 1, which would correspond to logarithmic utility.
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Hence the optimality HJB equation is an ordinary differential equation for J :
0 = max
u,σ
max
θM ,Ct
min
hSt ,h
M
t
C1−γt
1− γ −
u2
2
+ ψ
(hSt )
2 + (hMt )
2
2
− rJ
+JW
((
θM(µM − r + σMhMt ) + θ(µ− r + σ(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)hSt ) + r
)
Wt − Ct
)
+0.5JWWW
2
(
(θMσM + θσρ)
2 + θ2σ2(1− ρ2)) , (1.51)
subject to the boundary (transversality) condition limt→∞ Ehe−rtJ(W (t)) = 0.
Following Merton (1969), conjecture an indirect utility function J of the form:
J(W ) =
a−γ
1− γW
1−γ, (1.52)
where a is a constant in the infinite-horizon case.
Note that −JWWW/JW = γ is the relative risk-aversion coefficient. Moreover, we use
the specification of the penalty function proposed by Maenhout (2004):
ψ =
J(1− γ)
Ω
=
JWW
Ω
, (1.53)
where Ω is a constant that reflects ambiguity aversion.
The solution to the minimization problem exists due to the convexity of the objective
function with respect to hSt and h
M
t . The first-order condition is sufficient and yields the
following:
hMt = −
JWW
ψ
θMσM and h
S
t = −
JWW
ψ
θσ(ρ+
√
1− ρ2), (1.54)
or, using (1.53),
hMt = −ΩθMσM and hSt = −Ωθσ(ρ+
√
1− ρ2). (1.55)
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We substitute these values of hMt and h
S
t back into the HJB equation:
0 = max
u,σ
max
θM ,Ct
−ΩJWW
2
(
θ2Mσ
2
M + θ
2σ2(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)2
)
+
C1−γt
1− γ −
u2
2
− rJ + JW ((θM(µM − r) + θ(µ− r) + r)Wt − Ct)
+0.5JWWW
2
(
(θMσM + θσρ)
2 + θ2σ2(1− ρ2)) . (1.56)
Next, we derive the first-order conditions for the maximization part. First, optimal
consumption is equal to
C∗t = (JW )
−1/γ. (1.57)
Consumption depends on wealth as follows:
C∗t = aWt. (1.58)
Second, the optimal investment in the index is a Merton’s portfolio adjusted for ambi-
guity aversion and excess holding of the firm’s stock:
θ∗M =
µM − r − γθσρσM
σ2M(γ + Ω)
. (1.59)
Since the market beta is β = σρ
σM
, we obtain the optimal fraction of the wealth invested in
the market:
θ∗M =
µM − r − γθβσ2M
σ2M(γ + Ω)
. (1.60)
Third, the solution to the maximization problem with respect to the variables of man-
agerial choice (effort and volatility) exists due to concavity of the quadratic objective
function in u and σ. The optimal level of effort is the following:
u∗ = θξJWWt = θξa−γW
1−γ
t . (1.61)
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We consider a constant level of effort in the model. Hence, optimal effort depends on initial
wealth:
u∗ = θξa−γW 1−γ0 . (1.62)
Finally, optimal firm-specific volatility is the following:
σ∗ =
η + ρ(µM−r)
σM
− γρσMθM
θ(γ + Ω(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)2) . (1.63)
If we substitute (1.59) for θM in (1.63), we obtain the following explicit formula for the
optimal volatility:
σ∗ =
η + ρΩ(µM−r)
σM (Ω+γ)
θ
(
γ + Ω(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)2
)(
1− γ2ρ2
(γ+Ω)(γ+Ω(ρ+
√
1−ρ2)2)
) . (1.64)
We denote σ∗θ = x, where x = x(Ω) is a function independent of explicit variables chosen
by the manager and shareholders such as Ct, θM , and θ. x(Ω) is decreasing in Ω and
x(0) = η
γ(1−ρ2) . Using x = x(Ω), the optimal fraction of wealth invested in the market
index is the following:
θ∗M =
µM − r
σ2M(γ + Ω)
− γρx
σM(γ + Ω)
. (1.65)
The constant a in the indirect utility function (1.52) is computed by substituting (1.52)
for J in (1.51) and using the optimal values C∗t and u
∗:
0 =
a1−γW 1−γ
1− γ −
1
2
θ2ξ2a−2γW 2−2γ + Ωa−γW 1−γ
(
θ2Mσ
2
M + θ
2σ2(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)2
)
+a−γW 1−γ
(
θM(µM − r − ΩθMσ2M) + θ(µ− r − Ωθσ2(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)2 + r − a
)
−ra
−γW 1−γ
1− γ − γ
−γW 1−γ
(
(θMσM + θσρ)
2 + θ2σ2(1− ρ2)) . (1.66)
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The solution of the following equation yields the value of a:
a = r +
γ − 1
γ
(
1
2
θ2ξ2W 1−γ0 a
−γ + θ∗M(µM − r) + θ(µ− r)
−γ((θ∗MσM + θσ∗ρ)2 + θ2(σ∗)2(1− ρ2))). (1.67)
Using the optimal values θ∗M , and σ
∗, we obtain the following equation:
0 =
γ
1− γ (a− r) +
1
2
θ2ξ2a−γW 1−γ0 +
(µM − r)2Ω
σ2M(γ + Ω)
+
2γ(γ − 1)(µM − r)
γ + Ω
+
(
η +
Ωρ(µM − r)
σM(γ + Ω)
)
x+
(
γ2(γ + 2Ω)ρ2
(γ + Ω)2
− γ2
)
x2. (1.68)
We denote the terms independent of θ by y, and the equation for a becomes:
a = r +
γ − 1
2γ
θ2ξ2a−γW 1−γ0 + y, (1.69)
where y depends only on risk and ambiguity preferences, the market risk premium, the
risk-free rate (discount rate), and the correlation coefficient ρ. y decreases in Ω and so
does a. In the absence of effort, ξ = 0, the solution for a does not depend on θ:
a = r + y. (1.70)
Taking the expected value of ST and substituting the optimal values of effort u
∗ and
volatility σ∗, the principal’s problem becomes:
max
θ
EST = max
θ
S0e
(r+σ
∗ρ
σM
(µM−r)+ξu∗+ησ∗)T . (1.71)
The optimal θ∗ is found as a solution to the following implicit equation:
θ∗ξ2a−γW 1−γ0 = x
(
η +
ρ(µM − r)
σM
)
. (1.72)
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1.6.2 Subjective and Objective Evaluation of Equity Compensa-
tion
This section presents details of the equity compensation evaluations. We evaluate the
equity compensation paid by either shares of stock or stock options, from the shareholders’
point of view (objective evaluation) and from the manager’s point of view (subjective
evaluation).
The objective evaluation of the equity compensation coincides with its market value
computed as the expected payoff of stocks and stock options at time T , where expectations
are taken under the reference probability measure. However, the manager’s optimal choice
of effort u∗ and volatility σ∗ still affects the shareholders’ objective evaluation via the
mispricing term α in equation (1.5):
α = ξu+ ησ. (1.73)
The mispricing α increases the expected stock return µ as determined by equation (1.4):
µ = r + α +
σρ
σM
(µM − r). (1.74)
The objective evaluation of the stock held until time T is given by the following formula:
V MS = EST = S0eµT . (1.75)
The objective evaluation of an executive stock option is given by the Black-Scholes value,
and the mispricing term α plays the role of a dividend yield in the Black-Scholes model:
V MO = S0e
αTN (d1)−Ke−rTN (d2), (1.76)
where T is the time to maturity, K is the strike price, and d1,2 =
ln(S0/K)+(r+α±σ22 )T
σ
√
T
.
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The incentive effect of option-based compensation is measured by the option delta, the
sensitivity of the option value with respect to the underlying stock’s price:
∆MO = e
αTN (d1). (1.77)
The convexity of compensation payoff is given by the option gamma, the sensitivity of the
option delta with respect to the underlying stock’s price:
ΓM =
eαT
S0σ
√
T
∂N (d1)
∂d1
. (1.78)
The risk-taking incentive is given by the option vega, the sensitivity of the option value to
volatility:
νM = S0
√
TeαT
∂N (d1)
∂d1
− ηeαTN (d1). (1.79)
Note that the equations for delta and gamma are standard formulas for the greeks in the
Black-Scholes model for a dividend-paying stock. However, the formula for vega requires
an adjustment for the mispricing α dependent on σ.
The manager’s subjective evaluation of the compensation contract is based on two
arguments. First, the subjective evaluation is driven by manager’s ambiguity aversion. As
shown in equation (1.9), ambiguity distortion affects the dynamics of stock returns via the
mispricing term α. The distorted αh is given by:
αh = ξu+ ησ + σ(ρhMt +
√
1− ρ2hSt ). (1.80)
Substitute optimal values of hMt and h
S
t from equation (1.55):
αh = ξu+ ησ − σΩ(ρσMθM + θ
√
1− ρ2(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)). (1.81)
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Thus, the expected stock return for the ambiguity-averse manager equals the following:
µh = ξu+ ησ − σΩ(ρσMθM + θ
√
1− ρ2(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)) + r + σρ
σM
(µM − r). (1.82)
Note that ambiguity aversion affects µ not only via the explicit additional term αh but
also implicitly via the equilibrium values of σ∗, u∗, and θ∗. The evaluation of the equity
compensation by the ambiguity-averse manager is equivalent to its market evaluation with
the distorted stock dynamics µh under the alternative probability measure. The expected
payoff of stocks held until time T for the ambiguity-averse manager is the following:
V AS = EhST = S0eµ
hT . (1.83)
The evaluation of stock options for the ambiguity-averse manager is given by the Black-
Scholes value with mispricing term αh:
V AO = S0e
αhTN (dh1)−Ke−rTN (dh2), (1.84)
where T is the time to maturity, K is the strike price, and dh1,2 =
ln(S0/K)+(r+αh±σ22 )T
σ
√
T
. The
option greeks are also evaluated using αh:
∆AO = e
αhTN (dh1), (1.85)
ΓA =
eα
hT
S0σ
√
T
∂N (dh1)
∂dh1
, (1.86)
νA = −eαhTN (dh1)
(
η − Ω(ρσMθM +
√
1− ρ2(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)θ)
)
+S0
√
Teα
hT ∂N (dh1)
∂dh1
. (1.87)
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The second argument in the subjective evaluation of equity-based compensation is the
fact that the manager holds an undiversified portfolio with an overweighted position in the
firm’s equity due to compensation contract obligations. The subjective evaluation is based
on Ingersoll (2006), who computes a subjective asset value for an undiversified (restricted
to hold the firm’s stock until time T ) manager using her marginal utility as a martingale
pricing process. This same principle is applicable in our framework.
Subjective evaluations affect both the interest rate and the risky cash flows; in other
words, the dividend yield. Details of the derivation can be found in Ingersoll (2006).
According to Ingersoll (2006), the subjective interest rate r˜ is lower than the market interest
rate:
r˜ = r − γθ2σ2(1− ρ2). (1.88)
The subjective dividend yield q˜ is higher than the actual dividend yield, or, in our setting,
than the mispricing term αh (1.81):
q˜ = −αh + γ(1− θ)θσ2(1− ρ2). (1.89)
Equivalently, the subjective expected stock return or discount rate µ˜ is higher than the
actual expected stock return µh by the same adjustment term:
µ˜− µh = q˜ + αh = γ(1− θ)θσ2(1− ρ2). (1.90)
The manager discounts future cash flows at a higher rate µ˜ than the rate µh for the
ambiguity-averse manager. However, µh is lower than the market rate µ.
Stocks and stock options in the compensation contract are valued by the manager at
the optimal values of σ∗ and θ∗ with an adjusted interest rate r˜ and an adjusted dividend
yield q˜. As shown in Ingersoll (2006), the subjective value of a restricted stock held until
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time T equals the following:
V SS = e
−T µ˜EhST = e(µ
h−µ˜)TS0 = e−(γ(1−θ)θσ
2(1−ρ2))TS0. (1.91)
The incentive effect of stock compensation or the stock subjective delta is given by the
sensitivity of the subjective stock value to the stock price:
∆S = e
−(γ(1−θ)θσ2(1−ρ2))T . (1.92)
The risk-neutral drift in the option pricing equation is affected by the subjective ad-
justment:
r˜ − q˜ = r + αh − γθσ2(1− ρ2). (1.93)
Ingersoll (2006) derives the subjective option value as a Black-Scholes value with an ad-
justed interest rate r˜ and an adjusted dividend yield q˜:
V SO = S0e
−T q˜N (d˜1)−Ke−T r˜N (d˜2), (1.94)
where T is the time to maturity, K is the strike price, and d˜1,2 =
ln(S0/K)+(r˜−q˜±σ22 T )
σ
√
T
.
The option greeks are evaluated using similar adjustments. The subjective option delta
is
∆SO = e
−T q˜N (d˜1). (1.95)
The subjective option gamma is the following:
ΓS =
e−T q˜
S0σ
√
T
∂N (d˜1)
∂d˜1
. (1.96)
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The subjective option vega is the following:
νS = −eαhTN (dh1)
(
η − Ω
(
ρσMθM +
√
1− ρ2(ρ+
√
1− ρ2)θ
)
− 2γθσ(1− ρ2)
)
+S0
√
Teα
hT ∂N (dh1)
∂dh1
. (1.97)
Finally, we measure the costs to a shareholder of providing incentives as a market
compensation value per unit of subjective delta. The stock incentive costs are computed
as follows:
SIC =
V MS
∆S
, (1.98)
and the option incentive costs equal the following:
OIC =
V MO
∆SO
. (1.99)
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1.6.3 Tables
Table 1.1: Comparative statics of the manager’s volatility choice σ. The fixed parameters are the
following: risk-free rate r = 4%, expected rate of market return µM = 10%, market volatility σM = 0.3,
growth prospects η = 0.5. We vary the following parameters: manager’s holdings of the firm’s stock
θ ∈ {0.3, 0.6}, relative risk-aversion coefficient γ ∈ {2, 3, 4}, correlation coefficient between the stock
return and the market return ρ ∈ {0.1, 0.4}, and ambiguity-aversion coefficient Ω ∈ {0.01, 0.5, 1}.
Correlation ρ = 0.1
Equity holdings θ = 0.3 θ = 0.6
γ = 2 3 4 2 3 4
Ω Risk Choice σ
0.01 0.84 0.56 0.42 0.42 0.28 0.21
0.5 0.65 0.47 0.37 0.33 0.23 0.18
1 0.53 0.40 0.33 0.27 0.20 0.16
Correlation ρ = 0.4
Equity holdings θ = 0.3 θ = 0.6
γ = 2 3 4 2 3 4
Ω Risk Choice σ
0.01 0.98 0.66 0.49 0.49 0.33 0.25
0.5 0.66 0.49 0.39 0.33 0.25 0.20
1 0.50 0.40 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.16
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Table 1.2: Comparative statics of the equilibrium solution. The table reports the manager’s optimal
effort u∗, optimal volatility σ∗, the optimal equity compensation (i.e., the fraction θ∗ of wealth invested
in the firm’s stock in excess of the market portfolio), and the initial optimal consumption c∗0. The fixed
parameters are the following: risk-free rate r = 4%, expected rate of market return µM = 10%, market
volatility σM = 0.3, initial value of the firm’s stock price S0 = 1, initial wealth of the manager W0 = 1,
growth prospects η = 0.5, and effort multiplier ξ = 0.5. We vary the following parameters: relative risk-
aversion coefficient γ ∈ {2, 3, 4}, correlation coefficient between the stock return and the market return
ρ ∈ {0.1, 0.4}, and ambiguity-aversion coefficient Ω ∈ {0.01, 0.5, 1}.
ρ = 0.1 ρ = 0.4
γ = 2 3 4 2 3 4
Ω Effort u∗
0.01 31.16 20.81 15.62 57.96 38.72 29.07
0.5 25.15 17.94 13.95 44.75 32.25 25.24
1 21.02 15.74 12.58 36.75 27.79 22.37
Ω Volatility σ∗
0.01 2.92 6.06 5.19 13.25 28.46 15.93
0.5 0.94 3.05 3.86 0.51 2.09 3.29
1 0.69 2.34 3.44 0.36 1.24 2.06
Ω Equity Compensation θ∗
0.01 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.5 0.22 0.05 0.03 0.45 0.08 0.04
1 0.25 0.05 0.03 0.53 0.11 0.06
Ω Consumption c∗0
0.01 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.04 0.11
0.5 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.07 0.11 0.17
1 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.19
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Table 1.3: Stock compensation. The table reports the following values predicted by the equilibrium
solution of the model: stock market value VMS , stock ambiguity value V
A
S , stock subjective value V
S
S , and
stock incentive costs SIC. The fixed parameters are the following: risk-free rate r = 4%, expected rate
of market return µM = 10%, market volatility σM = 0.3, initial value of the firm’s stock price S0 = 1,
initial wealth of the manager W0 = 1, time horizon T = 1, correlation coefficient between the stock
return and the market return ρ = 0.1, growth prospects η = 0.5, and effort multiplier ξ = 0.5. We vary
the following parameters: relative risk-aversion coefficient γ ∈ {2, 3, 4} and ambiguity-aversion coefficient
Ω ∈ {0.01, 0.5, 1}.
γ = 2 3 4
Ω VMS
0.01 1.75 2.46 2.15
0.5 1.33 1.67 1.81
1 1.26 1.51 1.70
Ω V AS
0.01 1.74 2.45 2.14
0.5 1.16 1.46 1.61
1 1.02 1.22 1.40
Ω V SS
0.01 0.27 0.05 0.08
0.5 0.74 0.29 0.19
1 0.84 0.43 0.26
Ω SIC
0.01 6.60 46.38 27.99
0.5 1.79 5.81 9.57
1 1.50 3.47 6.52
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Table 1.4: Option compensation. The table reports the following values predicted by the equilibrium
solution of the model: option market value VMO , option ambiguity value V
A
O , option subjective value V
S
O ,
delta of the option market value ∆MO , delta of the option ambiguity value ∆
A
O, and delta of the option
subjective value ∆SO. The fixed parameters are the following: risk-free rate r = 4%, expected rate of market
return µM = 10%, market volatility σM = 0.3, initial value of the firm’s stock price S0 = 1, initial wealth
of the manager W0 = 1, time to maturity T = 1, correlation coefficient between the stock return and the
market return ρ = 0.1, growth prospects η = 0.5, and effort multiplier ξ = 0.5. We vary the following
parameters: relative risk-aversion coefficient γ ∈ {2, 3, 4}, ambiguity-aversion coefficient Ω ∈ {0.01, 0.5, 1},
and option strike price K ∈ {0.8, 1, 1.2}.
K = 0.8 1 1.2
γ = 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4
Ω VMO
0.01 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.78
0.5 0.47 0.76 0.77 0.43 0.76 0.77 0.40 0.76 0.77
1 0.37 0.71 0.76 0.33 0.70 0.76 0.29 0.70 0.75
Ω V AO
0.01 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.78
0.5 0.39 0.67 0.69 0.35 0.67 0.69 0.32 0.67 0.69
1 0.27 0.57 0.62 0.23 0.56 0.62 0.18 0.55 0.62
Ω V SO
0.01 0.20 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.06
0.5 0.24 0.19 0.13 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.13
1 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.10 0.22 0.16
Ω ∆MO
0.01 0.83 0.81 0.78 0.83 0.81 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.78
0.5 0.72 0.78 0.77 0.66 0.78 0.77 0.60 0.77 0.77
1 0.70 0.75 0.76 0.62 0.74 0.76 0.52 0.73 0.76
Ω ∆AO
0.01 0.82 0.81 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.78
0.5 0.60 0.68 0.69 0.54 0.68 0.69 0.48 0.68 0.69
1 0.50 0.60 0.63 0.41 0.60 0.62 0.31 0.59 0.63
Ω ∆SO
0.01 0.21 0.04 0.06 0.21 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.04 0.06
0.5 0.36 0.19 0.13 0.29 0.18 0.13 0.24 0.19 0.13
1 0.34 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.23 0.16 0.17 0.23 0.16
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Table 1.5: Option compensation (continued). The table reports the following values predicted by the
equilibrium solution of the model: option incentive costs OIC, option vega market value νM , option vega
subjective value νS , option gamma market value ΓM , and option gamma subjective value ΓS . The fixed
parameters are the following: risk-free rate r = 4%, expected rate of market return µM = 10%, market
volatility σM = 0.3, initial value of the firm’s stock price S0 = 1, initial wealth of the manager W0 = 1,
time to maturity T = 1, correlation coefficient between the stock return and the market return ρ = 0.1,
growth prospects η = 0.5, and effort multiplier ξ = 0.5. We vary the following parameters: relative risk-
aversion coefficient γ ∈ {2, 3, 4}, ambiguity-aversion coefficient Ω ∈ {0.01, 0.5, 1}, and option strike price
K ∈ {0.8, 1, 1.2}.
K = 0.8 1 1.2
γ = 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4
Ω OIC
0.01 3.88 18.91 12.58 3.93 18.91 12.58 3.98 18.91 12.58
0.5 1.29 4.06 5.97 1.46 4.10 5.99 1.67 4.14 6.00
1 1.10 2.92 4.70 1.35 2.99 4.72 1.71 3.05 4.74
Ω νM
0.01 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.02
0.5 0.31 0.12 0.06 0.37 0.13 0.07 0.41 0.15 0.07
1 0.30 0.18 0.08 0.38 0.21 0.09 0.43 0.23 0.10
Ω νS
0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.01
0.5 0.23 0.05 0.02 0.25 0.05 0.02 0.26 0.06 0.02
1 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.23 0.10 0.03
Ω ΓM
0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
0.5 0.32 0.04 0.01 0.39 0.04 0.01 0.43 0.05 0.02
1 0.44 0.08 0.02 0.55 0.08 0.03 0.62 0.09 0.03
Ω ΓS
0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.5 0.29 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.02 0.01
1 0.42 0.04 0.01 0.44 0.05 0.01 0.41 0.05 0.01
Chapter 2
Long/Short Equity Hedge Funds and
Systematic Ambiguity
Abstract
This paper presents a hedge fund portfolio choice model for an investor facing ambiguity. In
the empirical section, we measure ambiguity as the cross-sectional dispersion in forecasts
of industrial production growth and stock market returns, and we construct systematic
ambiguity factors from the universe of S&P 500 stocks. We estimate ambiguity betas for
long/short equity hedge fund strategies and document significant ambiguity exposures for
directional long/short equity hedge funds. We compare the out-of-sample performance
of portfolios constructed according to hedge fund alphas with and without systematic
ambiguity exposures and find that the former outperform the latter.1
JEL codes: G11
Keywords: Ambiguity, Asset Allocation, Long/Short Equity Hedge Funds, Perfor-
mance Measurement.
1This chapter is a co-authored paper with Professor Rajna Gibson Brandon.
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2.1 Introduction
What is ambiguity? Investors act under ambiguity when they do not know the exact prob-
ability measure associated with external events that may influence a decision or a choice.
Ambiguity differs from the concept of risk because it focuses on probabilistic uncertainty
rather than uncertainty with respect to the possible realizations of an event. Knight (1921)
was the first to emphasize the importance of ambiguity for economic decisions. Economic
agents behave differently when they know the probability distribution for uncertain out-
comes (known unknowns) than when they do not know it and thus act under ambiguity
(unknown unknowns). This finding is supported by psychological experiments such as the
Ellsberg Paradox (1961) that demonstrates that people are more likely to take on more risk
when the event probabilities are known.2 Such experiments demonstrated the existence of
ambiguity aversion.
The notion of ambiguity should be relevant for hedge fund investors due to various
sources of ambiguity associated with hedge fund investments. First, the opacity of hedge
fund strategies may generate ambiguity with respect to hedge funds’ risk exposures. The
inability to understand hedge funds’ investment strategies and to correctly attribute hedge
fund returns to systematic risk factors is one of the main sources of ambiguity for their
investors. Hence, hedge fund investors can easily be misguided when it comes to identifying
“pure” hedge fund alphas. The second source of ambiguity in hedge fund returns relates
to managerial skills. An investment in hedge funds is often considered a pure bet on the
specific skills of a hedge fund manager; these skills are to a large extent characterized by
probabilistic uncertainty. Finally, there is evidence of significant ambiguity affecting the
dynamics of equity markets, as empirically documented by Anderson et al. (2009). One
may therefore conjecture that systematic stock market ambiguity — or macroeconomic
uncertainty — may affect equity hedge funds’ expected returns. This conjecture is the
2See Epstein and Wang (1994) for a thorough discussion of this concept and its first application to
asset pricing.
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focus of our paper.
Whether hedge funds generate positive and significant alphas is widely debated in the
academic literature and among practitioners. The disagreement is caused in part by the
absence of an accepted asset pricing model and well-established systematic risk factors
with respect to which performance and risks of hedge funds can be properly measured. In
this study, we consider a new systematic factor which should be particularly important for
measuring equity hedge funds’ performance, namely systematic ambiguity. We postulate
that beyond the traditional risk factors, equity hedge funds’ expected returns embed a
premium for “systematic ambiguity” exposure that should be priced in equilibrium. If sys-
tematic ambiguity exposure is ignored, alpha estimates may be biased and the performance
of these hedge funds may be misread.
The paper consists of two parts: a theoretical presentation and an empirical study. In
the theoretical part, we propose an asset allocation model for an ambiguity-averse equity
hedge fund investor who makes her portfolio allocation decisions without relying on a sin-
gle probability measure but rather by considering all feasible alternatives. The investor
allocates her wealth among a risk-free bond, a risky stock (or broad stock market index),
and an equity hedge fund by solving an intertemporal portfolio choice model in continuous
time. Following Maenhout (2004), we explicitly incorporate ambiguity aversion into the
utility function and assess the impact of ambiguity aversion on the optimal allocation so-
lution. In the general model, we assume that ambiguity exists with respect to both hedge
fund and stock market price dynamics. The ambiguity parameter corresponding to the
stock market index price dynamics describes systematic ambiguity. The ambiguity param-
eter corresponding to the hedge fund price dynamics describes the investor’s confidence
regarding the hedge fund manager’s skills.
We solve the asset allocation problem within a Max-Min utility framework to derive the
optimal portfolio weights and consumption. We observe that, in general, ambiguity has
a negative impact on the investor’s allocation to risky assets. We next impose a market-
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clearing condition and derive a two-factor asset pricing model for the hedge fund in which
the market risk premium arises because of standard risk aversion and a systematic market
ambiguity premium arises because of ambiguity aversion. We call this model a capital asset
pricing model with ambiguity (ACAPM). The main result from the theoretical section
suggests that stock market ambiguity is priced in equilibrium and that this ambiguity
premium may be hidden in equity hedge funds’ alphas.
In the empirical part of the paper, we use the Trading Advisor Selection System (TASS)
hedge fund database and focus exclusively on long/short equity hedge funds, since these
funds have exposure only to stock market risk (and thus potentially to systematic am-
biguity). We then raise two questions: First, do long/short equity hedge funds exhibit
systematic ambiguity exposures? Second, can consideration of systematic ambiguity in the
portfolio construction process enhance the out-of-sample performance of long/short equity
hedge fund portfolios?
We measure systematic ambiguity by the dispersion (cross-sectional standard deviation)
of the forecasts for the S&P 500 stock market index (for stock market ambiguity) and for
the US Industrial Production Index (for macroeconomic ambiguity). We rely in both
cases on a panel of survey-based forecasts from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s
Livingston Survey. In order to construct both systematic ambiguity factors, we estimate
the stock market and macroeconomic ambiguity sensitivities of S&P 500 Index constituent
stocks. We define the ambiguity factor as the spread between the out-of-sample returns of
the portfolios consisting of the top decile and the bottom decile of stocks, respectively, as
ranked by their stock market or macroeconomic ambiguity sensitivities.
To answer the first question, we compute the ambiguity betas for long/short equity
hedge funds, which are estimated by adding the systematic ambiguity factor to various
benchmark multifactor models: namely, to three well-known equity-based models (the
CAPM and the Fama-French and Carhart models) and for robustness to a hedge fund-
specific pricing model, specifically the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with trend-following
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factors. The analysis is conducted for individual hedge funds and for equally weighted
and value-weighted portfolios of hedge funds. We report significant estimates of ambiguity
betas across most model specifications. As predicted in the theoretical section, we observe
that ambiguity betas matter especially for those long/short equity hedge funds that pursue
directional strategies.
To answer the second question, we analyze the out-of-sample performance of portfo-
lios constructed with and without systematic ambiguity. We rank hedge funds based on
their alphas (the hedge funds with top-decile alphas are included in the portfolio) from
the CAPM with systematic ambiguity and compare these portfolios’ out-of-sample perfor-
mance with that of portfolios constructed using the traditional CAPM (without systematic
ambiguity). We find that hedge fund portfolios constructed using the ACAPM outperform
on an out-of-sample basis. The latter finding is particularly noticeable for value-weighted
portfolios and holds for different hedge fund performance measurement models and holding
periods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related literature. Section
2.3 describes the asset allocation model for ambiguity-averse hedge fund investors and
the resulting two-factor ACAPM model with systematic ambiguity. Section 2.4 describes
the data, the empirical methodology, and our results. Section 2.5 concludes the paper.
Mathematical derivations, tables, and figures are provided as appendices in Section 2.6.
2.2 Related Literature
Our paper aims at contributing to the literature on ambiguity-averse preferences and
Knightian uncertainty with a specific focus on hedge fund investments.
The formal incorporation of ambiguity into economic modeling requires construct-
ing ambiguity-averse preferences. This development was pioneered by Gilboa (1987) and
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), who built the axiomatic foundations of multiple prior pref-
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erences. Economic agents solve a Max-Min optimization problem by first minimizing their
utility with respect to probability distributions from a given convex set (where the set of
probabilities constitutes a menu of multiple priors corresponding to heterogeneous beliefs
regarding the state of the economy) and then maximizing the expected utility of wealth
with respect to the traditional set of variables (such as their consumption and investment
choices). Another representation of ambiguity-averse preferences is developed in papers by
Hansen and Sargent (2001) and Anderson et al. (2003), who describe utility optimization
as a robust control problem. This problem also has a Max-Min optimization form with
a minimization over alternative probability measures, but the utility function contains a
penalty in terms of the entropy measure relative to alternative probability laws. It has
been shown3 that the robust control problem is equivalent to the multiple priors setting
only in the case of constrained relative entropy. This robust control approach offers a
very appealing and intuitive interpretation of the penalization term; however, it may fail
to satisfy some axiomatic foundations of economic preferences for general specifications of
the penalty function. Maccheroni et al. (2006) have resolved this potential inconsistency
by constructing an ambiguity-averse utility function of a general class that encompasses
both the multiple priors and the robust control settings, and therefore makes the latter
model consistent with axioms of economic preferences.
A body of literature has examined whether ambiguity-averse preferences can explain
some well-known financial market anomalies. Dow and Werlang (1992) utilize multiple
prior preferences to conclude that ambiguity aversion can explain limited participation in
equity markets. A recent paper by Easley and O’Hara (2009) also demonstrates that am-
biguity aversion induces nonparticipation in financial markets and suggests that regulation
that tends to decrease perceived ambiguity, especially during disruptive market events,
can help mitigate the effect of ambiguity aversion and thus resolve the non-participation
puzzle. The authors use as an example the 2008 credit crunch crisis, when governments
3See for example Trojani and Vanini (2004).
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all over the world increased the sums of insured deposits and indicated their willingness
to bail out major financial corporations at the verge of bankruptcy in order to diminish
ambiguity-induced lack of market participation.
Epstein and Miao (2003) address the equity home-bias puzzle (underinvestment in for-
eign securities) and the consumption home-bias puzzle (high correlation between country-
specific consumption growth and output growth) by using a multiple-prior utility function
to define ambiguity-averse preferences. The authors propose a heterogeneous agent model
of an exchange economy in complete markets. The agents differ not only in their en-
dowments but also in their ambiguity aversions (with higher ambiguity towards foreign
markets). The paper presents a closed-form equilibrium solution that shows that an en-
dogenously determined ambiguity or disagreement process appears in the equilibrium prices
and allocations. The equity home bias is explained by the difference in beliefs generated
by the disagreement term. In contrast to a standard heterogeneous-agent model with het-
erogeneity in beliefs or risk preferences, the main contribution of the Epstein and Miao
(2003) model is that the disagreement term is derived endogenously due to agents’ hetero-
geneous ambiguity aversions. Uppal and Wang (2003) also explain the home bias effect in
agents’ asset allocations by using a robust control problem to account for ambiguity. The
authors argue that the robust control approach not only allows multiple priors but also
establishes a reference model with respect to which an agent can differentiate among the
priors instead of always picking the worst-case scenario. The optimal portfolio allocation
is presented as an extension of the standard Merton portfolio weights. The paper conducts
a model calibration and shows that when the overall degree of ambiguity is high, the home
bias in the optimal holdings is stronger.
The equity premium puzzle can also be meaningfully addressed by ambiguity-averse
preferences, since ambiguity aversion raises overall risk aversion and therefore the equity
premium. This result is derived by Maenhout (2004), who obtains a closed-form solution for
the portfolio choice problem in continuous time for i.i.d. returns. The author proposes using
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a state-dependent weighting function in the penalty term of the robust control problem
to solve the optimization problem analytically and to preserve wealth independence in the
optimal solution. Maenhout (2004) emphasizes the decrease (up to 50% for reasonable
calibration parameters) in demand for the risky asset by robust investors that leads to an
increase in the equity premium and to a drop in the risk-free interest rate. The equity
premium is calibrated to lie between 4% and 6% when the model considers both risk
aversion and ambiguity aversion. We will rely on a similar formulation of the portfolio
choice problem and use a similar functional form for the penalty term in our hedge fund
asset allocation model.
As a starting point for our empirical analysis, we follow the results stemming from the
theoretical model proposed by Kogan and Wang (2003), a two-factor asset pricing model
based on a return versus risk and ambiguity relationship. To the best of our knowledge,
the only previous empirical test of an ambiguity-based asset pricing model was undertaken
by Anderson et al. (2009), inspired by the asset pricing model derived by Kogan and
Wang (2003). The former authors construct a measure of macroeconomic ambiguity as the
dispersion in the forecasts of nominal GDP growth and of corporate profits after taxes.
The authors find that macroeconomic ambiguity is indeed an additional priced factor that
has a significant impact on stocks’ expected returns.
Krahnen et al. (2012) estimate ambiguity aversion by conducting experiments under
various settings and observing how reservation prices of individuals vary with ambiguity.
The authors conclude that ambiguity aversion exists and differs across individuals. They
demonstrate that the ambiguity effect can be separated from the effect of risk aversion and
that ambiguity aversion has a stronger impact on asset prices than risk aversion. Therefore,
accounting for ambiguity is important in many financial applications, especially in asset
pricing.
Within the hedge fund literature, the identification of risk-adjusted performance is a
widely discussed but still challenging topic due to the absence of a proper hedge fund pricing
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model and due to the dynamic and nontractable risk exposures of these funds. One can
compare the ambiguity approach with Bayesian methods4 to estimate alphas as shown by
Kosowski et al. (2007). They apply a nonparametric bootstrap analysis to estimate alphas
of hedge funds, relying on the fact that most estimates of alpha fail to fit the normal
distribution and exhibit significant negative skewness and high kurtosis. They take the
seven-factor model of Fung and Hsieh (2004) as a benchmark risk model. The bootstrap
results indicate that ordinary least squares (OLS) alphas are often overstated and have
low persistence. The Bayesian alpha is found to be positive and statistically significant
at annual horizons; thus, according to the authors, hedge funds’ performance cannot be
attributed to luck. Avramov et al. (2011) further explore the Bayesian approach and study
the performance of hedge funds while assuming predictability in their return-generating
model. The authors find that strategies incorporating predictability in managerial skills
outperform substantially. Hence, the authors claim that predictability in alphas explains
a large component of hedge fund returns as well as the cross-sectional dispersion observed
in their performance.
Cvitanic et al. (2003) derive a closed-form solution to the optimal hedge fund alloca-
tion problem for investors with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility and in the
presence of uncertain abnormal returns, for instance with Gaussian priors on the abnormal
returns (relative to the CAPM alphas) of risky assets. The authors estimate uncertainty
risk as the standard deviation of alpha estimates across different asset pricing models.
They find that the optimal portfolio weights allocated to hedge funds should be lower
under model misspecification than under the standard optimal asset allocation framework.
Finally, the recent paper by Detemple et al. (2010) proposes an asset allocation model in
which hedge funds represent a nonredundant asset class. They analyze both theoretically
and empirically the market price of hedge fund risk, and find that including hedge funds
4Note that a Bayesian method implies a single prior framework while ambiguity involves a multiple
priors approach.
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in the optimal asset allocation strategy can provide substantial economic benefits due to
the presence of hedge fund managers with market-timing abilities.
2.3 An Equity Hedge Fund Asset Allocation Model
under Ambiguity
This section describes the portfolio allocation model of an equity hedge fund investor
with ambiguity-averse preferences. The investment opportunity set consists of three as-
sets: a risk-free asset and two risky assets, a stock representing the market portfolio and
a hedge fund that can itself take long or short positions in the stock market. The investor
has CRRA preferences and simultaneously displays ambiguity aversion. We investigate the
impact of ambiguity aversion on the optimal portfolio allocation. Furthermore, we derive
the equilibrium pricing implications of the model. In particular, we find that only system-
atic ambiguity over the market portfolio returns is priced in equilibrium. The resulting
equilibrium pricing model, the ACAPM, is a two-factor model in which systematic risk
and ambiguity are both priced.
2.3.1 Assets
Three types of assets exist in the economy. The first asset is a risk-free bond of price Bt,
paying a constant instantaneous interest rate r, implying the dynamics:
dBt = rBtdt. (2.1)
The second asset is a risky stock market portfolio whose instantaneous returns dMt
Mt
follow
a geometric Brownian motion with a constant drift µM and a constant volatility σM :
dMt
Mt
= µMdt+ σMdZ
M
t , (2.2)
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where dZMt is the increment of a standard Brownian motion.
The third asset is an equity hedge fund whose instantaneous returns follow a geometric
Brownian motion with a constant drift µF and a constant volatility σF :
dFt
Ft
= µFdt+ σFdẐt. (2.3)
The hedge fund can invest in both the risky and the risk-free assets, taking either long or
short positions. The total risk of investing in the hedge fund can be broken down into the
systematic risk arising from its exposure to the stock market and into idiosyncratic hedge
fund risk. The standard Brownian motion Ẑt represents the total risk of the hedge fund
and satisfies the following equation:
dẐt = ρdZ
M
t +
√
1− ρ2dZFt , (2.4)
where ρ is the correlation coefficient between the hedge fund and stock market returns, ZFt
is a Brownian motion related to the idiosyncratic (hedge fund-specific) risk, and ZMt is the
Brownian motion mentioned above, relating to the systematic risk (market portfolio).
We assume that the correlation coefficient between the hedge fund and the stock market
returns is constant:
E(dZFt dZMt ) = ρdt. (2.5)
Different hedge fund investment strategies can be distinguished from each other by
the values of their correlation coefficients. A higher correlation is attributed to direc-
tional strategies while a lower value of the coefficient would characterize “market-neutral”
strategies.
Constant model parameters — such as volatilities or correlations — may represent a
strong assumption, given the time-varying risk exposures typically taken by hedge funds.
Even though stochastic models with the above-mentioned state variables might better
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describe the dynamics of hedge fund returns under partially observable, dynamic risk
exposures, we try to keep the modeling framework parsimonious to focus on the ambiguity-
related implications for the cross-section of equity hedge funds’ returns.
2.3.2 Model Misspecification
We assume that the model or probability law that characterizes the stochastic dynamics of
risky assets returns is not correctly specified. Let P be the initial probability measure under
which the assets returns’ dynamics in the economy are specified. We refer to the stochastic
equations describing the dynamics of asset returns under this probability measure as the
reference model. We denote the alternative probability measures by QH , parameterized
by an appropriately adapted process Ht. The existence of the process Ht is ensured by
Girsanov’s Theorem. The process Ht uniquely defines the alternative probability measures.
We assume that QH is an absolutely continuous measure with respect to the reference
probability measure P , so that the Radon-Nikodym derivative or density dQH
dP exists and
is correctly defined.
Moreover, the density coincides with its conditional expectation. Under Novikov’s
condition, the density is an exponential martingale:
dQH
dP = exp
{
−
∫ T
0
|Ht|2
2
dt−
∫ T
0
HtdZt
}
, (2.6)
where Zt = (Z
M
t , Z
F
t ) is a vector of Brownian motions and Ht = (h
M
t , h
F
t ) is a vector of
ambiguity parameters related to the corresponding sources of ambiguity. Since Ht is a vec-
tor, we have |Ht|2 = (hMt )2 +(hFt )2. Indeed, we assume that there is no correlation between
the two sources of ambiguity hMt and h
F
t . This equation determines the parameterization
of alternative probabilities. Since we have two sources of risk, the stock market risk and
the idiosyncratic hedge fund risk, we also obtain two sources of ambiguity: the systematic
stock market ambiguity and the idiosyncratic hedge fund ambiguity.
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Ht determines the relationship between the Brownian motions related to the reference
and alternative models:
ZHt = Zt +
∫ t
0
Hsds, (2.7)
where ZHt is a vector of Brownian motions related to the alternative model and Zt is the
vector of Brownian motions defined above, relating to the reference model. Given the
parametrization of the alternative probability measure, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 2.1. The dynamics of stock market returns and of the long/short equity hedge
fund returns under the alternative probability measure QH jointly satisfy
dMt
Mt
=
(
µM + σMh
M
t
)
dt+ σMdZ
M
t , (2.8)
dFt
Ft
=
(
µF + ρσMh
M
t + σF
√
1− ρ2hFt
)
dt+ σF
(
ρdZMt +
√
1− ρ2dZFt
)
. (2.9)
The stochastic dynamics of assets’ returns under the alternative probability measure are
determined only by the drift change of each corresponding process scaled by the volatility
coefficients. The details of the proof can be found in Appendix 2.6.1.
We use robust control optimization with a relative entropy penalty term to specify
ambiguity aversion. The relative entropy measures the size of model misspecification or
the “distance”5 between two probability laws QH and P , and is defined as follows:
Ent(QH |P) = EH ln
(QH
P
)
. (2.10)
Lemma 2.2. The local relative entropy has the following functional form:
Ent(QH |P) = EH 1
2
∫ T
0
H2t dt. (2.11)
5Strictly speaking, the entropy is not a true distance measure because it is not symmetric.
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The global entropy is a compounded local relative entropy:
Entglob(QH |P) = δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
EH
∫ t
0
H2s
2
ds
)
dt, (2.12)
where δ > 0 is a discount factor.
Lemma 2.2 (details of the proof can be found in Appendix 2.6.1) shows that entropy is
a convex function of the ambiguity parameters captured in Ht at any time t.
2.3.3 Investor Preferences and the Portfolio Optimization Problem
The investor is characterized by a CRRA intertemporal utility over an infinite time
horizon, with a discount factor δ and a risk-aversion coefficient γ. The entropy in the
intertemporal utility of an ambiguity-averse agent constitutes a penalty term for any de-
viation from the reference model. The utility optimization problem has a Max-Min form,
according to which we first minimize with respect to parameters of the alternative proba-
bility laws hM and hF , searching for the worst-case scenario, and then maximize expected
discounted utility with respect to consumption and the portfolio weights:
max
θM ,θF ,C
min
hM ,hF
EH
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
C1−γt
1− γ +
(hMt )
2
2ψM
+
(hFt )
2
2ψF
)
dt, (2.13)
where Ct is the investor’s instantaneous consumption, θM is the fraction of his wealth
invested in the stock market, θF is the fraction of his wealth invested in the hedge fund,
and the residual 1 − θM − θF is allocated to the risk-free bond. (hMt , hFt ) is a vector of
ambiguity parameters related to stock market ambiguity and hedge fund ambiguity. The
positive vector parameter ψ = (ψM , ψF ) is an agent-specific weight indicating how much
the investor penalizes the alternative scenarios. This parameter represents the ambiguity-
aversion coefficient. If ψ = 0, the deviation penalty is infinite and the investor chooses to
remain under the reference model. If ψ → ∞, the penalty term goes to zero in the limit,
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and the investor does not restrict himself in the choice of alternative probability measures.
This is a myopic solution.
The optimization problem with the penalty function is solved subject to the stochastic
wealth dynamics of the investor endowed with initial wealth W0 as in the standard Merton
model.
Theorem 2.1. The solution of the optimization problem (2.13) subject to stochastic dy-
namics of asset returns as described in Lemma 2.1 for an ambiguity-averse agent with
initial wealth W0 is the following:
• the optimal consumption is
C∗ = [JW ]
− 1
γ , (2.14)
where J(W, t) is the indirect utility function satisfying the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation;
• the optimal fraction of wealth invested in the stock market is
θM =
µM − r − θFρσM(ΩMσM + γσF )
(γ + ΩM)σ2M
; (2.15)
• the optimal fraction of wealth invested in the hedge fund is
θF =
µF − r − θMρσM(ΩMσM + γσF )
γσ2F + ΩMρ
2σ2M + ΩFσ
2
F (1− ρ2)
, (2.16)
where Ω = (ΩM ,ΩF ) is a time-invariant vector proportional to the ambiguity aversion
vector-coefficient ψ = (ψM , ψF ):
ψ =
Ω
WJW
. (2.17)
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Proposition 2.1. The explicit solution for the optimal portfolio weights is as follows:
θM =
(µM − r)− B
D
(µF − r)
A− B2
D
, (2.18)
θF =
(µF − r)− C
A
(µM − r)
D − B2
A
, (2.19)
where coefficients A, B, C, and D are parameters dependent on volatilities σM and σF ,
ambiguities ΩM and ΩF , and the correlation coefficient ρ:
A = (γ + ΩM)σ
2
M , (2.20)
B = ρσM(ΩMσM + γσF ), (2.21)
C = B, (2.22)
D = γσ2F + ΩMρ
2σ2M + ΩFσ
2
F (1− ρ2). (2.23)
The derivation of the optimal portfolio weights can be found in Appendix 2.6.1.
The influence of systematic stock market ambiguity and idiosyncratic hedge fund am-
biguity on the optimal portfolio choice depends on the correlation coefficient ρ. On the one
hand, when ρ approaches 1, ΩF = 0 and the impact of hedge fund ambiguity disappears.
The stock market ambiguity affects the optimal portfolio weights either by increasing over-
all risk aversion (denominator effect) or through relative betas βM,F =
B
D
and βF,M =
C
A
.
On the other hand, when ρ approaches 0, the relative betas are equal to zero (there is
no correlation between hedge fund and stock market returns: βM,F = βF,M = 0) and the
formulas for the optimal allocation reduce to the following expressions:
θM =
µM − r
(γ + ΩM)σ2M
, (2.24)
θF =
µF − r
(γ + ΩF )σ2F
. (2.25)
71
Equations (2.24) and (2.25) can be compared with Merton’s optimal portfolio weights
in the case of ambiguity-averse preferences. In this case, ambiguity simply amplifies the
impact of risk aversion, reducing the optimal portfolio allocation to risky securities.
2.3.4 Equilibrium Equity Hedge Fund Pricing Model
To derive the equilibrium pricing relationship, we now impose the market-clearing condi-
tions on the optimal portfolio weights. In equilibrium, the representative investor holds
the stock market portfolio. The market-clearing conditions for the portfolio weights thus
satisfy the following relation:
θF = 0 and θM = 1. (2.26)
Substituting those values into the implicit expressions for the optimal portfolio weights in
Theorem 2.1, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2. The expected stock market returns satisfy the following condition:
µM = r + γσ2M + ΩMσ
2
M . (2.27)
The expected hedge fund returns satisfy the following:
µF = r + γσFρσM + ΩMρσ
2
M . (2.28)
Proposition 2.2 defines a representation of the ACAPM for expected stock market and
hedge fund returns. These equations show that the investor is compensated both for
bearing stock market risk and for acting under stock market ambiguity. These formulas
are similar to the two-factor relationship between equilibrium expected returns and risk
and ambiguity that were first derived by Kogan and Wang (2003) and empirically tested
by Anderson et al. (2009) for the equity market. Our paper empirically relies on this
proposition to characterize long/short equity hedge fund returns.
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The risk and ambiguity premia depend on the correlation coefficient between hedge fund
and stock market returns. Under the assumption of zero correlation, hedge fund investors
would not earn a premium for either stock market risk or stock market ambiguity. Such
a relationship is characteristic of nondirectional hedge fund strategies and absolute return
strategies with zero market betas. If the correlation is nonzero, the investor in the equity
hedge fund also earns an ambiguity premium reflected in the term ΩMρσ
2
M as well as a stock
market risk premium expressed by the well-known term γσFρσM . In the empirical section,
we organize the sample of long/short equity hedge funds based on their equity market
betas, assign them to the categories of directional and nondirectional equity hedge funds,
and separately estimate their ambiguity exposures. We conjecture, based on Proposition
2.2, that directional hedge funds should have higher stock market ambiguity exposures.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
The objective of the empirical analysis is twofold. First, we estimate the ambiguity betas
of long/short equity hedge funds with various benchmark models to compare their system-
atic ambiguity exposures with our theoretical model’s predictions. Second, we construct
long-only portfolios of long/short equity hedge funds relying on the ACAPM alphas in
the portfolios’ formation, and compute these portfolios’ out-of-sample returns. We then
compare the performance of these portfolios with that of portfolios formed without taking
systematic ambiguity exposure into account.
This empirical study is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to estimate the impact
of systematic ambiguity on long/short equity hedge funds’ return properties. We propose
to construct systematic ambiguity factors based on the cross-sectional dispersion of pro-
fessional forecasts for stock market index returns and a specific macroeconomic indicator,
namely industrial production growth.
The analysis is restricted to long/short equity hedge funds for two reasons. First,
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this is the largest category of hedge funds — in terms of assets under management —
within our hedge fund sample. Second, the primary investment instruments used in this
strategy are equity-linked and thus allow us to focus meaningfully on the role of stock
market ambiguity on the returns of hedge funds belonging to this strategy. We do not
exclude the possibility that ambiguity also affects other hedge fund strategies. However,
the return-generating model would then require different benchmark pricing models and
more detailed knowledge of the specific investment instruments used by those hedge funds.
This issue is left for future research.
2.4.1 Hedge Fund Data
We use the TASS Hedge Fund Database during the period from January 1994 through
November 2007.6 The database contains monthly data on the rate of return, assets under
management, and other characteristics of live and defunct hedge funds. A defunct hedge
fund is a fund that stopped reporting to the TASS database due to liquidation, merger, or
any other reason. These funds are contained in the Graveyard module, which is available
from January 1994 onwards.7 Reporting to the database is a voluntary decision for a hedge
fund’s manager, and thus we cannot know the exact reason for nonreporting. Nevertheless,
the combination of defunct and live funds allows us to account for survivorship bias.
We impose various filters to refine our data sample. First, we exclude the first 12 months
of observations from the sample in order to account for instant history bias. Backfill or
instant history bias is common in hedge fund databases as fund managers choose to report
hedge fund performance, not from inception, but rather after an established successful track
6The data for the paper were purchased at the end of 2007. We do not update the paper from 2008
onwards. We believe that the main conjectures are still valid after 2008, especially as investors have
demonstrated significant ambiguity aversion since the crisis. However, investors exited both the equity
market and equity hedge funds in the fall of 2008. Therefore, the implications of the asset allocation model
in the paper should be tested on the complete set of asset classes and hedge fund strategies. This task is
left for future research.
7This is the reason why most research using this database starts in January 1994.
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record, backfilling missing historical data. Second, only hedge funds reporting returns net
of fees in U.S. dollars and at monthly tracking frequency are selected. The final sample of
long/short equity hedge funds over the period between January 1994 and November 2007
consists of 2070 observations. The average (mean) life time of a long/short equity hedge
fund in the sample is 60 months, while the median lifetime is 50 months.
Panel A of Table 2.1 (see Appendix 2.6.2 for all tables) presents descriptive characteris-
tics of our sample of hedge funds. We report cross-sectional average values computed from
the monthly data for the whole sample and for each year.8 The number of long/short equity
hedge funds grew from 206 in 1994 to 986 in 2007, with a peak of 1168 hedge funds in 2005.
The positive trend in the sample size reflects the rapid development of this segment of the
hedge fund industry over the 13 years covered by our data. The drop in the sample size
during the last year may indicate the realization of capacity constraint in the long/short
equity hedge fund strategy. Moreover, many quantitative equity funds experienced large
losses during August 2007. The average assets under management (AUM) of hedge funds
grew from USD 60M to USD 152M by the end of 2007, albeit with troughs in 1995 and
1999.
The fee structure consists of a fixed management fee, an incentive fee, and a high
water mark provision. The management fee is on average 1.20%; the average incentive fee
reaches 18% during the sample period. In parallel, the lockup period9 increased from 2.8
to 5.5 months during the sample period. The leverage ratio reached its peak of 140% in
1999 and 2000 and then started decreasing to about 130%. However, the number of hedge
funds reporting nonzero leverage values increased considerably during our sample period.
Roughly one-third of long/short equity hedge funds reported nonzero leverage over the
sample period.
Panel B of Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics of long/short equity hedge fund
8Note that we only cover the first 11 months in 2007.
9The lockup period is a certain period of time during which the money allocated to the hedge fund
cannot be withdrawn.
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returns. Long/short equity hedge funds display large variability in their monthly returns:
the annualized average hedge fund return is 12.9% with an annualized standard deviation
of 15.92%. The annualized average Sharpe ratio10 is 0.70. The annual return distribution is
positively skewed (the skewness coefficient is 0.76). However, the annual kurtosis coefficient
is close to the value of 3 for the normal distribution: the mean and median values are
4.25 and 3.56 respectively, with a standard deviation of 1.58. In addition, we performed a
Jarque-Bera goodness-of-fit test of the normality of hedge fund returns. The null hypothesis
indicates that the returns are normally distributed against the alternative hypothesis that
the returns are not normally distributed (within the Pearson family of distributions). We
run the test for each hedge fund and assign a value JB = 0 if the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected and JB = 1 otherwise. We report the cross-sectional average of JB values
as well the median value and the standard deviation. JB = 0.66 means that we reject
the null hypothesis of a normal distribution of returns for 66% of the long/short equity
hedge funds in the sample. Moreover, we report the cross-sectional average, median, and
standard deviation for the p-values and actual values of the Jarque-Bera statistic.
2.4.2 Construction of the Systematic Ambiguity Factors
We construct two systematic ambiguity factors using the dispersion (standard deviation)
in the cross-section of survey-based forecasts for S&P 500 stock market index returns and
for growth in the US Industrial Production Index. The data source for the forecasts is
the Livingston Survey, begun in June 1946 by Joseph Livingston and taken over in 1990
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The survey, conducted semiannually each
June and December, asks participants to provide forecasts for key economic variables for
the end of the current month, 6 months ahead, and 12 months ahead. We will consider
10The Sharpe ratio is defined as the ratio of the historic average hedge fund monthly return in excess
of the risk-free rate (the return on a 1-month Treasury bill) to the standard deviation of monthly returns.
The Sharpe ratio is annualized and a cross-sectional mean value is reported.
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only the medium term 6-months-ahead forecasts for the analysis. On the one hand, the
forecasts for the end of the current month might be inappropriate as some information
about the actual values of the variables in the current month may be learned during
the month by a forecaster. On the other hand, the cross-section of the longer-term 12-
months-ahead forecasts might have higher dispersion, not because of ambiguity regarding
the state of economy but rather due to a greater inability to forecast long-term trends.
The affiliations of individual forecasters vary and consist of nonfinancial business (30%),
investment banking (29%), commercial banking (20%), academic institutions (13%), and
government, insurance companies, and labor organization (the remaining 8%).11
We will rely on two different systematic ambiguity measures: macroeconomic ambiguity
and stock market ambiguity. We use these two measures for two reasons. On the one hand,
using two different variables would contribute to the robustness of the results and mitigate
potential data problems with survey-based forecasts. On the other hand, we believe that
both macroeconomic and stock market ambiguity may significantly affect the returns of
long/short equity hedge funds, and we are interested in the comparative analysis for those
two ambiguity measures.
As far as the macroeconomic ambiguity measure is concerned, the Livingston Survey
provides values for the 6-months-ahead forecast for the Industrial Production Index with
seasonal adjustments. The data are taken from December 1989. Actual values of the
Industrial Production Index are available from the Federal Reserve Board G17 statistical
release series. On average, the panel of respondents consists of 37 forecasters, with a stan-
dard deviation of 12. We compute the expected semiannual index return as the percentage
change between a forecast and a base-period index level. The macroeconomic ambiguity
measure is defined as the cross-sectional standard deviation of the forecasted returns.
The stock market ambiguity measure is defined as the standard deviation in the fore-
casts of S&P 500 stock market index returns. The stock market forecast is a 6-months-
11See Croushore (1997) for further details on these estimates.
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ahead forecast for the S&P 500 Index level on the last trading day of June or December.
The underlying data source is the New York Times, and the data are available from De-
cember 1990. On average, the panel of respondents consists of 25 forecasters, with a
standard deviation of 6. We compute a semiannual expected return for each forecaster as
the percentage price return between a forecasted index value and a base-period index level.
The ambiguity measure is again defined as the cross-sectional standard deviation of the
forecasted returns.
To construct each ambiguity factor, we proceed as follows: we rank all constituents
of the S&P 500 Index12 according to their sensitivity to the specific ambiguity measure
(S&P 500 or Industrial Production) by running the following OLS rolling regression at
semiannual frequency and with a fixed-size estimation window:
StockReturni,t −RiskFreet = α + βmkt(SP500t −RiskFreet) + βambAmbt + εt. (2.29)
The ambiguity factor is then computed as the out-of-sample return of an equally
weighted long/short portfolio of stocks where long positions are taken in the top decile
and short positions are taken in the bottom decile of stocks ranked by their ambiguity sen-
sitivities βamb. The size of the estimation window is 4 years. The initial estimation window
consists of all data prior to January 1994: from December 1990 for stock market ambiguity
and from December 1989 for macroeconomic ambiguity. In both cases, the first observation
for the ambiguity factor refers to January 1994. We generate monthly ambiguity factor
returns while we re-estimate the regression for the sensitivities every 6 months.
The time series of ambiguity factor returns for the stock market and macroeconomic
ambiguity factors are displayed in Figure 2-1 in Appendix 2.6.2. In both cases, the ambi-
guity factor experiences the highest volatility over the period between 2000 and 2003. The
maximum absolute values of the ambiguity factors are reached in 2000, during the spikes
12Data for stock returns of S&P 500 constituent stocks are downloaded from the CRSP (Center for
Research in Security Prices) database.
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in uncertainty just before the dot-com bubble burst. The lowest values of the ambiguity
factors are usually observed during periods of economic recovery.
In order to investigate potential multicollinearity among the two ambiguity factors
and the other standard risk factors, we calculate pairwise correlation coefficients: the
Pearson correlation, the Kendall correlation, and the Spearman correlation for both the
macroeconomic ambiguity AmbIP and the stock market ambiguity AmbSP factors and
the Fama-French and Carhart momentum risk factors. The correlation coefficients are
displayed in Panel A of Table 2.2. We observe that both ambiguity factors have low
correlation levels with the equity market factor. It is worth noting, however, that we found
different signs for the correlations of the market factor with the stock market ambiguity
factor (positive) and with the macroeconomic ambiguity factor (negative), respectively.
Higher correlations are observed with the Fama-French factors HML (high minus low) and
SMB (small minus big). SMB and HML have relatively high Pearson correlations with
the stock market ambiguity factor: 0.37 and −0.37, respectively. However, for the Kendall
and Spearman coefficients, the values drop to negligible levels. Hence, it is likely that
the high value of the Pearson correlation is due to some outliers and does not present
a matter of concern. The momentum factor, however, exhibits strong correlation with
the macroeconomic ambiguity factor: 0.65 for the Pearson coefficient and 0.43 for the
Spearman coefficient. The correlation between momentum and stock market ambiguity is
low: 0.17 for the Pearson coefficient and 0.07 for the Spearman coefficient.
Given the high correlations observed between the macroeconomic ambiguity and mo-
mentum factors, we further investigate the causality between those factors. Panel B of
Table 2.2 reports values of the F -statistic and corresponding critical values of the Granger
causality test with a maximum of 5 lags (the actual number of lags is chosen using the
Bayesian information criterion) and at the 5% significance level. The values F and Fc
correspond to the regressions such that momentum causes ambiguity and the values G
and Gc correspond to the opposite such that ambiguity causes momentum. Whenever the
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value of the F -statistic is higher than the critical value, we reject the null hypothesis of
no Granger causality. We reject the null hypothesis in both directions in the case of the
stock market ambiguity AmbSP factor. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
momentum causes ambiguity in the case of the macroeconomic ambiguity factor AmbIP.
2.4.3 Long/Short Equity Hedge Funds’ Ambiguity Betas
In this section, we estimate the ambiguity exposures of long/short equity hedge funds by
adding the macroeconomic or stock market ambiguity factor to traditional linear multi-
factor hedge fund return-generating models. The regressions are estimated for portfolios
of equally weighted and value-weighted long/short equity hedge funds as well as for indi-
vidual long/short equity hedge funds. All coefficients are estimated with standard OLS
regressions.
We will rely on three benchmark risk factor models: the CAPM, the Fama-French
model augmented with the HML and SMB factors, and the Carhart model augmented
with the momentum factor. The data for the equity factors are taken from the K. French
data library.13 The market factor is the return on the market (the value-weighted return
on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks) in excess of the risk-free rate. The risk-free
rate is the 1-month T-bill rate taken from Ibbotson Associates.
Let us start by examining the estimated ambiguity betas for the equally weighted (EW )
and value-weighted (VW ) long/short equity hedge fund portfolios. The estimates are pre-
sented in Table 2.3 for the CAPM and the Fama-French and Carhart models, augmented
by the ambiguity factors. Under the ACAPM, we find significant estimates of ambiguity
betas in the range of 0.07 to 0.15, depending on the portfolio formation and type of ambigu-
ity factor. Value-weighted portfolios tend to have higher ambiguity betas, suggesting that
13I thank K. French for providing these risk factors. Data are publicly available and regularly updated on
the following website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.
html.
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larger hedge funds display higher stock market or macroeconomic ambiguity exposures.
Ambiguity betas are slightly higher for macroeconomic ambiguity that for stock market
ambiguity. The market betas for the portfolios of hedge funds are fairly stable with values
around 0.50.
The Fama-French and Carhart models both have higher explanatory power for long/short
equity hedge fund portfolio returns than the one-factor CAPM: 0.83 and 0.85, respectively,
versus 0.68 for the equally weighted portfolios and 0.70 and 0.77, respectively, versus 0.50
for the value-weighted portfolios. The ambiguity betas in the Fama-French specification
are lower than in the CAPM and are significant only for the macroeconomic ambiguity fac-
tor. We document significant estimates of ambiguity betas of 0.05 and 0.10 for the equally
weighted and value-weighted portfolios, respectively. In the case of the Carhart 4-factor
model, ambiguity betas lose their statistical significance while the momentum factor is
highly significant. The likely cause of this insignificance is the potential multicollinearity
between the macroeconomic ambiguity factor and the momentum factor reported in Table
2.2 and discussed in Section 2.4.2.
We then extend the measurement of ambiguity exposures to individual long/short eq-
uity hedge funds, running each of the three multifactor risk models with both ambiguity
factors for each individual hedge fund in the sample. Table 2.4 reports the mean and me-
dian estimates of alphas and ambiguity betas that are significant at the 10% level as well as
the adjusted R2 coefficients for these regressions in the case of both macroeconomic ambi-
guity and stock market ambiguity factors. We observe that about 27% of long/short equity
hedge funds have significant stock market ambiguity exposures and 32% have significant
macroeconomic ambiguity betas under the ACAPM regression. The median estimate of
the ambiguity beta equals 0.13 and 0.15 for the stock market and macroeconomic ambigu-
ity factors, respectively. The median explanatory power of the models with ambiguity for
individual hedge funds reaches approximately 0.30 in the case of the augmented CAPM.
Ambiguity betas and the number of hedge funds with significant ambiguity betas relative
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to the augmented Fama-French and Carhart models are lower. However, in these cases, we
did not adjust the results for the multicollinearity between the ambiguity factors and the
momentum factor.
Next, we differentiate hedge funds by their market betas and examine separately the
ambiguity betas for high and low market beta hedge funds. These results are reported in
the bottom two panels of Table 2.4. The threshold for the market betas is set at 0.10.
High market beta hedge funds are those with estimated values of betas higher than 0.10
and statistically significant at 10% level. Low market beta hedge funds constitute the rest
of the sample. There are 838 hedge funds in the high market beta category and 1232 in
the low market beta category. About 50 to 56% of the high market beta hedge funds (446
hedge funds for the ACAPM model) have significant ambiguity exposures with estimated
ambiguity beta coefficients similar to those observed in the overall sample: 0.13 for both
the stock market and macroeconomic ambiguities. Only 12 to 18% of the low market beta
hedge funds exhibit significant exposure to the ambiguity factor with mean estimates of the
ambiguity beta of 0.05 for the stock market ambiguity factor in the ACAPM model. These
results confirm the hypothesis stated in the theoretical section, namely that systematic
ambiguity matters primarily for long/short equity hedge funds that pursue directional
strategies and thus have higher stock market betas.
We further test whether the macroeconomic ambiguity factor adds value relative to the
Carhart model. For this purpose, we augment the Carhart model with macroeconomic
ambiguity by substituting the original MOM (momentum) and ambiguity factors by their
orthogonal counterparts: the principal components PC 1 and PC 2 of the joint matrix
[MOM,AmbIP ]. By considering principal components that are orthogonal, by definition, we
solve the potential multicollinearity issue. Assuming that the orthogonal momentum factor
alone is significant, if the second orthogonal factor PC 2 is still statistically significant, then
variations in the macroeconomic ambiguity factor contribute to explaining the systematic
risk exposures of long/short equity hedge funds. The drawback of this approach is that
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the estimated coefficients of PC 2 do not represent macroeconomic ambiguity betas exactly.
We report the results of these regressions in Panel A of Table 2.5 for equally weighted and
value-weighted portfolios of hedge funds and in Panel B of Table 2.5 for the individual
hedge funds. We confirm the statistical significance at the 1% level of the coefficients
for both PC 1 and PC 2 for the hedge fund portfolios. Furthermore, the percentages of
significant coefficients in PC 1 and PC 2 are higher for individual hedge funds with high
stock market betas (i.e., directional hedge funds).
From this analysis of the ambiguity betas, we can conclude that ambiguity exposure
is statistically significant and economically meaningful for directional long/short equity
hedge funds. Furthermore, value-weighted portfolios have higher exposure to ambiguity,
and hence hedge funds with higher assets under management seem to be more exposed to
stock market and macroeconomic ambiguity.
2.4.4 Asset Allocation under Systematic Ambiguity
In this section, we examine the value added by accounting for systematic ambiguity when
constructing portfolios of long/short equity hedge funds. We estimate alphas for individ-
ual long/short equity hedge funds in our sample under both the ACAPM and the CAPM.
These estimated alphas are then used to select hedge funds and construct long-only port-
folios whose out-of-sample performance is examined. Portfolios consist of the top 10 hedge
funds ranked by their estimated alphas under both models. We assess the risk-adjusted
performance of these hedge fund portfolios during the whole sample period (except for the
observations from the first estimation window). The portfolio construction method was
motivated by the Avramov and Wermers (2006) study that assessed the ex-post out-of-
sample performance of various portfolio strategies with monthly rebalancing. The initial
estimation window size in that paper is 60 months, and an additional month is added at
each realigning point. In our study, we conduct rolling estimation with a fixed-size window
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of 60 months and rebalance the portfolio every 6 months. The semiannual rebalancing
approach corresponds to an average lockup period. As a robustness check, we also pro-
vide results with rebalancing frequencies of 1 month and 12 months. The portfolios are
constructed on both an equally weighted and a value-weighted basis. We collect the out-
of-sample returns of these portfolios (based on the ACAPM and the CAPM) from January
2000 (61st month) to November 2007 (end of the sample period) and compute their real-
ized alphas relative to three benchmark multifactor models: the CAPM, the Fama-French
three-factor model, and the Carhart four-factor model.
Table 2.6 reports the risk-adjusted performance or monthly alphas in percentage points
of the portfolios of long/short equity hedge funds. The comparison across performance
measurement models is organized in columns. EW and VW stand for whether the portfolio
is constructed on an equally weighted or value-weighted basis, respectively. If the portfolio
construction involves estimating alphas utilizing models with systematic ambiguity, we add
the terms AmbSP and AmbIP for the stock market and macroeconomic ambiguity factors,
respectively. We find that the alphas of the portfolios formed with the ambiguity factors are
positive, statistically significant, and higher than those estimated for the portfolios formed
without the ambiguity factors. For example, with the CAPM performance measurement
model over a 12-month holding period, the estimated alpha equals 1.01 for the equally
weighted portfolio formed without the ambiguity factor versus 1.23 (1.29) for the models
with the stock market (macroeconomic) ambiguity factor. Value-weighted portfolios have
higher alphas (except over the 1-month holding period) but similar rankings: for instance,
under the CAPM benchmark performance model and over the 12-month holding period,
alpha equals 1.09 (with a t-statistic of 1.6) for the no-ambiguity model and increases to
1.54 (with a t-statistic of 2.86) for the AmbSP and to 1.92 (with a t-statistic of 3.86) for
the AmbIP models. The abnormal performance of all hedge fund portfolios decreases but
remains significant over longer and thus more realistic (given hedge funds’ lockup periods)
holding periods.
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Thus, we can conclude from these out-of-sample performance results that selecting
long/short equity hedge fund portfolios based on hedge funds’ ambiguity-adjusted alphas
can generate superior performance that remains statistically and economically significant
across all pricing models, even when yearly holding periods are considered.
2.4.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, we discuss the robustness of the empirical results presented so far.
First, in the entire analysis, we relied on two ambiguity factors: the first factor, which
assesses the ambiguity surrounding the S&P 500 rate of return forecasts, and the second
one, which assesses the ambiguity surrounding the forecasts of Industrial Production Index
growth. The results are to a large extent consistent across those two ambiguity factors.
We measured ambiguity in both cases as the forecasts’ dispersion using the cross-sectional
standard deviation. We also studied alternative measures of dispersion such as the range
(i.e., the difference between the maximum and minimum forecasted values) and the mean
absolute deviation (MAD, computed as the average of the absolute values of the deviations
of the individual forecasts from the arithmetic mean). We found consistent results and no
significant difference when using those measures as opposed to the standard deviation for
the estimation of ambiguity betas and for testing the portfolios’ out-of-sample performance.
Second, we always considered equally weighted portfolios as well as value-weighted
portfolios to illustrate the impact of large funds. We find that generally the value-weighted
portfolios generate superior abnormal performance. Moreover, value-weighted portfolios
tend to have higher estimated ambiguity betas regardless of the benchmark risk models.
In the portfolio allocation section, our results clearly show that accounting for ambiguity
exposure is important for filtering out lower-performing hedge funds.
Third, we vary the estimation window for the portfolio construction: 36 months versus
60 months.14 We find no significant impact of the rebalancing window on the results.
14The results for the 36-month estimation window are not reported for parsimony but are available upon
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Fourth, we repeat the analysis while enlarging the scope of performance models to the
seven risk factors of the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model that encompasses the asset-based
style factors and three option-based trend-following factors. The factors for the Fung
and Hsieh (2004) model are available from the D. Hsieh’s data library.15 The first three
factors are trend-following risk factors: first, PTFSBD is a bond trend-following factor,
constructed as the return on a PTFS 16 bond lookback straddle; second, PTFSFX is a
currency trend-following factor, which is constructed as the return on a PTFS currency
lookback straddle; and finally PTFSCOM is a commodity trend-following factor, which is
constructed as the return on a PTFS commodity lookback straddle. The next two factors
are equity-oriented risk factors: the equity market factors are the S&P 500 monthly total
return index SP500TR and the size spread factor Size, defined as the Russell 2000 Index
monthly total return minus the S&P 500 monthly total return.17 The last two factors are
bond-oriented risk factors: the bond market factor Bond defined as the monthly change
in the 10-year Treasury constant maturity yield (month end-to-month end), available from
the St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data database (FRED); and the credit spread
factor Credit defined as the monthly change in Moody’s Baa yield less 10-year Treasury
constant maturity yield (month end-to-month end), also available from FRED.18
Table 2.7 reports the correlation coefficients of the stock market and macroeconomic
ambiguity factors with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. We find no significant correlation
between either ambiguity factor and the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors that would raise
request.
15Refer to the following website: https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm.
16PTFS stands for primitive trend-following strategy, as described by Fung and Hsieh (2004).
17Fung and Hsieh updated the factors provided on the web page. In the original paper they used the
Wilshire Small Cap 1750 minus Wilshire Large Cap 750 monthly return.
18The two bond-oriented factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model do not represent excess returns
on traded assets. Thus, the regression intercept cannot be interpreted as an abnormal return. To obtain
abnormal return estimates, one could replace the factors by excess returns on tradable factor-mimicking
portfolios: the bond factor would be the return on the US Treasury 10-year government bond index in
excess of the risk-free rate; the credit spread factor would be the return on the Baa corporate bond index
in excess of the return on treasuries. Since the focus of our analysis is the estimation of ambiguity betas
rather than abnormal returns, we use the original Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors.
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any multicollinearity issues in the subsequent regression analysis. Table 2.8 reports the
factor loadings when using the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model augmented with the ambiguity
factors for equally weighted and value-weighted portfolios of long/short equity hedge funds.
The total return of the S&P 500 Index and the size spread are the only significant factors.
However, the ambiguity factor is always significant, with OLS estimates in the range of
0.11 to 0.17. The explanatory power of the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model measured by the
adjusted R2 coefficient increases noticeably after adding either of the ambiguity factors.
Table 2.9 reports ambiguity betas for the individual hedge funds and for hedge funds
sorted by their market betas. High market beta hedge funds once again tend to have
higher ambiguity exposure estimates, and about 35% of high market beta hedge funds
have statistically significant ambiguity exposures versus about 20% for the low market
beta hedge funds.
Finally, we analyze the time series properties of ambiguity betas by conducting a rolling
regression estimation. To assess the time variation in the ambiguity beta estimates, rolling
regressions with a 36-month fixed-size sample window were estimated for the CAPM and
Fama-French ambiguity-adjusted models in the case of value-weighted portfolios.19 At the
end of Appendix 2.6.2, Figure 2-2 illustrates rolling ambiguity betas: graphs A and B plot
the stock market ambiguity betas, and graphs C and D plot the macroeconomic ambiguity
betas. The stock market ambiguity exposures grew during the period after the Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM) collapse, with a peak around 2000 during the dot-com
bubble burst. Afterwards, we experienced a strong bull market, and the estimated stock
market ambiguity exposures decreased. When we look at the macroeconomic ambiguity
exposures, we observe that these betas reached a peak around the turn of the millennium
and later increased gradually from 2003 and more rapidly from 2005, contrasting with
stock market ambiguity exposures, which are characterized by a negative trend toward the
end of the sample period. Thus, long/short equity hedge funds’ sensitivity to fundamental
19Rolling ambiguity betas for alternative model specifications are available upon request.
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uncertainty increased at the same time as their sensitivity to stock market uncertainty
decreased.
2.5 Conclusion
Following Maenhout (2004), this study derives the optimal portfolio choice of an equity
hedge fund investor who is sensitive to ambiguity. The solution of the asset allocation model
reveals that stock market ambiguity induces the investor to reduce his or her allocation to
risky assets. Furthermore, imposing market-clearing conditions, we obtain an equilibrium
asset-pricing model with stock market ambiguity (ACAPM). In equilibrium, only stock
market ambiguity exposure is priced.
In the empirical section, we investigate long/short equity hedge funds and start by
estimating their exposures to macroeconomic and stock market ambiguity factors. For this
purpose, we measure macroeconomic and stock market ambiguity as the cross-sectional
dispersion in the forecasts of Industrial Production Index growth and of S&P 500 Index
return from the Livingston Survey, respectively. We construct the ambiguity factors as
long/short portfolios of S&P 500 stocks. We estimate ambiguity betas for long/short
equity hedge funds and document significant stock market and macroeconomic ambiguity
exposures for those funds that follow directional (i.e., high stock market beta) strategies.
We then compare the out-of-sample performance of hedge fund portfolios constructed based
on their alpha rankings obtained from two pricing models, with and without a systematic
ambiguity factor (the ACAPM and the CAPM, respectively). The out-of-sample analysis
shows that portfolios constructed based on ACAPM alphas display superior abnormal
risk-adjusted returns, especially for the value-weighted portfolios, and that this superior
performance is robust to alternative rebalancing horizons and performance measurement
models.
This study offers an insight into a thus far neglected dimension of long/short equity
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hedge fund risk profiles, namely their stock market (or macroeconomic) ambiguity expo-
sures. Our empirical results suggest that for this large category of hedge funds, systematic
ambiguity is economically and statistically significant and could be meaningfully exploited
by hedge fund investors and fund-of-hedge-fund managers. Interesting extensions of this
study would involve examining whether systematic ambiguity matters for understanding
other types of hedge fund strategies. Furthermore, it would be useful to determine whether
and how ambiguity regarding the skills of individual hedge fund managers should be taken
into account during the portfolio construction process. These issues are left for further
research.
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2.6 Appendices
2.6.1 Optimal Asset Allocation of an Ambiguity-Averse Investor
In this section, we present the mathematical details of the theoretical part of the paper.
Proof of Lemma 2.1
The asset returns under the reference model P are the following:
dBt = rBtdt, (2.30)
dMt
Mt
= µMdt+ σMdZ
M
t , (2.31)
dFt
Ft
= µFdt+ σFdẐt,where dẐt = ρdZ
M
t +
√
1− ρ2dZFt . (2.32)
Let QH be an alternative probability measure parameterized by an appropriately adapted
process Ht, with
dQH
dP = exp
{
−
∫ T
0
|Ht|2
2
dt−
∫ T
0
HtdZt
}
, where Ht = (h
M
t , h
F
t ). (2.33)
It follows from equation (2.33) that the relationship between the Brownian motions
related to the alternative model and the reference model is linear: ZHt = Zt +
∫ t
0
Hsds.
Hence, dZHt = dZt + Htdt. We substitute this formula into equations (2.31) and (2.32) to
obtain the stochastic dynamics of asset returns under the alternative probability measure
QH :
dMt
Mt
=
(
µM + σMh
M
t
)
dt+ σMdZ
M
t , (2.34)
dFt
Ft
=
(
µF + ρσMh
M
t + σF
√
1− ρ2hFt
)
dt+ σF
(
ρdZMt +
√
1− ρ2dZFt
)
. (2.35)
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Proof of Lemma 2.2
The formula for the relative entropy is derived as follows:
Ent(QH |P) = EH ln
(QH
P
)
= EH
(
−
∫ T
0
|Ht|2
2
dt−
∫ T
0
HtdZt
)
= EH
(
−
∫ T
0
|Ht|2
2
dt−
∫ T
0
Ht(dZ
H
t −Htdt)
)
= EH
∫ T
0
|Ht|2
2
dt. (2.36)
Compounding the entropy in equation (2.36), we obtain the value of the global entropy as
follows
Entglob(QH |P) = δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
EH
∫ t
0
(hMs )
2 + (hFs )
2
2
ds
)
dt. (2.37)
Proof of Theorem 2.1
The expected utility optimization problem has a Max-Min formulation whereby we first
minimize with respect to the parameters of the alternative probability laws hM and hF
searching for the worst-case scenario and then maximize expected discounted utility with
respect to the consumption and the portfolio weights:
max
θM ,θ,C
min
hM ,hF
EH
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
C1−γt
1− γ +
(hMt )
2
2ψM
+
(hFt )
2
2ψF
)
dt. (2.38)
The sources of ambiguity hMt and h
F
t are assumed to be uncorrelated.
The optimization problem is solved subject to the stochastic wealth dynamics of the
investor endowed with initial wealth W0 as in the standard Merton model. The wealth
dynamics under the reference probability measure
dWt =
( (
θM(µ
M − r) + θF (µF − r) + r
)
Wt − Ct
)
dt
+Wt(σMθM + σFρθF )dZ
M
t +WtσF
√
1− ρ2θFdZFt . (2.39)
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The stochastic process for the wealth dynamics distorted by ambiguity satisfies the
following:
dWt =
((
θM(µ
M − r + σMhMt ) + θF (µF − r + ρσMhMt + σF
√
1− ρ2hFt ) + r
)
Wt
−Ct
)
dt+Wt
(
σMθM + σFρθ
F
)
dZMt +WtσF
√
1− ρ2θFdZFt . (2.40)
The solution of the optimization problem for the ambiguity-averse agent is achieved
with the indirect utility function J(W, t) that should satisfy the HJB equation:
δJ = max
Ct,θF ,θM
min
hMt ,h
F
t
{
C1−γt
1− γ +
(hMt )
2
2ψM
+
(hFt )
2
2ψF
+ Ah(J)
}
, (2.41)
where δ is the investor’s time preference and Ah(J) is a generator as in Merton’s intertem-
poral asset allocation model under the alternative probability measure:
Ah(J) = JW
((
θM(µ
M − r + σMhMt ) + θF (µF − r + ρσMhMt +
√
1− ρ2σFhFt ) + r
)
Wt
−Ct
)
+
1
2
JWWW
2
t
(
(θMσM + θFσFρ)
2 + θ2Fσ
2
F (1− ρ2)
)
. (2.42)
The specification of the ambiguity aversion coefficient proposed by Maenhout (2004)
defines ψ as a function of the indirect utility in the following form:
ψ =
Ω
WJW
, (2.43)
where Ω = (ΩM ,ΩF ) is a time-invariant vector proportional to the ambiguity-aversion
vector-coefficient ψ = (ψM , ψF ) and J is the indirect utility function. This functional
specification will allow us to obtain a closed-form solution to the portfolio choice problem.
Note that due to the choice of the CRRA utility function, the previous expression reduces
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to the following:
ψM =
ΩM
J(1− γ) , ψ
F =
ΩF
J(1− γ) . (2.44)
The minimization problem gives a unique solution for the optimal ambiguity parameters
due to the convexity of the function with respect to hMt and h
F
t :
hMt = −ΩMσM(θM + θFρ), hFt = −ΩF θFσF
√
1− ρ2. (2.45)
After solving the minimization part, we substitute the expressions for hMt and h
F
t into
the objective function and solve the maximization problem in order to determine the op-
timal portfolio weights θM and θF and optimal consumption C
∗.
Using the first-order condition of the HJB equation with respect to C, optimal con-
sumption can be obtained in terms of indirect utility as follows:
C∗ = [JW ]
− 1
γ . (2.46)
The implicit expressions for the optimal fraction of wealth invested in the stock market
and in the hedge fund respectively are the following:
θM =
µM − r − θFρσM(ΩMσM + γσF )
(γ + ΩM)σ2M
, (2.47)
θF =
µF − r − θMρσM(ΩMσM + γσF )
γσ2F + ΩMρ
2σ2M + ΩFσ
2
F (1− ρ2)
. (2.48)
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Proof of Proposition 2.1
The explicit formulas for the optimal allocation are derived in several steps. First, consider
the equations (2.47) and (2.48) as a system of linear equations:
AθM +BθF = µ
M − r, (2.49)
CθM +DθF = µ
F − r, (2.50)
or in matrix notation:
Mθ = µ− r, (2.51)
where
M =
A B
C D
 , θ =
θM
θF
 , and µ− r =
µM − r
µF − r
 . (2.52)
The coefficients A, B, C, and D are functions of volatilities σM and σF , ambiguities
ΩM and ΩF , and correlation ρ:
A = (γ + ΩM)σ
2
M , (2.53)
B = ρσM(ΩMσM + γσF ), (2.54)
C = B, (2.55)
D = γσ2F + ΩMρ
2σ2M + ΩFσ
2
F (1− ρ2). (2.56)
The explicit solution in terms of an inverse matrix20 is the following:
θ = M−1(µ− r), (2.57)
20Assuming an inverse matrix exists, i.e., the determinant is not zero: AD 6= BC.
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or in scalar notation:
θM =
D(µM − r)−B(µF − r)
AD −BC , (2.58)
θF =
A(µF − r)− C(µM − r)
AD −BC . (2.59)
The above equations are equivalent to the following:
θM =
(µM − r)− B
D
(µF − r)
A− B2
D
, (2.60)
θF =
(µF − r)− C
A
(µM − r)
D − B2
A
. (2.61)
The optimal portfolio weights for both the stock market and the hedge fund are propor-
tional to the expected excess return of the corresponding asset and inversely proportional
to risk and ambiguity as contained in the denominators A− B2
D
and D− B2
A
. Moreover, the
optimal portfolio weight for each asset is negatively related to the expected excess return
of the other asset adjusted by the relative beta βM,F =
B
D
or βF,M =
C
A
. The higher the
expected excess return of the other asset, the lower the allocation to the specific asset.
Substituting the values of coefficients A, B, C, and D into equations (2.60) and (2.61),
the general explicit formulas for the optimal portfolio weights are as follows:
θM =
µM − r − ρσM (ΩMσM+γσF )
γσ2F+ΩMρ
2σ2M+ΩF σ
2
F (1−ρ2)
(
µF − r)
(γ + ΩM)σ2M − ρ
2σ2M (ΩMσM+γσF )
2
γσ2F+ΩMρ
2σ2M+ΩF σ
2
F (1−ρ2)
, (2.62)
θF =
µF − r − ρσM (ΩMσM+γσF )
(γ+ΩM )σ
2
M
(
µM − r)
γσ2F + ΩMρ
2σ2M + ΩFσ
2
F (1− ρ2)− ρ
2σ2M (ΩMσM+γσF )
2
(γ+ΩM )σ
2
M
. (2.63)
The influence of systematic stock market ambiguity and idiosyncratic hedge fund am-
biguity on the optimal portfolio choice depends on the correlation coefficient ρ. On the one
hand, when ρ approaches 1, ΩF = 0 in the formula for coefficient D and the impact of hedge
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fund ambiguity disappears. Stock market ambiguity affects the optimal portfolio weights
either by increasing overall risk aversion (denominator effect) or through the relative betas
βM,F =
B
D
and βF,M =
C
A
. On the other hand, when ρ approaches 0, the relative betas
are equal to zero (there is no correlation between hedge fund and stock market returns:
βM,F = βF,M = 0), B = C = 0, and the formulas for the optimal allocation reduce to the
following expressions:
θM =
µM − r
(γ + ΩM)σ2M
, (2.64)
θF =
µF − r
(γ + ΩF )σ2F
. (2.65)
The equations (2.64) and (2.65) are the Merton optimal portfolio weights in the case of
ambiguity-averse preferences. Ambiguity amplifies the impact of risk aversion, reducing
the optimal portfolio allocation to risky securities.
In the case of no ambiguity (ΩM = 0 and ΩF = 0), the optimal portfolio choice coincides
with the standard Merton optimal portfolio weights for two risky assets and a risk-averse
investor. In this case, we have A = γσ2M , B = C = ργσMσF , and D = γσ
2
F , and the
portfolio weights are the following:
θM =
µM − r − βM,F (µF − r)
γσ2M(1− ρ2)
, (2.66)
θF =
µF − r − βF,M(µM − r)
γσ2F (1− ρ2)
, (2.67)
where
βM,F =
ρσM
σF
, (2.68)
βF,M =
ρσF
σM
. (2.69)
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Proof of Proposition 2.2
Using the formula for the optimal portfolio weights in Theorem 2.1 and the market-clearing
conditions (2.26), we obtain:
µM − r = (γ + ΩM)σ2M , (2.70)
µF − r = ρσM(ΩMσM + γσF ), (2.71)
which is equivalent to
µM = r + γσ2M + ΩMσ
2
M , (2.72)
and for the hedge fund’s expected returns,
µF = r + γσFρσM + ΩMρσ
2
M . (2.73)
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2.6.2 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics. Panel A reports hedge fund characteristics for each year as well as
over the whole sample period from January 1994 to November 2007. Sample Size is the average number
of live hedge funds. Fees are management fee/incentive fee in percentage points. Lockup is the average
lockup period in months. Leverage is the average hedge fund leverage level as a percentage of AUM.
NumbLev is the number of hedge funds that report nonzero leverage. AUM is the average AUM in USD
mn. The average (median) life of hedge funds in the sample is 60 (50) months. The total number of
both live and defunct hedge funds in the sample is 2070. Panel B reports descriptive statistics on hedge
fund returns: cross-sectional mean, median, and standard deviation of annualized hedge fund returns,
annualized standard deviation, annualized Sharpe ratio, annual skewness and kurtosis. For the Jacques-
Bera test we report the sample descriptive statistics of the indicator JB (JB = 0 if the Null that the
return distribution is Gaussian cannot be rejected vs. JB = 1 if the Null is rejected at 5% significance
level), the JB p-value and the value of the JB statistic.
Panel A
Year Sample Size Fees LockUp Leverage NumbLev AUM
1994 206 1.09 / 17.00 2.84 127 54 58
1995 265 1.11 / 17.58 2.92 126 70 49
1996 358 1.11 / 18.04 3.17 127 95 53
1997 462 1.11 / 18.44 3.40 131 137 57
1998 555 1.12 / 18.64 3.55 138 178 58
1999 653 1.13 / 18.76 4.05 140 229 56
2000 778 1.15 / 18.97 4.60 141 287 77
2001 886 1.18 / 19.10 5.12 138 306 78
2002 959 1.21 / 19.08 5.27 137 312 77
2003 1014 1.24 / 19.00 5.34 135 305 74
2004 1101 1.28 / 19.08 5.41 135 310 92
2005 1168 1.33 / 19.12 5.46 133 310 107
2006 1143 1.36 / 19.00 5.54 133 296 130
2007 986 1.38 / 18.91 5.41 133 247 152
All years 752 1.20 / 18.60 4.43 134 224 80
Panel B
Mean Median Std Dev Max Min
Return 12.90 11.74 13.19 136.29 −54.46
Std Dev 15.92 12.76 11.77 112.84 0.08
Sharpe 0.70 0.68 0.84 5.89 −5.46
Skewness 0.76 0.72 0.61 3.21 −1.40
Kurtosis 4.25 3.56 1.58 15.70 2.10
JB 0.66 1.00 0.47 1.00 0.00
JB p-value 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.50 0.00
JB-stat 49.13 14.83 68.12 666.83 0.06
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Table 2.2: Panel A reports pairwise Pearson, Kendall, and Spearman correlation coefficients between
ambiguity factors and the excess market return (EMKT ), the Fama-French factors (SMB and HML), and
momentum factor (MOM ). Panel B reports the Granger causality test for the momentum factor and the
ambiguity factors. Granger causality is tested with a maximum of 5 lags (the actual number of lags is
chosen using the Bayesian information criterion, BIC ) and a 5% significance level. F and G are values
of the F -statistic of the Granger test. Fc and Gc are critical values from the F -distribution. Rule: if
F > Fc, then we reject the null hypothesis that momentum does not cause the ambiguity factor; if G > Gc,
then we reject the null hypothesis that the ambiguity factor does not cause momentum. AmbIP is the
macroeconomic ambiguity factor based on the Industrial Production Index growth forecasts. AmbSP is
the stock market ambiguity factor based on the S&P 500 return forecasts.
Panel A AmbSP AmbIP
Pearson Kendall Spearman Pearson Kendall Spearman
EMKT 0.07 0.03 0.05 −0.11 −0.09 −0.13
SMB 0.37 0.08 0.13 0.26 0.07 0.10
HML −0.37 −0.12 −0.17 −0.16 0.02 0.02
MOM 0.17 0.05 0.07 0.65 0.31 0.43
Panel B AmbSP AmbIP
F 1.18 8.25
Fc 3.90 3.90
G 1.49 1.72
Gc 3.90 3.90
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Table 2.3: Multifactor model for the hedge fund portfolios. This table presents the results of OLS
regressions of hedge fund portfolio returns for the CAPM, Fama-French, and Carhart model specifications.
EW denotes the equally weighted portfolio of hedge funds, and VW the value-weighted portfolio of hedge
funds. AmbIP is the macroeconomic ambiguity factor based on the Industrial Production Index growth
forecasts. AmbSP is the stock market ambiguity factor based on the S&P 500 return forecasts. 1% (5%)
statistical significance is indicated by two (one) asterisks. The t-statistics of regression coefficients are
reported in parentheses.
CAPM EW VW EW,AmbSP VW,AmbSP EW,AmbIP VW,AmbIP
Alpha 0.62∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.59∗∗
(5.36) (3.77) (6.00) (4.43) (5.76) (4.20)
EMKT 0.51∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.52∗∗
(18.73) (13.05) (19.19) (13.38) (20.64) (15.29)
Amb — — 0.07∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.15∗∗
— — (3.91) (4.34) (5.24) (6.63)
Adj R2 0.68 0.50 0.70 0.55 0.72 0.61
FF EW VW EW,AmbSP VW,AmbSP EW,AmbIP VW,AmbIP
Alpha 0.62∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.60∗∗
(7.18) (4.90) (7.21) (5.00) (7.30) (5.08)
EMKT 0.46∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.45∗∗
(19.61) (11.89) (19.50) (12.00) (20.50) (13.53)
SMB 0.26∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(10.64) (8.65) (10.17) (8.12) (10.06) (8.05)
HML −0.01 −0.05 0.00 −0.03 0.01 −0.02
(−0.23) (−1.05) (−0.02) (−0.62) (0.24) (−0.41)
Amb — — 0.01 0.03 0.05∗∗ 0.10∗∗
— — (0.76) (1.42) (3.42) (5.02)
Adj R2 0.83 0.70 0.83 0.70 0.84 0.74
Carhart EW VW EW, AmbSP VW, AmbSP EW, AmbIP VW, AmbIP
Alpha 0.53∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.46∗∗
(6.48) (3.98) (6.47) (4.04) (6.48) (4.07)
EMKT 0.49∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.47∗∗
(21.67) (15.29) (21.51) (15.29) (21.61) (15.32)
SMB 0.25∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.27∗∗
(10.52) (8.76) (10.18) (8.35) (10.32) (8.53)
HML 0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.01
(0.34) (−0.34) (0.41) (−0.08) (0.38) (−0.25)
MOM 0.08∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.15∗∗
(5.11) (7.55) (5.04) (7.43) (3.70) (5.34)
Amb — — 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
— — (0.33) (0.93) (0.53) (1.00)
Adj R2 0.85 0.77 0.85 0.77 0.85 0.77
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Table 2.4: Ambiguity betas and alphas relative to CAPM, Fama-French, and Carhart models for individ-
ual long/short equity hedge funds. AmbSP is the stock market ambiguity. AmbIP is the macroeconomic
ambiguity. Results are reported for the whole sample as well as for the subsample of high market beta
hedge funds (those for which the market beta is statistically significant at the 10% level and its absolute
value is higher than 0.10) and low market beta hedge funds (the rest of the sample). The number of
high market beta hedge funds is 838 out of a total of 2070. %ofSgnf denotes the percentage of significant
estimates at the 10% level. #ofSgnf denotes the number of significant estimates at the 10% level.
All Hedge Funds AmbSP AmbIP
CAPM FF Carhart CAPM FF Carhart
Mean Alpha 0.99 0.87 0.75 1.09 1.00 1.11
Median Alpha 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.90 0.90 0.95
%ofSgnf Alpha 47.58 44.09 41.52 47.26 45.94 40.80
Mean Beta 0.11 −0.02 −0.01 0.13 0.08 0.08
Median Beta 0.13 −0.08 −0.07 0.15 0.12 0.10
%ofSgnf Beta 26.91 15.12 13.96 31.79 24.40 14.44
Mean Adj R2 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.33 0.41 0.39
Median Adj R2 0.33 0.39 0.46 0.32 0.42 0.38
Low Market Beta AmbSP AmbIP
CAPM FF Carhart CAPM FF Carhart
Mean Alpha 0.63 0.56 0.45 1.26 1.01 1.11
Median Alpha 0.80 0.72 0.69 0.82 0.97 0.86
%ofSgnf Alpha 48.65 50.62 50.65 43.75 44.74 40.48
Mean Beta 0.05 −0.03 −0.01 0.12 0.13 0.13
Median Beta −0.06 −0.09 −0.06 0.14 0.14 0.13
%ofSgnf Beta 17.37 12.94 12.54 22.54 18.21 13.68
#ofSgnf Beta 111.00 81.00 77.00 144.00 114.00 84.00
Mean Adj R2 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.16 0.22 0.22
Median Adj R2 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.11 0.14 0.16
High Market Beta AmbSP AmbIP
CAPM FF Carhart CAPM FF Carhart
Mean Alpha 1.09 0.99 0.90 1.05 1.00 1.11
Median Alpha 0.91 0.92 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.96
%ofSgnf Alpha 47.31 41.81 38.21 48.25 46.29 40.93
Mean Beta 0.13 −0.01 −0.01 0.13 0.07 0.06
Median Beta 0.15 −0.08 −0.07 0.16 0.11 0.08
%ofSgnf Beta 31.68 16.54 15.13 36.51 27.87 15.35
#ofSgnf Beta 446.00 232.00 212.00 514.00 391.00 215.00
Mean Adj R2 0.40 0.46 0.50 0.38 0.47 0.46
Median Adj R2 0.38 0.44 0.51 0.37 0.46 0.45
101
Table 2.5: Carhart multifactor model with the macroeconomic ambiguity factor adjusted for collinearity
with the momentum factor (original MOM and AmbIP are substituted by their two orthogonal principal
components PC 1 and PC 2). All other variables are identical to the previous tables. Panel A reports
estimated coefficients for the hedge fund portfolios (equally weighted EW and value-weighted VW ). Panel
B reports estimated coefficients of individual hedge funds for the whole sample, low market beta hedge
funds, and high market beta hedge funds. 1% (5%) statistical significance is indicated by two (one)
asterisks. The t-statistics of regression coefficients are reported in parentheses. %ofSgnf denotes the
percentage of significant estimates at the 10% level. #ofSgnf denotes the number of significant estimates
at the 10% level.
Panel A EW VW EW VW
Alpha 0.60∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.58∗∗
(7.33) (5.13) (7.40) (5.24)
EMKT 0.49∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.47∗∗
(21.15) (14.58) (21.61) (15.32)
SMB 0.24∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.27∗∗
(10.09) (8.16) (10.32) (8.53)
HML 0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.01
(0.40) (−0.22) (0.38) (−0.25)
MOM 0.05∗∗ 0.10∗∗ — —
(4.44) (6.58) — —
PC1 — — 0.05∗∗ 0.10∗∗
— — (4.52) (6.82)
PC2 — — 0.06∗∗ 0.11∗∗
— — (2.45) (3.44)
Adj R2 0.84 0.76 0.85 0.77
Panel B All Hedge Funds Low Market Beta High Market Beta
Mean Alpha 1.15 1.56 0.99
Median Alpha 0.87 1.24 0.82
%ofSgnf Alpha 48.51 54.23 46.62
Mean PC1 0.20 0.27 0.19
Median PC1 0.17 0.18 0.16
%ofSgnf PC1 14.30 10.11 19.42
#ofSgnf PC1 296.00 57.00 239.00
Mean PC2 0.20 0.23 0.19
Median PC2 0.22 0.25 0.21
%ofSgnf PC2 27.58 23.13 30.62
#ofSgnf PC2 571.00 142.00 429.00
Mean Adj R2 0.43 0.27 0.48
Median Adj R2 0.42 0.23 0.47
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Table 2.6: Comparative performance analysis of the portfolios formed with and without the ambiguity
factor. The portfolios consist of 10 equally weighted or value-weighted hedge funds with the highest
alpha ranking. The ranking is based on the historical alphas estimated by CAPM (one-factor model)
versus ACAPM (two-factor model with the ambiguity factor: either the stock market ambiguity AmbSP
or macroeconomic ambiguity AmbIP). The estimation window is 60 months. The out-of-sample portfolio
formation period is 1 month, 6 months, or 12 months such that we rebalance the portfolio every month,
every 6 months, or every 12 months. The table reports risk-adjusted portfolio performance, i.e. estimated
alphas relative to CAPM, Fama-French (FF), and Carhart models. 1% (5%) statistical significance is
marked by two (one) asterisks. The t-statistics of regression coefficients appear in parentheses.
1 month 6 months
Portfolio CAPM FF Carhart CAPM FF Carhart
EW Alpha 2.21∗∗ 1.98∗∗ 1.93∗∗ 1.44∗∗ 1.22∗∗ 1.16∗∗
(4.6) (4.72) (4.56) (3.4) (3.57) (3.38)
EW, AmbSP Alpha 2.43∗∗ 2.25∗∗ 2.23∗∗ 1.56∗∗ 1.3∗∗ 1.29∗∗
(5.72) (5.5) (5.39) (3.92) (3.73) (3.66)
EW, AmbIP Alpha 1.92∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗ 1.77∗∗ 1.69∗∗ 1.46∗∗ 1.47∗∗
(4.89) (4.41) (4.38) (4.86) (4.32) (4.29)
VW Alpha 2.09∗∗ 1.71∗∗ 1.67∗∗ 1.47∗ 1.14∗ 1.00
(3.15) (2.8) (2.7) (2.15) (2.14) (1.88)
VW, AmbSP Alpha 2.26∗∗ 2.04∗∗ 1.97∗∗ 1.69∗∗ 1.42∗∗ 1.39∗∗
(3.28) (3.07) (2.93) (3.1) (2.75) (2.67)
VW, AmbIP Alpha 1.83∗∗ 1.58∗∗ 1.5∗∗ 1.94∗∗ 1.67∗∗ 1.66∗∗
(3.32) (2.97) (2.81) (3.92) (3.5) (3.45)
12 months
Portfolio CAPM FF Carhart
EW Alpha 1.01∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.78∗
(2.52) (2.7) (2.47)
EW, AmbSP Alpha 1.23∗∗ 1.04∗∗ 1.04∗∗
(3.3) (3.23) (3.18)
EW, AmbIP Alpha 1.29∗∗ 1.05∗∗ 1.08∗∗
(3.99) (3.3) (3.35)
VW Alpha 1.09 1.07∗ 0.85
(1.6) (2.06) (1.69)
VW, AmbSP Alpha 1.54∗∗ 1.52∗∗ 1.45∗∗
(2.86) (2.91) (2.76)
VW, AmbIP Alpha 1.92∗∗ 1.8∗∗ 1.77∗∗
(3.86) (3.64) (3.54)
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Table 2.7: Robustness check: pairwise Pearson, Kendall, and Spearman correlation coefficients between
ambiguity factors and Fung-Hsieh hedge fund factors. AmbIP is the macroeconomic ambiguity factor based
on Industrial Production Index growth forecasts. AmbSP is the stock market ambiguity factor based on
S&P 500 return forecasts. PTFSBD is a bond trend-following factor, PTFSFX is a currency trend-
following factor, PTFSCOM is a commodity trend-following factor, SP500TR is the S&P 500 monthly
total return index, Size is defined as the Russell 2000 Index monthly total return minus the S&P 500
monthly total return, Bond is defined as the monthly change in the 10-year Treasury constant maturity
yield (month end-to-month end), and Credit is defined as the monthly change in Moody’s Baa yield less
10-year Treasury constant maturity yield (month end-to-month end).
AmbSP AmbIP
FH factors Pearson Kendall Spearman Pearson Kendall Spearman
PTFSBD 0.14 0.12 0.17 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02
PTFSFX −0.12 −0.15 −0.21 0.00 −0.01 −0.02
PTFSCOM 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.19 0.11 0.16
SP500TR −0.01 0.01 0.02 −0.19 −0.12 −0.17
Size −0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 −0.04 −0.04
Bond −0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06
Credit −0.11 −0.07 −0.10 −0.11 0.01 0.01
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Table 2.8: Robustness check: OLS regression of hedge fund portfolio returns on the Fung-Hsieh fac-
tors. EW denotes the equally weighted hedge fund portfolio, VW denotes the value-weighted hedge fund
portfolio. AmbSP is the ambiguity factor based on the S&P 500 Index return forecasts. AmbIP is the
macroeconomic ambiguity factor based on Industrial Production Index growth forecasts. 1% (5%) statis-
tical significance is indicated by two (one) asterisks. The t-statistics of regression coefficients appear in
parentheses.
EW VW EW,AmbSP VW,AmbSP EW,AmbIP VW,AmbIP
Const 0.29 0.39 0.01 0.03 −0.03 −0.09
(0.53) (0.56) (0.02) (0.04) (−0.06) (−0.14)
PTFSBD −1.19 −2.03 −1.96∗ −3.03∗ −0.90 −1.60
(−1.20) (−1.61) (−2.09) (−2.57) (−0.98) (−1.41)
PTFSFX 1.27 1.15 1.93∗ 2.00∗ 1.49∗ 1.47
(1.59) (1.13) (2.55) (2.11) (2.00) (1.61)
PTFSCOM 0.86 1.87 0.44 1.32 −0.14 0.39
(0.77) (1.32) (0.43) (1.01) (−0.13) (0.30)
SP500TR 0.46∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.47∗∗
(12.88) (9.19) (13.96) (10.05) (14.67) (11.32)
Size −0.01 −0.01∗ 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01∗
(−1.56) (−2.10) (−1.37) (−1.94) (−1.47) (−2.07)
Bond 0.29 −0.19 0.34 −0.13 0.15 −0.40
(0.45) (−0.24) (0.57) (−0.18) (0.25) (−0.56)
Credit 0.02 −0.14 0.22 0.11 0.19 0.11
(0.08) (−0.38) (0.81) (0.34) (0.72) (0.34)
Amb — — 0.12∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.17∗∗
— — (5.15) (5.33) (5.21) (6.29)
Adj R2 0.50 0.35 0.57 0.45 0.57 0.48
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Table 2.9: Robustness check: ambiguity betas and regression intercepts relative to the Fung-Hsieh
multifactor model for individual long/short equity hedge funds. AmbSP is the stock market ambiguity.
AmbIP is the macroeconomic ambiguity. Results (mean, median, and percentage of significant estimates
at the 10% level) are reported for the whole sample as well as for high market beta hedge funds (those
for which the market beta is statistically significant at the 10% level and its absolute value is higher than
0.10) and low market beta hedge funds (the rest of the sample). The number of high market beta hedge
funds is 838 out of a total of 2070. %ofSgnf denotes the percentage of significant estimates at the 10%
level. #ofSgnf denotes the number of significant estimates at the 10% level.
AmbSP All Hedge Funds Low Market Beta High Market Beta
Mean Const −2.36 −9.99 −0.99
Median Const −1.93 −1.91 −1.96
%ofSgnf Const 21.77 31.62 19.56
Mean Beta 0.17 0.13 0.19
Median Beta 0.16 −0.08 0.19
%ofSgnf Beta 29.52 19.90 35.63
Mean Adj R2 0.34 0.24 0.36
Median Adj R2 0.32 0.18 0.34
AmbIP All Hedge Funds Low Market Beta High Market Beta
Mean Const −3.32 −3.62 −3.22
Median Const −2.26 0.73 −2.95
%ofSgnf Const 17.11 22.41 15.82
Mean Beta 0.21 0.18 0.23
Median Beta 0.19 0.17 0.20
%ofSgnf Beta 29.37 19.73 35.42
Mean Adj R2 0.32 0.22 0.35
Median Adj R2 0.31 0.16 0.33
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Figure 2-1: Time series of ambiguity factor returns. Graph A shows monthly returns for the stock market
ambiguity factor, graph B returns for the macroeconomic ambiguity factor. Stock market ambiguity is
measured by the standard deviation of the forecasts of S&P 500 Index returns. Macroeconomic ambiguity
is measured by the standard deviation of the forecasts of Industrial Production Index growth. The factor
return is defined as the out-of-sample return of a long/short equally weighted portfolio of stocks where long
positions are taken in the top decile and short positions are taken in the bottom decile of stocks ranked
by their ambiguity sensitivities.
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Figure 2-2: Time series properties of ambiguity betas. The CAPM (graphs A and C) and Fama-French
(graphs B and D) ambiguity-adjusted models are estimated for the value-weighted portfolio of hedge funds
by OLS rolling regressions with a 36-month fixed-size sample window. Graphs A and B plot the stock
market ambiguity betas based on S&P 500 return forecasts. Graphs C and D plot the macroeconomic
ambiguity betas based on Industrial Production Index growth forecasts.
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Chapter 3
Hedge Fund Price Pressure in
Convertible Bond Markets
Abstract
Prices of convertible bonds are sensitive to unexpected demand shocks generated by con-
vertible arbitrage hedge funds. This paper investigates whether the price pressure created
by innovations in hedge fund demand can account for the systematic mispricing of con-
vertible bonds. We empirically construct the risk factor associated with hedge fund price
pressure and document the nonnegligible risk premium embedded in convertible bond re-
turns. Moreover, we demonstrate that contemporaneous returns of convertible bond mutual
funds have significant negative exposure to the price-pressure factor. Price-pressure risk is
amplified during financial crises, creating the risk of a convertible bond sell-off.
JEL codes: G12
Keywords: Convertible Bonds, Convertible Arbitrage, Hedge Funds, Price Pressure.
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3.1 Introduction
A convertible bond is a fixed-income security that gives its holders an option to convert the
bond into a predetermined number of shares of the issuing firm. The price of a plain vanilla
convertible bond can, in principle, be modeled as the price of a corporate bond plus an
embedded option. However, the structure and the embedded clauses of convertible bonds
complicate the actual pricing task. The systematic underpricing of convertible bonds — the
difference between the market price and the theoretical value — has been well documented
in the literature.1 The attractive valuation of convertible bonds provides a basis to pursue
a convertible arbitrage strategy. The plain vanilla convertible arbitrage strategy consists
of a long position in the convertible bond and a short position in the underlying stock.
Traditionally, major holders of convertible bonds have been specialized mutual funds, so-
called convertible bond mutual funds, or other long-only investors with a similar investment
mandate. However, along with the growth of the hedge fund industry since the 1990s, the
focus of convertible bond investing has shifted toward arbitrage. According to the estimates
reported by Mitchell et al. (2007), about 75% of all convertible bond issues were used by
hedge funds in 2005. Moreover, Choi et al. (2009) report that the recent growth in trading
volume and new issues of convertible bonds has been primarily driven by demand from
convertible arbitrage hedge funds. Based on the academic evidence and common beliefs
circulating among brokers, sell-side research, and the press, we postulate that the major
source of demand for convertible bonds is convertible arbitrage hedge funds, at least in
the last decade. This sector’s homogenous demand structure with the dominant role of
arbitrageurs creates a possibility of price-pressure risk that could have implications for the
pricing of convertible bonds.
This paper proposes to explain the underpricing of convertible bonds by the existence
of systematic price-pressure risk, originating from innovations in hedge fund demand. We
1See Section 3.2 for a literature review.
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hypothesize that the mispricing of convertible bonds disappears after taking into account
price-pressure risk. In this paper, in order to avoid the complexity of computing theoretical
prices of individual convertible bonds having a large variety of contractual specifications,
we do not evaluate the mispricing of convertible bonds as a discrepancy between the market
price and the theoretical price. To tackle the underpricing anomaly, we instead investigate
the space of convertible bond risk factors empirically. We consider the puzzle of convertible
bond underpricing in the context of a missing risk factor in a risk-based factor model. The
unspecified risk factors produce modeling errors in any pricing model. Fully accounting
for all potential risk factors is paramount in reducing mispricing of convertible bonds.
The paper constructs the convertible bond risk factor associated with the price pres-
sure of convertible arbitrage hedge funds and computes the corresponding risk premium
that an investor would demand to compensate for price-pressure risk. Furthermore, the
paper empirically tests the hypothesis that augmenting the conventional convertible bond
multifactor model by the price-pressure risk factor improves the explanatory power of the
risk model.
Convertible arbitrage hedge funds are liquidity suppliers to the convertible bond market.
Hence the price-pressure risk factor can be viewed as another liquidity factor. Securities
with high liquidity sensitivity are traded at a discount relative to those with low sensitivity.
Likewise, convertible bonds with high sensitivities to hedge fund demand shocks carry a
price discount and hence possess higher expected returns as compensation for price-pressure
risk. As the price pressure amplifies during financial crises, an investor would prefer to hold
securities that are unlikely to be liquidated by convertible arbitrage hedge funds, namely
convertible bonds with low or negative sensitivity to the hedge fund demand innovation.
Therefore these convertible bonds embed a premium in contemporaneous prices and have
low expected returns. The spread in expected returns of convertible bonds with high and
low sensitivities to aggregate demand shocks defines the price-pressure risk factor.
This paper contributes to our understanding of the convertible bond market’s fragility
111
due to price pressure and potential forced-selling risk. The convertible arbitrage hedge fund
strategy is proven to be vulnerable to exogenous shocks, particularly during market-wide
liquidity squeezes. When a hedge fund faces redemptions, it is forced to sell its convertible
bond holdings, thus driving down prices. Moreover, the risk aversion of convertible bond
investors may rise during a market crash and increase the sell-off of convertible bond
holdings. A high correlation in the selling activity of hedge funds contributes to the price
pressure on convertible bonds during market disruption events. Convertible bonds are
one of the asset classes most prone to fire-sale risk. Any exogenous shock in financial
markets, even unrelated to convertible bond fundamentals, leads to selling pressure. In
the past decade, the convertible bond market experienced periods of serious troughs. For
example, convertible bonds reacted negatively to the 1998 crisis after the LTCM collapse.
A second example is the 2005 period, when convertible arbitrage hedge funds faced large
redemptions from investors after poor past performance. Finally, in October 2008, the
post-Lehman credit crunch crisis brought another free fall in convertible bond prices. The
risk of forced selling may explain a significant portion of the drawdowns of convertible
bond prices during financial crises. Awareness of price pressure and forced-selling risk
causes investors to demand a premium in expected returns to hold convertible bonds in
their portfolios. Hedge fund price pressure is an additional risk factor in the convertible-
bond-pricing model, and this risk is amplified in times of financial turbulence. This is why
the underpricing of convertible bonds is more apparent during financial crises.
To conduct the empirical analysis, we use monthly returns of convertible bonds, con-
stituents of the UBS (now Thomson Reuters) Convertible Bond Index, and monthly aggre-
gate flows of convertible arbitrage hedge funds to measure hedge fund demand innovations
(HFD).2 First, we estimate the HFD beta for equally weighted and value-weighted portfo-
lios of convertible bonds, considering separately the impacts of unexpected flows, inflows,
and outflows. The paper finds no significant impact of innovation in inflows on the con-
2We use the abbreviation HFD to denote hedge fund demand innovations throughout the paper.
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temporaneous returns of convertible bond portfolios. However, both unexpected flows and
outflows negatively affect contemporaneous convertible bond returns, indicating the pres-
ence of price pressure. The value-weighted portfolios have lower estimates of the HFD beta
than equally weighted portfolios, suggesting that convertible bonds with larger market cap-
italization are less sensitive to price pressure. Furthermore, the paper documents that the
post-Lehman period from September 2008 through March 2009 was characterized by rising
selling pressure. We also test for Granger causality between convertible bond returns and
hedge fund demand innovations in order to avoid the endogeneity bias in the regressions
and find conclusive evidence that convertible bond returns do not cause fluctuations in
hedge fund demand innovations.
Second, we construct the price-pressure risk factor by forming an equally weighted
long/short portfolio that takes long and short positions in convertible bonds with the
highest and lowest HFD betas, respectively. The price-pressure risk factor is defined as
the out-of-sample next-month return of this long/short portfolio. We rebalance this portfo-
lio each month to obtain the monthly time series for the price-pressure factor. The positive
average next-month return spread between the extreme quantile portfolios indicates the
existence of a price-pressure risk premium. We then implement the Fama-Macbeth pro-
cedure and find a positive, economically significant premium in convertible bond returns
that is attributable to price pressure.
Finally, we investigate how the price-pressure factor affects the contemporaneous return
of a convertible bond mutual fund. Augmenting the benchmark model for portfolios of
convertible bond mutual funds — either CAPM or the multifactor model with equity,
bond, and volatility factors — with the price-pressure risk factor, we report that price
pressure is a statistically significant factor that increases the explanatory power of the
benchmark risk model. The exposure to price pressure has a negative sign, demonstrating
that hedge-fund selling pressure diminishes the contemporaneous returns of convertible
bond mutual funds.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the relevant literature
on convertible bonds. Section 3.3 describes the data sources for the demand and supply
sides of the convertible bond market. Section 3.4 demonstrates the empirical results and
discusses their economic significance. Section 3.5 concludes, and tables appear in Appendix
3.6.
3.2 Literature Review
A large body of literature has documented pricing anomalies in convertible bond markets.
In many cases, the mispricing is considered relative to a theoretical model. The classic
theoretical pricing models of convertible bonds are based on pricing a contingent claim
on the firm value. Models of this kind were developed by Ingersoll (1977), Brennan and
Schwartz (1977), and Brennan and Schwartz (1980). Following these basic models, various
extensions have been developed with the objective of achieving a better empirical fit.
However, they were unable to eliminate the mispricing completely. Ammann et al. (2003)
use a sample of French convertible bonds to investigate the ability of stock-based binomial-
tree models with exogenous credit risk to price a variety of convertible bond specifications.
The authors find that market prices are on average 3% lower than the ones implied by their
model. These results are consistent with the earlier empirical evaluation of underpricing
of 3.75% for a sample of U.S. convertible bonds conducted by King (1986).
There are many potential explanations for convertible bond underpricing. For example,
Calamos (2003) attributes the underpricing phenomenon to the underestimation of stock
volatility. In contrast, Lhabitant (2002) argues that the mispricing is driven by the com-
plexity of convertible bond valuation. Agarwal et al. (2011) suggest that convertible bonds
are mispriced due to illiquidity, small issue size, and the complexity of pricing models. The
literature has paid special attention to the short-term and long-term performance of new
issues and the mispricing of convertible bonds at issue. The performance of new issues
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is studied by Henderson (2005), who reports that convertible bonds are underpriced at
issuance and consequently have positive forward risk-adjusted returns.
Choi et al. (2009) document an increase in the short-selling of stocks around the period
of convertible bond issuance. This observation suggests that the majority of new issues are
bought by convertible bond arbitrageurs. Choi et al. (2010) further their analysis of the
interrelationship between convertible arbitrage hedge funds and the issuance of convertible
bonds, documenting that issuance is positively related to several measures of capital supply
by arbitrageurs, namely hedge fund returns, flows, and leverage.
Our paper approaches convertible bond mispricing by detecting the price pressure trans-
mitted by demand fluctuations. Mitchell et al. (2007) investigate how capital-constrained
arbitrageurs affect the convertible bond market. The authors compare the cheapness of
convertible bonds (the spread between the theoretical price and the market price) and
returns of hedge funds that report large convertible bond holdings during two crises: the
period of convertible arbitrage hedge fund redemptions from December 2004 to June 2006
and the period of the LTCM failure from December 1997 to December 1999. They also
conduct a similar analysis of the activity of merger arbitrageurs and their impact on the
prices of merger targets during the 1987 market crash. In both cases, the authors report
significant price deviations from theoretical values in situations of capital shocks when
hedge funds are unable to provide liquidity to market participants. Our paper represents
an extension of the event analysis by Mitchell et al. (2007). Due to the niche position of
the convertible bond market and the unique role of convertible arbitrage hedge funds as
specialized investors, our paper argues for the existence of not only event-specific but also
systematic mispricing driven by hedge fund demand.
Agarwal et al. (2011) empirically study the source of return and risk of convertible arbi-
trage hedge funds. The authors construct a multifactor model whose factors are portfolios
mimicking the convertible arbitrage strategy: positive carry, volatility arbitrage, and credit
arbitrage. The abnormal returns (relative to these systematic risk factors) of convertible
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arbitrage hedge funds are explained by the embedded liquidity premium. Furthermore,
they compute the supply-demand imbalance factor and show its statistical significance in
explaining the cross-sectional returns of convertible arbitrage hedge funds. The authors find
no alpha in convertible arbitrage hedge fund returns after accounting for three asset-based
style factors and a liquidity premium. Batta et al. (2010) also support the liquidity-based
explanation of convertible arbitrageurs’ alpha. The price-pressure factor constructed in
our paper is related to the supply-demand imbalance factor used by Agarwal et al. (2011).
Both factors provide a liquidity signal in the convertible bond market. However, the main
focus of Agarwal et al. (2011) is to examine how the supply of convertible bonds affects
the returns of convertible arbitrageurs. On the contrary, our paper contributes to under-
standing how hedge fund demand influences the pricing of convertible bonds. We consider
hedge fund price pressure as a factor explaining the mispricing puzzle of convertible bonds.
The portfolio holdings of a convertible bond mutual fund are mainly long-only positions
in convertible bonds. The only study of convertible bond mutual funds was conducted
by Ammann et al. (2010). According to their estimates, assets under management of
convertible bond mutual funds that report to the CRSP mutual fund database were equal
to USD 40 bn in 2005. The authors examine empirically a large set of systematic factors
that affect returns of convertible bond mutual funds. The multifactor model for convertible
bond mutual funds includes
• stock factors: EMKT, SMB, HML, and MOM as in the four-factor model proposed
by Carhart (1997);
• bond factors: the term factor TERM is defined as the return of the Lehman (now
Barclays Capital) US Government Long Bond Index minus the 1-month Treasury bill
rate; the default factor DEF is defined as the return on the Lehman US Corporate
Long Bond Index minus the return of the Lehman US Government Long Bond Index;
the high yield factor HY is defined as the return on the Merrill Lynch US High Yield
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Index; and the broad bond factor BOND is defined as the excess return of the Lehman
US aggregated Government/Credit Bond Index;
• option factors: VOLA is defined as the return on the CBOE (Chicago Board Options
Exchange) Volatility VXO Index; max(0,MKT − BOND); MKT 2 is the squared
market factor; ATM is defined as the return on a dynamic portfolio of at-the-money
call and put options; and OTM is defined as the return on a dynamic portfolio of
out-of-the-money call and put options; and
• convertible-bond-specific factors: CBI is defined as the return on the Merrill Lynch
All US Convertible Bond Index; CBAI is defined as the return on the CSFB/Tremont
(now Credit Suisse/Tremont) Convertible Arbitrage Index; and SD is the supply-
demand factor proposed by Agarwal et al. (2011).
A parsimonious version of this multifactor model with the equity market factor, two bond
factors, and one volatility factor is used as a benchmark model in our paper.
The existence of price pressure is not unique to the convertible bond market. For
example, Coval and Stafford (2007) document the existence of an equity market price-
pressure effect created by institutional investors. They find empirical support for the
hypothesis that capital flows forcing the selling or buying activity of mutual funds create
price pressure on the equity market that leads to the persistent mispricing of stocks relative
to their fundamental values. Since mutual fund holdings information is publicly available,
the authors can measure the flow-motivated trading in a given stock and define aggregate
price pressure. In our case, we cannot follow this procedure, since hedge fund holdings
are unavailable; therefore we must rely on estimated sensitivities of individual convertible
bonds to demand shocks to construct the price-pressure factor.
As hedge funds are liquidity providers in the convertible bond market, research on
aggregate liquidity and its impact on asset prices is also relevant for this paper. A number
of papers show that aggregate market liquidity is a persistent and priced risk factor for
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any asset class. First, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) derive an equilibrium asset-pricing
model with a liquidity factor and discover the channel through which liquidity affects asset
prices. According to their model, negative liquidity shocks lead to low contemporaneous
asset returns and high long-term asset returns. This fact predicts that during downturns,
investors are unlikely to sell high-liquidity beta assets, and instead sell low-liquidity beta
assets. Second, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) construct a liquidity factor based on the
sensitivity of returns to trading volume and show that expected stock returns are related
to the liquidity factor in the cross section. The expected rate of return of stocks with high
sensitivity to liquidity is found to be higher than the expected returns of stocks with low
sensitivity. Moreover, the authors find that part of the returns of momentum strategies
can be attributed to the liquidity factor. Third, Amihud (2002) takes the average daily
ratio of absolute stock return to dollar volume as an illiquidity measure and demonstrates
that there is a positive relationship between illiquidity and cross-sectional stock returns.
Furthermore, the illiquidity premium may be useful in tackling the equity premium puzzle.
Finally, Acharya et al. (2013) compute the illiquidity premium for the corporate bond
market and additionally discover that illiquid bonds have higher yields.
3.3 Convertible Bond Market: Data and Definitions
This section describes our data sources and the participants in the convertible bond mar-
ket; it also defines the variables of interest for the empirical analysis. The supply side is
represented by the convertible bond issues of U.S. firms, while the demand side is repre-
sented by the universe of convertible arbitrage hedge funds. Furthermore, we employ a
sample of convertible bond mutual funds in our study.
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3.3.1 Convertible Bond Supply
Our sample of convertible bonds consists of constituents of the UBS Global Convertible
Index, a broad-based index representing the convertible bond market that is often used as
a benchmark for convertible bond mutual funds. It is defined as a market capitalization-
weighted total return index; that is, coupons are assumed to be reinvested upon payment
proportionate to index weighting. The index was launched on September 30, 1998; however,
historical data for all its constituents are available only since September 30, 2002. The
constituents of the index are any equity-linked convertible instruments such as convertible
bonds, exchangeables, mandatory issues, bonds with warrants, and similar products that
must be convertible into a listed share. For example, pre-IPO convertibles are excluded
from the index. The issues are required to satisfy liquidity criteria (a valid indicative price
is available from three or more market makers) and market capitalization criteria (the size
of the issue is above USD 100M). The index was devised by UBS and is independently
maintained by MACE Advisers. About 50% of global issues originate in the United States,
and our paper reports results for the sample of U.S. convertible bonds.3 The data sample
covers the period from October 2002 to September 2009.
The return of a convertible bond is computed as a price differential and an interest
accrual using the following formula:
Rt =
Pt + It
Pt−1
− 1, (3.1)
where Pt is the convertible bond price at the end of month t and It the interest payment
accumulated in the period from t− 1 to t. The returns are collected at monthly frequency.
Panel A of Table 3.1 reports the cross-sectional mean, median, and standard deviation of
the distributional properties of convertible bond returns. Convertible bonds have average
3Among other regions, Japanese convertible bonds are the most prominent in the Asian market, and
French issues dominate the European market.
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annualized returns of 10% and an average volatility of 22% or, equivalently, a Sharpe
ratio of 0.45. Median values of returns are lower: 6.6% with approximately the same
volatility, yielding a Sharpe ratio of 0.3. Based on the median value of the Jarque-Bera
test statistics, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that convertible bond returns are
normally distributed.
Table 3.2 reports convertible bonds’ characteristics for each year. The average number
of securities in the convertible bond universe decreased to 189 in 2009 from 292 in 2002.
Average market capitalization of convertible bond issues varies from USD 583M in 2002 to
USD 798M in 2008. However, the total market capitalization of convertible bonds in the
data sample achieves its maximum value USD 210 bn in 2007, after which it decreases to
USD 135 bn in 2009. Monthly average returns of convertible bonds were negative in 2008,
with a subsequent recovery in 2009. Convertible bond returns were also low in 2005 and
2007. The credit crunch crisis in 2008 had a significant impact on the convertible bond
market, with negative returns and an increase in volatility. Average delta, a measure of
equity sensitivity, had its peak value of 62% in 2007 and decreased after the crisis to 43%
in 2009.
3.3.2 Conventional Multifactor Convertible Bond Model
We conjecture that the returns of convertible bonds are driven by conventional risk factors
such as the equity market factor, two bond factors, and the volatility factor. This conjecture
is based on the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) multifactor model for convertible bond
performance presented by Ammann et al. (2010). This set of risk factors reflects the
hybrid structure of convertible securities with risk exposures coming from the corporate
bond, the underlying equity, and the embedded option to convert the bond into equity. The
conventional factors are constructed for the U.S. market. The equity factor is the equity
market return in excess of the risk-free rate where the market includes all NYSE, AMEX,
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and NASDAQ stocks. The risk-free rate is the 1-month T-bill rate of return. The data
come from the K. French data library.4 There are two bond factors: the term spread and
the default spread. The data are collected from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. We take Moody’s Seasoned Aaa and Baa Corporate Bond Yields plus
the 1-Year GS1 and 10-year GS10 Treasury Constant Maturity rates. The credit risk or
default spread is measured by the difference between Baa and Aaa yields. The term spread
is defined as the difference between GS10 and GS1, and captures variation in the slope of
the yield curve. Finally, the volatility factor is represented by the monthly percent change
in the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX index). The month-end closing prices for the VIX
index are taken directly from the CBOE website.5
Table 3.3 reports the estimated coefficients of the convertible bond multifactor model
with conventional risk factors for the monthly returns of equally weighted and value-
weighted portfolios. In additional model specifications, we augment the regression by
the dummy variable for the official recession period declared by the the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) from January 2007 to June 2009. The general form of the
multifactor model is the following:
RCB,t = α +
M∑
i=1
βiFi,t + βrRECt + εt, (3.2)
where RCB,t is convertible bond portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate, α is an
intercept coefficient, βi are factor loadings, RECt is the NBER recession dummy variable,
εt is the regression residual, and Fi,t are factor returns such that
M∑
i=1
βiFi,t = β1EMKTt + β2TERMt + β3DEFt + β4VIXt, (3.3)
4The risk-free rate comes originally from Ibbotson Associates. The K. French data library is available
at: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
5Data are publicly available from www.cboe.com.
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where EMKTt is the excess equity market return, TERMt is the term spread, DEFt is the
default spread, and VIXt is the monthly change in the VIX index.
The most significant factor is the equity market factor, with estimated market betas
of 0.63 and 0.58 for the equally weighted and value-weighted portfolios, respectively. This
result is consistent with our intuition that equity risk is a major source of risk for a convert-
ible bond investor. The default spread is another significant factor for convertible bonds
because credit risk is a natural source of risk for a fixed-income security. The default spread
beta is estimated to be equal to 0.68 (0.77) for the equally weighted (value-weighted) port-
folio. The estimated coefficients of the default spread dramatically increase in the model
specification with the recession dummy to 1.47 (1.59) for the equally weighted (value-
weighted) portfolio. Therefore, the sensitivity of convertible bond returns to a widening
credit spread increases during the recession. The recession negatively affects convertible
bond returns, as indicated by the statistically significant negative coefficient on the reces-
sion dummy variable. Contemporaneous returns of individual bonds are negative during
the recession due to the deterioration of macroeconomic conditions and the decrease in
equity prices. Both high-delta convertible bonds and high-yield junk bonds are negatively
affected: the former due to the fall in equity prices and the latter due to the deterioration
of convertible bond creditworthiness. Comparing the coefficients for the value-weighted
and equally weighted portfolios, it is worth noting that the equity market beta is lower
and the credit spread beta is higher for convertible bonds with a larger market capitaliza-
tion. Interest-rate risk reflected in the government bond spread is insignificantly negative.
The volatility factor is also found to be insignificantly negative in this linear regression
framework. Nonetheless, we use all conventional factors to control for the systematic risk
premium in the regression analysis in this paper.
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3.3.3 Hedge Fund Demand for Convertible Bonds
We act under the assumption that the demand for convertible bonds is driven by convertible
arbitrage hedge funds. This assumption is based on the facts reported by Mitchell et al.
(2007), Choi et al. (2009), and Choi et al. (2010). However, the assumption of homogenous
demand can be considered as a limitation of the empirical analysis since the magnitude
of the price-pressure impact depends on the validity of this assumption. Nonetheless, we
argue that the major source of convertible bond capital is provided by hedge funds, at least
in the first decade of the twenty-first century, in which our sample period from October
2002 to September 2009 is included.
The hedge fund data source is the TASS Lipper Hedge Fund Database. The data
include information about monthly returns, assets under management, and different hedge
fund characteristics. The data contain both live and graveyard hedge funds. Hedge funds
are divided into ten primary investment categories, one of which is convertible arbitrage.
The CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund Style indices aggregate the returns and assets under
management (AUM) of hedge funds for each investment strategy. The style index aims to
be a representation of the hedge fund strategy universe and covers approximately 85% of
the AUM in each investment category, according to the CSFB description.6
We use the CSFB/Tremont Convertible Arbitrage Hedge Fund Index in order to mea-
sure hedge fund demand. An alternative method would be to use the individual hedge fund
flows and compute the aggregate measure. However, we choose to use the index data to
ensure representativeness of convertible arbitrage hedge funds. The demand is measured
by hedge fund flows, calculated from return and assets under management by the following
formula:
Flowst+1 =
AUMt+1 − (1 +Rt)AUMt
AUMt
, (3.4)
where AUMt is assets under management at month t and Rt is the hedge fund return during
6Descriptions of the CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund indices are publicly available at www.hedgeindex.com.
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month t (observable at the beginning of month t + 1). This definition of flows is widely
accepted and used in the literature.7 Basic descriptive statistics of flows are presented in
panel C of Table 3.1.
Following Baquero and Verbeek (2009), we assume that flows are predictable and per-
sistent over time. Hence, we can separate expected and unexpected flows. We apply the
simple autoregressive prediction process AR(p) for flows and estimate the residuals from
the following time-series regression:
Flowst = γ0 +
p∑
i=1
γiFlowst−i + ε̂t. (3.5)
The number of lags is chosen according to the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC)8 and is
equal to four.9 The regression residuals represent hedge fund demand innovation,10 which
is the unexpected portion of the total hedge fund demand for convertible bonds.
The regression output appears in panel A of Table 3.4. The adjusted R2 coefficient of
the AR(4) regression is 0.44, and all individual lag coefficients are statistically significant.
Panel B of Table 3.4 reports the pairwise Pearson, Kendall, and Spearman correlation
coefficients between hedge fund demand surprise and conventional convertible bond risk
factors. We find a positive Pearson correlation of hedge fund demand with the equity
market factor of 0.24 and a negative correlation with the default spread of −0.28. On
the one hand, a widening credit spread during recession negatively affects the buying
opportunities for convertible bonds. The demand for convertible bonds shrinks due to the
increase in credit risk. On the other hand, the demand for convertible bonds increases
7For example, see Fung et al. (2008).
8We chose the AIC as the most widely known and used model selection criterion.
9A conventional way to preprocess fund flows in the literature is to apply moving average smoothing.
Fung et al. (2008) and Ozik and Sadka (2010) use the arithmetic sum of the prior three months’ flows.
Our AR(4) model essentially provides a similar preprocessing of the flows. The residuals from the AR(4)
process applied to the raw flows and the AR(1) process applied to MA(3)-smoothed flows have a correlation
of 0.8.
10The terms hedge fund demand innovation, hedge fund demand shock, hedge fund demand surprise,
and unexpected hedge fund demand are used interchangeably throughout the paper.
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during a bull equity market, which is indicated by a positive correlation with the equity
risk factor. However, the significance of correlations diminishes in the case of alternative
types of correlation that are more robust to outliers. Hence it is likely that the higher
correlation may be attributed to certain time periods (of equity market expansion and
recession with corresponding credit spread widening) within the sample history.
3.3.4 Convertible Bond Mutual Funds
A typical long-only convertible bond portfolio can be represented by the holdings of a
convertible bond mutual fund. As a long-only specialized investor in convertible bonds,
this category of mutual funds is expected to be sensitive to the price-pressure risk factor
generated by convertible arbitrage hedge funds. The data for convertible bond mutual
funds (defined by the Morningstar category as “convertible”) are taken from the Yahoo
Finance Database. Our sample consists of 40 mutual funds with sufficient historical data.
Monthly returns are computed as price differentials adjusted for dividends payments.11
Descriptive statistics of convertible bond mutual funds are reported in panel B of Table
3.1. Average returns of convertible bond mutual funds are 4.8% with a volatility of 14.5%,
and the median returns are 6.3% with a volatility of 12.8%. The average Sharpe ratio
is 0.22, and its median is 0.32. Comparing these numbers with convertible bond returns,
we observe that the median risk-adjusted returns in terms of Sharpe ratio are the same
while the average risk-adjusted returns are lower for convertible mutual funds. Moreover,
contrary to convertible bond returns, convertible bond mutual fund returns are unlikely
to follow the normal distribution because we reject the Jarque-Bera Gaussian distribution
hypothesis based on both average and median values of the Jarque-Bera test statistic.
11The typical mandate of convertible bond mutual funds allows minor holdings in other securities in-
cluding stocks or bonds converted to stocks, and stocks’ dividend payout is a part of the return calculation.
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3.4 Estimating the Price-Pressure Factor
In this section, we examine empirically the impact of hedge fund demand shocks on contem-
poraneous convertible bond returns and construct the price-pressure factor. Furthermore,
we estimate the risk premium for bearing price-pressure risk in convertible bonds. Finally,
we investigate how the price-pressure risk factor affects the monthly returns of convertible
bond mutual funds.
3.4.1 Does Hedge Fund Demand Matter?
Before constructing the price-pressure risk factor, we pose the simple questions of whether a
hedge fund impact exists and, if so, is statistically significant in the time series of convertible
bond returns. We address these questions by regressing the contemporaneous returns of
the equally weighted and value-weighted convertible bond portfolios on hedge fund demand
surprise, controlling for the conventional convertible bond factors. We consider innovations
in flows, inflows (positive net flows), and outflows (negative net flows) separately in different
regression specifications.12 We expect an asymmetry in the magnitude of the impact of
outflow shocks versus inflow shocks, as selling pressure may have a more prominent effect
than buying pressure on convertible bond prices.
The time-series regression model is the following:
RCB,t = α +
M∑
i=1
βiFi,t + βQQt + εt, (3.6)
where RCB,t is the monthly return of the convertible bond portfolio in excess of the risk-free
rate; Qt is the hedge fund demand surprise measured by innovation in flows, inflows, or
outflows; Fi,t are the conventional convertible bond factors; βi are factor loadings; and α
12Positive or negative net flows are not necessarily inflows or outflows; however, we use this terminology
to distinguish the signs of flows.
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is an intercept coefficient.
Table 3.5 reports the regression output. We observe the negative coefficient on the flows’
surprise, which is equal to −0.15 (−0.11) with a t-statistic of −1.57 (−0.11) for the equally
weighted (value-weighted) portfolio. This result may be considered counterintuitive. How-
ever, the impact of inflows’ surprise is insignificant while the coefficient on the outflows’
surprise is highly significant and equals −0.26 (−0.20) with a t-statistic of −2.41 (−1.93)
for the equally weighted (value-weighted) portfolio. The impact of unexpected flows on
contemporaneous convertible bond returns is driven predominately by innovation in out-
flows of capital from convertible arbitrage hedge funds rather than innovation in inflows.
This impact of outflow shocks is so strong that the coefficient on overall flows’ surprise
remains negative even though its statistical significance is weaker compared with outflows.
The impact of surprise in both flows and outflows is weaker for the value-weighted portfo-
lios, indicating that securities with lower market capitalization and lower ex-ante liquidity
are more sensitive to outflow shocks.
To avoid a potential endogeneity bias in the return and flows relationship, we conduct
the Granger causality test for the equally weighted and value-weighted portfolios of con-
vertible bonds versus innovation in flows, inflows, and outflows. The results are reported
in Table 3.6 for six model specifications. The test is conducted for 1 lag and at the 5%
level of significance. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that convertible bond returns do
not cause a surprise in flows for any of these model specifications. However, we reject the
null hypothesis that surprise in flows does not cause convertible bond returns for the value-
weighted portfolios. The results are weaker in the case of equally weighted portfolios, but
the values of the F -statistics are close to the critical value. To sum up, it is unlikely that
convertible bond returns cause flow shocks; however, the opposite direction of causality is
plausible.
The preliminary regression analysis motivates us to use the capital outflow surprise in
modeling the selling pressure generated by convertible arbitrage hedge funds. On the one
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hand, selling pressure may lead to fire sales of convertible bonds, and thus the outflows
measure helps to identify fire-sale risk. On the other hand, the persistence of selling pressure
explains the perceived underpricing puzzle of convertible bonds. We let HFD denote the
surprise in outflows from convertible arbitrage hedge funds.
3.4.2 Price-Pressure Factor
As shown in the previous section, the hedge fund demand innovation HFD has a signifi-
cant negative impact on the contemporaneous returns of convertible bond portfolios, and
this impact is stronger for smaller-cap securities. To measure the price pressure in the
convertible bond market, we sort convertible bonds by their HFD betas and construct the
factor as a factor-mimicking portfolio.
The HFD betas for individual convertible bonds are estimated using OLS for a sam-
ple window of 24 months while controlling for the conventional convertible bond factors.
Control variables allow us to focus on the incremental impact of the hedge fund demand
surprise. The regression equation has the following form:
RCB,t = α +
M∑
i=1
βiFi,t + βHFDHFDt + εt, (3.7)
where RCB,t is the monthly convertible bond return in excess of the risk-free rate at time t,
HFDt is the innovation in outflows from convertible arbitrage hedge funds, α is an intercept
coefficient, βi and βHFD are the factor loadings, and Fi,t are conventional convertible bond
factors: excess equity market return, term spread, default spread, and changes in the VIX
index.
We rank convertible bonds by the value of the t-statistic for the HFD beta estimates.
Ranking by t-statistic rather than by beta values is a more robust approach to the presence
of outliers that cause large but statistically insignificant coefficients. Convertible bonds are
assigned to three quantile portfolios (Q1, Q2, and Q3 ) based on the estimated HFD beta
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with increasing beta t-statistic from the bottom quantile to the top quantile. We chose
three quantiles to have a sufficient number of securities in each portfolio. Thus the factor
portfolio is more diversified and less driven by idiosyncratic sources of risk and return. The
quantile portfolios are equally weighted.13 We calculate the post-ranking out-of-sample
monthly returns of the quantile portfolios and the spread return between the top and the
bottom quantile portfolios. The portfolios are rebalanced each month, and the size of the
estimation window for the HFD coefficient remains fixed. The spread represents the return
on a zero-investment portfolio that takes equally weighted long and short positions in the
top and bottom quantiles, respectively. This factor-mimicking portfolio of convertible
bonds defines the price-pressure risk factor.
Panel A of Table 3.7 shows descriptive statistics of the HFD beta-sorted portfolio re-
turns: mean, values of t-statistic and of Newey-West t-statistic adjusted for autocorrelation
and heteroscedasticity, median, maximum, and minimum values, standard deviation, and
skewness and kurtosis coefficients. We observe a monotonically increasing pattern from the
bottom to the top quantile portfolio in the time series of mean values, median values, and
corresponding t-statistic. This pattern allows us to identify the positive spread between
the top and bottom quantile portfolios that implies the existence of a premium for holding
convertible bonds with higher HFD beta. An investor holding convertible bonds requires
higher average returns for holding securities with high HFD beta. The premium is reflected
in the positive return of the spread portfolio. The average value of the price-pressure factor
return equals 0.32 with a t-statistic of 1.39 (1.07 for the Newey-West t-statistic), which
is higher than corresponding values of t-statistics for the quantile portfolios. We consider
these values of the t-statistic adequate to identify the price-pressure effect given the rel-
atively short time period of the sample. However, it is worth examining the t-statistic
relative to alternative systematic risk factors that we present in Table 3.8.
Panel B of Table 3.7 reports the characteristics of the constituents of the HFD beta-
13The results for value-weighted quantile portfolios are presented in the robustness check section.
129
sorted portfolios. First, we estimate the post-ranking HFD betas of the quantile portfolios.
The HFD beta increases from −1.14 in the bottom quantile to 1.20 in the top quantile
and is highly significant in both extreme quantiles. This observation is consistent with
the ex-ante choice of convertible bonds in the quantile portfolios. Delta, the measure of
equity sensitivity, is slightly decreasing. The bottom quantile portfolio is characterized by
a high interest-rate spread.14 We find a hump-shaped pattern in market capitalization.
Small-cap convertible bonds usually have significant HFD betas while large-cap securities
are not sensitive to hedge fund demand shocks. This phenomenon may be also linked to
liquidity, as convertible bonds with large market capitalization are ex ante more liquid
securities.15 Therefore price-pressure risk is more relevant for small-cap convertible bond
issues.
Table 3.8 reports the time-series estimates of factor exposures for the HFD beta-sorted
portfolios and the price-pressure-factor-mimicking portfolio. Absence of significant expo-
sures to convertible bond factors would indicate the existence of a risk premium orthogonal
to these alternative sources of risk. Panel A of Table 3.8 reports the regression coefficients
of the four-factor model with conventional convertible bond factors: excess equity market
return, term spread, default spread, and changes in the VIX index. Panel B of Table 3.8
reports regression coefficients for the one-factor CAPM setting with only the equity market
factor. All factor exposures except the equity market exposures are insignificant for the
price-pressure factor. In the case of the four-factor regression, the equity market factor is
statistically significant for the quantile portfolios, but the statistical significance (t-statistic
of −1.72) drops for the price-pressure factor. The estimates of the intercept coefficient for
the price-pressure factor are positive and statistically significant: 1.02 with a t-statistic
of 2.35 for the four-factor regression and 0.72 with a t-statistic of 2.3 for the one-factor
14The interest-rate spread is defined as the difference between the coupon rate of the convertible bond
and the risk-free rate. It captures both term spread and default spread.
15The relationship between the price-pressure factor and the market-wide liquidity factor is a subject of
future research.
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regression. Therefore we conclude that the premium attributed to price pressure cannot
be fully captured by the equity market premium or alternative factors.
3.4.3 Price-Pressure Premium Estimation
In this section we estimate the premium attributed to the price-pressure factor using the
two-stage regression procedure pioneered by Fama and MacBeth (1973).16 The objec-
tive of the Fama-Macbeth approach is to quantitatively estimate the magnitude of the
risk premium associated with a particular factor and the pricing error of the multifactor
model. The two-pass procedure combines estimating the factor exposures from time-series
regressions with estimating the risk premia from cross-sectional regressions. Applying this
procedure, we first investigate whether adding the price-pressure risk factor brings an added
value to the pricing of convertible bonds and decreases the pricing error of a multifactor
model; second, we measure the premium attributable to the price-pressure factor relative
to conventional factors.
First, we create a set of test portfolios of convertible bonds, for which we run the
Fama-MacBeth regressions. We avoid testing on individual securities because estimates
of factor exposures for portfolios are more likely to be statistically significant and stable
over time. We apply a simultaneous 3× 3 double-sorting procedure such that convertible
bonds are sorted on the one hand by the HFD beta and on the other hand by their market
capitalization. We use 24-month rolling time-series regressions to estimate the HFD beta.
The sample length of 24 months remains fixed. The returns of test portfolios are computed
outside of the estimation window. This formation procedure for the test portfolios allows
us to smooth the individual characteristics of convertible bonds and to avoid the formation
of similar portfolios with index-like behavior that might occur if the sampling were done
randomly. As a robustness check, we also create a similar sorting procedure based on
16Refer to Cochrane (2005) for full details of asset pricing tests including the Fama-MacBeth approach
or to the recent survey of empirical cross-sectional asset pricing by Goyal (2012).
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convertible bond delta.
There are two stages in the Fama-Macbeth procedure. In the first stage, we obtain the
estimates of factor exposures from N time-series regressions, where N is the number of
test portfolios. In each regression, the contemporaneous returns of the convertible bond
portfolios in excess of the risk-free rate are regressed on the returns of K risk factors:
Rnt = an +
K∑
k=1
βn,kFt,k + ε
n
t , for each n ∈ {1, ..., N}, (3.8)
where Rnt is the excess return of the n
th test portfolio at time t, an is the time-series
intercept, βn,k is a factor exposure for the n
th test portfolio and the kth factor, Ft,k is the
kth factor return at time t, and εnt is the regression residual for the n
th regression.
In the second stage, we conduct T cross-sectional regressions using the matrix βn,k
of estimated factor exposures as a regressor matrix in each regression. The regression
specification is as follows:
Rtn = λ
t
0 +
K∑
k=1
βn,kλ
t
k + α
t, for each t ∈ {1, ..., T}, (3.9)
where T is the size of the sample (excluding the first 24 months, when returns of the test
portfolios sorted by HFD beta are unavailable), Rtn and βn,k are as in equation (3.8), λ
t
k is
the estimated risk premium at time t for the kth factor, λt0 is an intercept term at time t to
denote the zero-beta rate in excess of the risk-free rate, and αt is a residual that denotes
the pricing error at time t. The cross-sectional regressions are run using OLS. The factor
risk premia λ̂k and the pricing errors of the model α̂ are computed as time-series averages:
λ̂k =
1
T
T∑
t=1
λ̂tk and α̂ =
1
T
T∑
t=1
α̂t. (3.10)
The variances of the estimates λ̂k and α̂ are computed as the variances of the average
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estimates as follows:
var(λ̂k) =
1
T 2
T∑
t=1
(λ̂tk − λ̂k)(λ̂tk − λ̂k)′ and var(α̂) =
1
T 2
T∑
t=1
(α̂t − α̂)(α̂t − α̂)′. (3.11)
To account for possible autocorrelation in risk premium estimates, we also adjust the
statistics by the Newey-West corrections.
The results of the second-stage estimation are displayed in Table 3.9. We run regressions
for two model specifications: the one-factor CAPM with the equity market factor (model
I) and the four-factor convertible bond model (model III). Both models are augmented
by adding the price-pressure factor (models II and IV). We find negative equity premia
in convertible bond returns and a positive default premium. The price-pressure premium
is positive and equal to 0.38 regardless of the multifactor benchmark model. Both the
intercept term and the equity premia are highly statistically significant for all model speci-
fications except model IV. In the case of model IV (the four-factor model augmented by the
price-pressure factor), the statistical significance of the intercept and equity premium de-
creases. Generally, the statistical significance of the price-pressure and default premia are
lower than the equity market premium; however, the relative magnitude of the t-statistic
is comparable between these two premia. Furthermore, we observe that the addition of the
price-pressure factor to the multifactor model improves the average explanatory power of
the second-stage regressions from 0.07 to 0.44 in models I and II and from 0.07 to 0.16 in
models III and IV. Table 3.9 provides evidence that, first, the premium attributed to price
pressure does not depend on conventional convertible bond factor premia, and second,
that it is not negligible relative to alternative factors even in the small sample of given test
portfolios.
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3.4.4 Convertible Bond Mutual Funds and Price-Pressure Factor
If price pressure is a priced risk factor for convertible bonds, it should appear as an attribute
of risk modeling for any convertible bond investor. We test the hypothesis of a missing risk
factor for U.S. convertible bond mutual funds. Table 3.10 presents OLS regressions of the
equally weighted portfolio returns of convertible bond mutual funds on the price-pressure
risk factor. We consider the ability of different benchmark models to explain the returns
of convertible bond mutual funds. Panel A shows the one-factor CAPM with the equity
market factor and the four-factor convertible bond model with equity market factor, term
spread, default spread, and changes in the VIX index. Panel B shows the standard equity
factor models: the Fama-French factor model with equity market factor, value factor HML
(high minus low), and size factor SMB (small minus big), and the Carhart model with the
additional equity momentum factor MOM. All these benchmark models are augmented by
adding the previously constructed price-pressure factor PP and the price-pressure factor
conditional on the post-Lehman period PP ·PL: the dummy variable for the post-Lehman
period from September 2008 to March 2009 multiplied by the price-pressure factor. By
adding the latter variable, we identify the selling pressure on convertible bonds, particularly
during the 2008 financial crisis.
Adding the price-pressure factor significantly improves, in fact almost doubles, the
explanatory power of all regression models: from 0.12 to 0.26 in the case of the four-factor
convertible bond model in panel A and from 0.17 to 0.29 in the case of the Carhart model
in panel B. The price pressure coefficient is highly statistically significant and around −0.9
for all models. The post-Lehman period is the most prominent example of selling pressure
in convertible bonds. We find that the coefficient on the conditional price pressure is
significant, and the value is estimated to be in the range of −1.7 to −2.3. Moreover, the
adjusted R2 coefficient increases to 0.35.
In conclusion, we find that traditional equity, bond, and volatility factors poorly explain
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the performance of convertible bond mutual funds due to the peculiarities of the convertible
bond market. By contrast, the proposed price-pressure risk factor captures a significant
portion of convertible bond returns and can improve on the existing benchmark risk model.
The negative sign on mutual funds’ exposure toward the price-pressure factor indicates
hedge fund selling pressure. The contemporaneous returns of convertible bond mutual
funds as representative long-only portfolios are affected by the underpricing phenomenon
of convertible bonds caused by hedge fund selling pressure.
3.4.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our results. We first consider an alternative
portfolio formation method to construct the price-pressure factor using value-weighted
HFD beta-sorted quantile portfolios. Table 3.11 describes the statistics of the quantile
portfolios and the price-pressure factor return. The mean return of the spread portfolio
is higher than for the equally weighted portfolio and equals 0.71 with a t-statistic of 2.07.
We confirm the positive significant spread and the increasing pattern in quantile portfolio
returns from the bottom quantile to the top quantile. The post-ranking HFD betas in the
top and bottom value-weighted quantile portfolios are higher in absolute value than for
the equally weighted quantile portfolios. This finding confirms the observation that larger
market-cap convertible bonds are less sensitive to hedge fund demand shocks.
Table 3.12 reports the exposures of the quantile portfolios and the price-pressure factor
to alternative risk factors: four conventional bond factors in panel A and a univariate
equity market factor in panel B. The only statistically significant exposure for the price-
pressure factor is the equity market exposure, which can be explained by the fact that large
market-cap convertible bonds are contained in the extreme quantile portfolios and simple
value-weighted positioning does not completely eliminate the equity market exposure. The
intercept coefficient of the price-pressure factor is highly significant and equals 1.32. It
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is slightly higher than the corresponding value for the price-pressure factor based on the
equally weighted quantile portfolio.
Table 3.13 reports the regression analysis for convertible bond mutual funds. As in
Table 3.10, we regress the portfolio returns of convertible bond mutual funds on the price-
pressure risk factor while controlling for the benchmark factors. Panel A of Table 3.13
reports regression coefficients using the equity market factor and the conventional convert-
ible bond factors as benchmark models. Panel B of Table 3.13 reports regression coefficients
using the Fama-French factors and the momentum factor as benchmark models. The over-
all fit of the linear model for convertible bond mutual funds is improved by augmenting
the factor model with the price-pressure risk factor. We also observe the negative exposure
to selling pressure, but it is weaker than in the case of the price-pressure factor based on
the equally weighted quantile portfolios.
In addition to using a different portfolio formation rule in constructing the price-
pressure factor, we also consider the impact of changing the length of the estimation window
to 36 months.17 The results are consistent with those presented in Section 3.4, indicating
the economic significance of the findings throughout the paper. However, the statistical
significance is on average slightly lower. The weak statistical significance is a natural con-
sequence of the relatively short time period of the data sample available for the empirical
analysis.
Our final robustness check is to investigate the impact of changes in the formation of
the test portfolios for the Fama-Macbeth procedure. Table 3.14 documents the results of
estimating the price-pressure premium for the portfolios double-sorted by HFD beta and
delta. The results are very similar to those in Table 3.9. The price-pressure premium is
estimated to be 0.34 for the four-factor model with conventional convertible bond factors
and 0.46 for the one-factor CAPM setting.
17The results are available upon request.
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the impact of demand shocks on the risk and return of con-
vertible bonds. The convertible bond market is characterized by a relatively homogeneous
demand that is primarily driven by convertible arbitrage hedge funds. Arbitrageurs in
this niche market create persistent selling pressure on convertible bond prices. Our paper
empirically tests the hedge fund price-pressure hypothesis as an explanation for the puzzle
of convertible bond underpricing.
Demand shocks are measured by innovations in aggregate outflows of convertible arbi-
trage hedge funds. Using the estimated sensitivities of convertible bond returns to hedge
fund demand innovations, we construct a new convertible bond risk factor associated with
hedge fund price pressure. The time-series average return of the price-pressure factor is
positive, indicating the existence of a positive premium for holding securities whose prices
are sensitive to demand shocks. Further, we apply the Fama-Macbeth procedure to es-
timate the price-pressure factor premium for the set of convertible bond portfolios and
discover that it is positive and non-negligible relative to conventional risk factors. Finally,
we show that convertible bond mutual funds have significant exposures to price-pressure
risk. The existence of hedge fund selling pressure adversely affects contemporaneous re-
turns of convertible bond mutual funds.
This paper ought to be of use to long-only convertible bond investors, who should be
aware of the existence of hedge fund price pressure. Adding price-pressure risk provides
value in spanning the space of convertible bond risk factors. The robustness of the re-
sults is supported by variations in the definition of the price-pressure factor, such as using
the value-weighted method of factor-mimicking portfolio formation instead of the equally
weighted method, alternative estimation windows for the hedge fund demand beta, and
market- and cap-sorted convertible bond test portfolios versus delta-sorted test portfolios in
the Fama-Macbeth estimation of the price-pressure premium. Thus, the paper establishes
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the economic significance of the impact of price pressure on convertible bonds. However,
its statistical significance could be improved by analyzing a longer-time, higher-frequency
sample of convertible bonds and convertible bond mutual funds, a subject for future re-
search.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for monthly returns of convertible bonds (panel A), monthly returns
of convertible bond mutual funds (panel B), and monthly convertible arbitrage hedge fund flows (panel
C). Panel A and panel B report cross-sectional mean, median, and standard deviation of the annualized
returns, standard deviation, Sharpe ratio, skewness, kurtosis, and Jarque-Bera statistic (JB = 0 if the Null
that the distribution is Gaussian cannot be rejected vs. JB = 1 if the Null is rejected at the 5% significance
level). Panel C reports time-series mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and Jarque-Bera statistic
of convertible arbitrage hedge fund flows. The sample period is from October 2002 to August 2009.
Panel A Mean Median Std Dev
Return 10.58 6.59 22.54
Std Dev 22.31 18.30 17.10
Sharpe 0.45 0.30 0.92
Skewness −0.16 −0.29 0.76
Kurtosis 3.22 2.90 1.64
JB 0.38 0.00 0.49
JB p-value 0.16 0.08 0.18
JB-stat 12.16 3.56 67.32
Panel B Mean Median Std Dev
Return 4.77 6.31 4.84
Std Dev 14.47 12.78 3.56
Sharpe 0.22 0.32 0.27
Skewness −1.00 −1.03 0.27
Kurtosis 3.37 3.73 0.83
JB 1.00 1.00 0.00
JB p-value 0.01 0.01 0.01
JB-stat 15.32 14.44 6.61
Panel C Flows
Mean −0.007
Std Dev 0.14
Skewness −0.64
Kurtosis 2.09
JB 1.00
JB p-value 0.02
JB-stat 7.47
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Table 3.2: Properties of convertible bonds. The table reports convertible bonds’ characteristics for each
year from October 2002 to September 2009 (2002 includes 3 months and 2009 includes 9 months): aver-
age number of convertible bonds in the sample (NumofCB); cross-sectional mean of annualized monthly
returns in percentage points (Return); 12-month average of annualized cross-sectional standard devia-
tion in percentage points (CSStd); cross-sectional mean of annualized 12-month standard deviation in
percentage points (12mthStd); average delta of convertible bonds in percentage points (Delta); average
implied volatility in percentage points (ImplVol); average market capitalization of convertible bonds in
USD mn (MktCap); and 12-month average of total market capitalization of convertible bonds in USD bn
(TotalMktCap).
NumofCB Return CSStd 12mthStd Delta ImplVol MktCap TotalMktCap
2002 292 32 35 21 40 46 583 179
2003 284 22 19 14 49 38 612 189
2004 254 13 22 17 55 31 636 173
2005 239 4 16 14 56 27 630 163
2006 250 10 17 13 61 28 671 178
2007 254 5 19 15 62 28 789 214
2008 238 −37 30 33 49 42 798 197
2009 189 47 29 22 43 51 692 136
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Table 3.3: Conventional multifactor convertible bond model for the equally weighted and value-weighted
portfolios. The factors are the following: EMKT is the excess equity market return (value-weighted return
on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus 1-month T-bill rate), TERM is the term spread between
10-year and 1-year Treasury yields, DEF is the default spread between Baa and Aaa Moody’s corporate
bond yields, VIX is the monthly percent change in the VIX index, and REC is a dummy variable on the
NBER recession period from January 2007 through June 2009. The t-statistics appear in parentheses.
Two stars denote a 5% level of significance. One star denotes a 10% level of significance.
Equally weighted Value-weighted
I II I II
Const −0.67 −1.20∗ −0.66 −1.21∗∗
(−1.17) (−1.87) (−1.26) (−2.06)
EMKT 0.63∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.55∗∗
(8.66) (8.03) (8.74) (8.09)
TERM −0.03 −0.02 0.00 0.00
(−0.13) (−0.12) (−0.01) (0.01)
DEF 0.72∗ 1.47∗∗ 0.82∗∗ 1.59∗∗
(1.68) (2.43) (2.07) (2.86)
VIX −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(−0.80) (−0.94) (−0.85) (−1.01)
REC — −1.56∗ — −1.60∗
— (−1.73) — (−1.94)
Adj R2 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.68
141
Table 3.4: Hedge fund demand surprise. HFD is defined as OLS residuals from an autoregressive
process AR(4) for convertible arbitrage hedge fund outflows. Panel A reports regression coefficients with
t-statistics in parentheses and regression diagnostic results. Panel B reports the correlation matrix between
hedge fund demand surprise and conventional convertible bond factors: EMKT is the excess equity market
return, TERM is the term spread between 10-year and 1-year Treasury yields, DEF is the default spread
between Moody’s Baa and Aaa corporate bond yields, and VIX is the monthly change in the VIX index.
Panel A Coefficient
Const −0.58∗
(−1.94)
Outflows(-1) 0.40∗∗
(3.93)
Outflows(-2) 0.06
(0.64)
Outflows(-3) 0.58∗∗
(6.16)
Outflows(-4) −0.43∗∗
(−4.11)
Adj R2 0.44
Log-Likelihood −177.00
Durbin-Watson 1.87
AIC 4.61
F -statistic 16.28
Panel B
Pearson Correlation EMKT TERM DEF VIX HFD
EMKT 1.00 0.00 −0.16 −0.66 0.24
TERM 0.00 1.00 0.35 −0.12 −0.08
DEF −0.16 0.35 1.00 −0.11 −0.28
VIX −0.66 −0.12 −0.11 1.00 −0.11
HFD 0.24 −0.08 −0.28 −0.11 1.00
Kendall Correlation EMKT TERM DEF VIX HFD
EMKT 1.00 0.04 0.02 −0.47 −0.04
TERM 0.04 1.00 0.19 −0.06 −0.03
DEF 0.02 0.19 1.00 −0.06 0.07
VIX −0.47 −0.06 −0.06 1.00 0.04
HFD −0.04 −0.03 0.07 0.04 1.00
Spearman Correlation EMKT TERM DEF VIX HFD
EMKT 1.00 0.07 0.01 −0.65 −0.05
TERM 0.07 1.00 0.30 −0.09 −0.04
DEF 0.01 0.30 1.00 −0.09 0.08
VIX −0.65 −0.09 −0.09 1.00 0.06
HFD −0.05 −0.04 0.08 0.06 1.00
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Table 3.5: Impact of unexpected (surprise) flows, inflows, and outflows on the returns of equally weighted
and value-weighted portfolios of convertible bonds. The table reports OLS coefficients from time-series
regressions of convertible bond portfolio returns on conventional convertible bond factors: EMKT is the
excess equity market return (value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus
the 1-month T-bill rate); TERM is the interest-rate spread between 10-year and 1-year Treasury yields;
DEF is the default spread between Moody’s Baa and Aaa corporate bond yields; and VIX is the monthly
change in the VIX index. We augment this regression by adding the surprise flows, inflows, and outflows
SurF. Surprise is defined as OLS residuals of the autoregressive process AR(p), where the number of lags
p is chosen according to the AIC. The t-statistics appear in parentheses.
Equally weighted Value-weighted
Flows Inflows Outflows Flows Inflows Outflows
Const −0.08 −0.25 0.03 −0.12 −0.24 −0.04
(−0.15) (−0.43) (0.05) (−0.22) (−0.45) (−0.07)
EMKT 0.65∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.60∗∗
(8.90) (8.62) (9.20) (8.89) (8.69) (9.09)
TERM −0.13 −0.12 −0.12 −0.11 −0.10 −0.10
(−0.66) (−0.62) (−0.63) (−0.57) (−0.54) (−0.54)
DEF 0.55 0.68 0.44 0.67∗ 0.77∗ 0.59
(1.28) (1.58) (1.03) (1.69) (1.94) (1.50)
VIX −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02
(−0.73) (−0.80) (−0.83) (−0.79) (−0.85) (−0.88)
SurF −0.14 0.01 −0.26∗∗ −0.11 0.00 −0.20∗
(−1.57) (0.06) (−2.41) (−1.32) (−0.02) (−1.93)
Adj R2 0.66 0.65 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.67
Table 3.6: Granger causality test. This table reports test statistics and critical values for the Granger
causality test between surprise in flows, inflows, and outflows and the returns on equally weighted and
value-weighted portfolios of convertible bonds. Granger causality is tested with 1 lag and a 5% significance
level. F and G are the values of the F -statistic of the Granger test. CV is the critical value from the
F -distribution. Rule: if F > CV, then we reject the null hypothesis that convertible bond returns do not
cause flows; if G > CV, then we reject the null hypothesis that flows do not cause convertible bond returns.
Equally weighted Value-weighted
Flows Inflows Outflows Flows Inflows Outflows
CV 3.96 3.96 3.96 3.96 3.96 3.96
F 0.62 1.43 1.52 0.39 1.35 1.20
G 2.90 3.66 3.60 4.47 4.31 4.86
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Table 3.7: Descriptive statistics of HFD beta-sorted quantile portfolios of convertible bonds. The
portfolio returns are the post-ranking out-of-sample next-month returns of the equally weighted portfolio
with monthly rebalancing. The HFD beta is estimated using a fixed sample window of 24 months. HFD
is the surprise in convertible arbitrage hedge fund outflows. The bottom quantile Q1 contains convertible
bonds with the lowest sensitivity while the top quantile Q3 contains convertible bonds with the highest
sensitivity. The price-pressure factor return (PP) is defined as the return spread between the top and
bottom quantiles. The t-statistics and the Newey-West t-statistics (NW) are reported in parentheses.
Panel A presents the distributional characteristics of the three quantile portfolios and the price-pressure
factor return. Panel B presents the average characteristics of a convertible bond included in each of
the three quantile portfolios: HFD beta and its Newey-West t-statistic, equity market delta, volatility,
interest-rate spread, and market capitalization.
Panel A Q1 Q2 Q3 PP
Mean 0.22 0.47 0.55 0.32
NW t-stat (0.30) (0.68) (0.99) (1.07)
t-stat (0.41) (0.84) (1.17) (1.39)
Median 0.50 0.93 0.70 0.43
Max 11.97 9.73 7.30 3.91
Min −20.26 −18.52 −16.76 −6.74
Std Dev 4.20 4.27 3.59 1.79
Skewness −1.84 −1.72 −1.91 −0.79
Kurtosis 12.15 9.34 10.85 5.72
Panel B Q1 Q2 Q3
βHFD −1.14∗∗ 0.00 1.21∗∗
NW t-stat (−3.09) (−0.02) (2.64)
Delta 57.47 55.38 54.74
Hist Volatility 32.63 32.07 32.16
Spread 275.17 246.22 218.98
Market Cap 770.57 807.67 763.93
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Table 3.8: OLS estimates of risk exposures for the HFD beta-sorted quantile portfolios (Q1 stands for
the bottom quantile, Q2 for the middle quantile, and Q3 for the top quantile) and the price-pressure
factor (PP), defined as the return spread between the top and bottom quantile portfolios. Newey-West
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Two stars denote a 5% level of significance. One star denotes a
10% level of significance. Panel A reports the results for the four-factor convertible bond model. Panel B
reports the results for the one-factor CAPM.
Panel A Q1 Q2 Q3 PP
Const −1.23∗∗ −0.65 −0.21 1.02∗∗
(−2.72) (−1.15) (−0.35) (2.35)
EMKT 0.66∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.56∗∗ −0.11∗
(3.97) (3.27) (3.28) (−1.72)
TERM −0.06 −0.12 −0.30 −0.24
(−0.19) (−0.32) (−0.96) (−1.33)
DEF 1.00∗ 0.78 0.70 −0.30
(1.72) (1.10) (0.93) (−0.67)
VIX −0.02 −0.04 −0.01 0.00
(−0.75) (−1.61) (−0.52) (0.44)
Adj R2 0.63 0.60 0.62 0.08
Panel B Q1 Q2 Q3 PP
Const 0.04 0.29 0.75∗∗ 0.72∗∗
(0.08) (0.87) (3.12) (2.30)
EMKT 0.71∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.52∗∗ −0.19∗∗
(5.47) (4.12) (5.84) (−2.71)
Adj R2 0.57 0.53 0.59 0.11
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Table 3.9: Fama-Macbeth estimates of price-pressure factor premia. The test portfolios are double-sorted
by HFD beta and by convertible bond market capitalization. Values of the t-statistics and Newey-West
t-statistics (NW) appear in parentheses. Two stars denote a 5% level of statistical significance. One star
denotes a 10% level of statistical significance. Model I reports the premium estimates in the context of
the one-factor CAPM, and Model II augments the CAPM by adding the price-pressure factor. Model III
reports the premium estimates in the context of a four-factor convertible bond model (CB model). Model
IV augments the four-factor convertible bond model by adding the price-pressure factor.
CAPM CB model
I II III IV
λ0 2.87
∗∗ 2.89∗∗ 2.99∗∗ 2.26∗
t-stat (4.12) (3.78) (3.44) (1.92)
NW t-stat (2.92) (2.64) (2.66) (1.92)
λEMKT −3.85∗∗ −3.88∗∗ −4.38∗∗ −3.19
t-stat (−2.93) (−2.72) (−3.03) (−1.60)
NW t-stat (−2.03) (−2.03) (−2.01) (−1.48)
λTERM — — 0.38 0.41
t-stat — — (0.81) (0.86)
NW t-stat — — (0.76) (0.81)
λDEF — — 0.28 0.38
∗
t-stat — — (1.32) (1.83)
NW t-stat — — (1.12) (1.61)
λV IX — — 3.91 2.95
t-stat — — (0.95) (0.67)
NW t-stat — — (1.10) (0.82)
λPP — 0.38 — 0.38
t-stat — (1.35) — (1.55)
NW t-stat — (1.16) — (1.26)
Adj R2 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.16
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Table 3.10: Impact of price pressure on convertible bond mutual funds. This table presents OLS
regressions of the equally weighted portfolio returns of convertible bond mutual funds on the price-pressure
risk factor PP and PP·PL (where PL is a dummy variable for the post-Lehman period from September 2008
to March 2009), controlling for conventional convertible bond factors. Panel A shows the results for the
CAPM and the four-factor convertible bond model. Panel B presents similar results for the Fama-French
and Carhart models. The t-statistics appear in parentheses.
Panel A CAPM CB model
I II III I II III
Const 0.26 0.41 0.56 −0.74 0.02 −0.77
(0.71) (0.90) (1.30) (−0.84) (0.02) (−0.80)
EMKT 0.28∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.12 0.23∗∗ 0.13 0.10
(3.49) (2.01) (1.25) (2.01) (0.99) (0.86)
TERM — — — 0.10 −0.44 −0.32
— — — (0.32) (−0.85) (−0.66)
DEF — — — 0.67 0.74 1.36
— — — (1.01) (0.84) (1.62)
VIX — — — −0.03 −0.03 −0.02
— — — (−0.96) (−0.87) (−0.47)
PP — −0.94∗∗ −0.69∗∗ — −0.91∗∗ −0.56∗∗
— (−3.57) (−2.67) — (−3.31) (−2.04)
PP ·PL — — −1.98∗∗ — — −2.28∗∗
— — (−2.97) — — (−3.23)
Adj R2 0.12 0.26 0.35 0.12 0.25 0.36
Panel B Fama-French Carhart
I II III I II III
Const 0.40 0.51 0.61 0.40 0.52 0.60
(1.10) (1.15) (1.44) (1.09) (1.15) (1.39)
EMKT 0.39∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.19
(4.46) (2.85) (1.92) (3.84) (2.76) (1.59)
SMB −0.32∗ −0.17 −0.09 −0.32∗ −0.16 −0.10
(−1.89) (−0.74) (−0.44) (−1.86) (−0.72) (−0.47)
HML −0.29∗∗ −0.39∗∗ −0.30∗ −0.29∗∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.33∗
(−2.05) (−2.25) (−1.81) (−2.04) (−2.08) (−1.88)
MOM — — — −0.01 0.01 −0.05
— — — (−0.17) (0.15) (−0.56)
PP — −0.89∗∗ −0.70∗∗ — −0.91∗∗ −0.64∗∗
— (−3.40) (−2.69) — (−3.24) (−2.24)
PP ·PL — — −1.69∗∗ — — −1.81∗∗
— — (−2.50) — — (−2.54)
Adj R2 0.18 0.31 0.37 0.17 0.29 0.36
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Table 3.11: Robustness check: price-pressure factor based on value-weighted portfolio. Descriptive
statistics of HFD beta-sorted quantile portfolios of convertible bonds. The portfolio returns are the post-
ranking out-of-sample next-month returns of the value-weighted portfolios with monthly rebalancing. The
HFD beta is estimated using a fixed sample window of 24 months. HFD is the surprise in convertible
arbitrage hedge fund outflows. The bottom quantile Q1 contains convertible bonds with the lowest sensi-
tivity while the top quantile Q3 contains convertible bonds with the highest sensitivity. The price-pressure
factor return (PP) is defined as the return spread between the top and bottom quantiles. Values of the
t-statistics and Newey-West t-statistics appear in parentheses. Panel A presents the distributional charac-
teristics of the three quantile portfolios and the price-pressure factor return; panel B presents the average
characteristics of a convertible bond included in each of the three quantile portfolios: HFD beta and its
Newey-West t-statistic, equity market delta, volatility, interest-rate spread, and market capitalization.
Panel A Q1 Q2 Q3 PP
Mean 0.29 0.54 1.01∗∗ 0.71∗∗
NW t-stat (0.37) (0.91) (1.84) (1.62)
t-stat (0.49) (1.04) (2.35) (2.07)
Median 0.35 1.08 1.13 0.78
Max −19.59 −16.04 −11.15 −8.15
Min −20.26 −18.52 −16.76 −6.74
Std Dev 4.60 4.00 3.29 2.65
Skewness −0.95 −1.35 −0.65 −0.60
Kurtosis 9.47 6.96 5.38 6.21
Panel B Q1 Q2 Q3
βHFD −0.89∗∗ −0.01 0.88∗∗
NW t-stat (−2.79) (−0.07) (2.64)
Delta 57.47 55.38 54.74
Hist Volatility 32.63 32.07 32.16
Spread 275.17 246.22 218.98
Market Cap 770.57 807.67 763.93
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Table 3.12: Robustness check: price-pressure factor based on value-weighted portfolio. The table reports
the OLS estimates of risk exposures for the HFD beta-sorted quantile portfolios (Q1 stands for the bottom
quantile, Q2 for the middle quantile, and Q3 for the top quantile) and the price-pressure factor (PP),
defined as the return spread between the top and bottom quantile portfolios. The portfolio returns are the
post-ranking out-of-sample next-month returns of the value-weighted portfolios with monthly rebalancing.
Newey-West t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Two stars denote a 5% level of significance. One star
denotes a 10% level of significance. Panel A reports the results for the four-factor convertible bond model.
Panel B reports the results for the one-factor CAPM.
Q1 Q2 Q3 PP
Const −1.60∗∗ −0.64 −0.28 1.32∗∗
(−3.22) (−1.06) (−0.53) (2.78)
EMKT 0.68∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.51∗∗ −0.18∗∗
(4.18) (2.75) (3.63) (−2.09)
TERM −0.08 −0.21 −0.27 −0.19
(−0.21) (−0.63) (−0.99) (−0.76)
DEF 1.36∗∗ 0.92 1.08∗ −0.28
(2.33) (1.32) (1.75) (−0.60)
VIX −0.03 −0.05 −0.01 0.01
(−1.06) (−1.45) (−0.53) (0.86)
Adj R2 0.61 0.56 0.62 0.10
Panel B Q1 Q2 Q3 PP
Const 0.04 0.29 0.75∗∗ 0.72∗∗
(0.08) (0.87) (3.12) (2.30)
EMKT 0.71∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.52∗∗ −0.19∗∗
(5.47) (4.12) (5.84) (−2.71)
Adj R2 0.57 0.53 0.59 0.11
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Table 3.13: Robustness check: price-pressure factor based on value-weighted portfolio. The table reports
the impact of the price-pressure factor on the returns of convertible bond mutual funds. The returns of
equally weighted portfolio of mutual funds are regressed on the price-pressure risk factor PP and PP ·PL
(where PL is a dummy variable for the post-Lehman period from September 2008 to March 2009), using
OLS and controlling for conventional convertible bond factors. Panel A shows the results for the CAPM
and the four-factor convertible bond model. Panel B presents similar results for the Fama-French and
Carhart models. The t-statistics appear in parentheses.
Panel A CAPM CB model
I II III I II III
Const 0.26 0.53 0.64 −0.74 −0.17 −0.69
(0.71) (1.12) (1.37) (−0.84) (−0.17) (−0.68)
EMKT 0.28∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.08 0.23∗∗ 0.13 0.06
(3.49) (1.71) (0.72) (2.01) (0.94) (0.45)
TERM — — — 0.10 −0.33 −0.17
— — — (0.32) (−0.63) (−0.33)
DEF — — — 0.67 0.86 1.20
— — — (1.01) (0.96) (1.37)
VIX — — — −0.03 −0.03 −0.02
— — — (−0.96) (−0.76) (−0.47)
PP — −0.60∗∗ −0.45∗∗ — −0.56∗∗ −0.38∗
— (−3.18) (−2.36) — (−2.92) (−1.89)
PP ·PL — — −0.91∗∗ — — −1.07∗∗
— — (−2.14) — — (−2.37)
Adj R2 0.12 0.23 0.28 0.12 0.22 0.28
Panel B Fama-French Carhart
I II III I II III
Const 0.40 0.60 0.67 0.40 0.58 0.65
(1.10) (1.27) (1.45) (1.09) (1.23) (1.39)
EMKT 0.39∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.20 0.38∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.17
(4.46) (2.54) (1.54) (3.84) (2.32) (1.19)
SMB −0.32∗ −0.20 −0.17 −0.32∗ −0.21 −0.18
(−1.89) (−0.88) (−0.74) (−1.86) (−0.90) (−0.78)
HML −0.29∗∗ −0.34∗ −0.28 −0.29∗∗ −0.37∗ −0.32∗
(−2.05) (−1.93) (−1.56) (−2.04) (−1.94) (−1.71)
MOM — — — −0.01 −0.03 −0.07
— — — (−0.17) (−0.38) (−0.77)
PP — −0.53∗∗ −0.43∗∗ — −0.51∗∗ −0.38∗
— (−2.80) (−2.19) — (−2.64) (−1.90)
PP ·PL — — −0.74∗ — — −0.82∗
— — (−1.71) — — (−1.83)
Adj R2 0.18 0.26 0.29 0.17 0.25 0.28
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Table 3.14: Robustness check: Fama-Macbeth estimates of price-pressure factor premia. The price-
pressure factor return is defined as the return spread between the top and bottom equally weighted
quantile portfolios. The test portfolios are double-sorted by the HFD beta and by the convertible bond
delta. Values of the t-statistics and Newey-West t-statistics appear in parentheses. Two stars denote a 5%
level of significance. One star denotes a 10% level of significance. Model I reports the premium estimates
in the context of the one-factor CAPM, and Model II augments the CAPM by adding the price-pressure
factor. Model III reports the premium estimates in the context of a four-factor convertible bond model
(CB model). Model IV augments the four-factor convertible bond model by adding the price-pressure
factor.
CAPM CB model
I II III IV
λ0 0.46 0.14 0.53
∗ −0.07
t-stat (1.42) (0.43) (1.65) (−0.21)
NW t-stat (1.40) (0.39) (1.69) (−0.20)
λEMKT −0.06 0.67 −0.01 0.87
t-stat (−0.07) (0.77) (−0.01) (0.92)
NW t-stat (−0.06) (0.73) (0.00) (0.95)
λTERM — — 0.26 0.47
t-stat — — (0.67) (1.13)
NW t-stat — — (0.60) (0.97)
λDEF — — −0.21 0.17
t-stat — — (−0.97) (0.81)
NW t-stat — — (−0.77) (0.64)
λVIX — — −3.47 −3.78
t-stat — — (−0.66) (−0.72)
NW t-stat — — (−0.76) (−0.83)
λPP — 0.46
∗ — 0.34
t-stat — (1.73) — (1.26)
NW t-stat — (1.28) — (1.03)
Adj R2 0.19 0.29 0.27 0.29
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